

in India, 1779 to 1788. Privately
Munster's copy, 8vo. half bound,
1794



Earl of Munster.



L^t Col. Fitz Clarence.

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TRACTS UPON INDIA, &c.

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WRITTEN BY

1875



MR. JOHN

TRACTS UPON INDIA

SUBSEQUENT OBSERVATIONS

BY

1875

TRACTS UPON INDIA ;

WRITTEN IN THE YEARS,

1779, 1780, AND 1788.

BY

Mr. JOHN SULLIVAN. *K*

WITH

SUBSEQUENT OBSERVATIONS

BY HIM.

LONDON, 1794.

TRACTS FROM INDIA

WRITTEN IN THE YEARS

1773, 1780 AND 1788



INTRODUCTION.

THE following work consists of letters which were presented to his Majesty's Ministers, and to the Court of Directors, in the years 1779, 1780, and 1788, without any intention that they should ever be brought under more general view. But motives of personal respect and regard for the noble Lord lately appointed to the government of India, having induced me to revise those letters, and to collect them together, as forming parts of one general subject ; I have thought it necessary in doing this, to connect them with some events that have taken place since they were written, and which I conceive will be found to elucidate and confirm the information and opinions

that were then submitted for consideration.

The letter which has the first place in this collection, contains, in a reduced form, and with some literal alterations, the substance of three letters that were addressed by me to Lord North in the autumn of 1780, at which time they were written with the design of exciting his Lordship's attention, as the Minister of this country, to the political situation of the British interests in India. I have now divided that letter, in its abridged state, into two parts, for the purpose of connecting with the subjects in each, such observations and reflections, as have suggested themselves to my mind upon a review of them ; and I have introduced immediately after them, a Memoir which I had the honour of presenting to Mr.

Dundas in March, 1788, to which I have also added observations. By this arrangement I have endeavoured to give some degree of unity to the subject of the papers which I had at different times submitted to his Majesty's Ministers upon the political state of India, and upon the relation in which we stood connected with the native Princes of the Peninsula.

With the same view, I have endeavoured to connect the subject of those papers with two letters which I addressed to the Court of Directors in the years 1779 and 1780. The first of those letters was written in the hope, that the description it gave of the ancient usages of the Hindoos, in the settlement and collection of the land revenue; and of the benefits which had been known to have resulted to the public, while those usages were

observed, would induce the India Company, upon principles of policy and of interest, to engraft upon those established usages, a permanent system for the administration of the territorial revenue, instead of the arbitrary and precarious mode then in use. I endeavoured to exemplify my ideas on this subject, by an application of them to that part of our dominion commonly called the Northern Circars. The object of the other letter was, to represent the disadvantages which had arisen under a confined monopoly of the trade with India, and to draw the attention of the Company to what appeared to be the only principle, on which the commercial intercourse between England and India could be maintained, with advantage to both countries.

I feel peculiar satisfaction on now reviewing those papers, to find that ideas which were so many years ago submitted by me to the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers, and of the Court of Directors, have not been contradicted by the extended and improved experience that has since taken place: but that, on the contrary, the sketches which were made in the year 1780, of the political interests of the British nation in India, appear to have received a distinguished elucidation from the negotiations, which in the year 1789, produced the triple alliance, and made the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Mahratta state, parties with us in the late war against Tippoo Sultaun. The operations of that war have not, I conceive, less tended to illustrate

the observations that were submitted by me to Mr. Dundas in 1788, in respect to the relative situation of our force and possessions in Bengal, at Madras, and at Bombay, when compared with the compact and concentrated resources of Tip-poo Sultaun. I am encouraged to advert with some confidence, to the ideas which I suggested to the Court of Directors in 1779, upon the subject of their territorial revenue, from the analogy which I allow myself to hope they will be found to have in principle, to the system that was finally established in Bengal in 1792; with which, while they agree in the essential points of giving the landholders a defined right, and a secured possession, they differ in modifications, which local circumstance suggested. A difference consisting rather in a ques-

tion of policy, as to the time and manner of introducing the system in all its extent (and therefore depending on the state of improvement in the country, the extent of information we may be possessed of, and the disposition of the people), than affecting the principle on which that system is founded. In the explanatory observations I have thought it necessary to represent, at some length, the importance of attending to this difference in the application of the system to our possessions on the Coast of Coromandel, where neither the people nor the country are in a state that would render it prudent or advisable to introduce it suddenly; and where, I apprehend, we have yet to acquire much of the information requisite to enable us to direct and control so great an undertaking.

In my letter to Lord North, I adverted to the great resources which I conceived might be drawn from India, in our marine department, both in the construction of ships of war, and in the employment of the natives in the common duties of the ships. No attempt has, to this time, been made to render those resources subservient to the increase of our naval force in India; but such decisive evidence is offered to us from our commercial speculations, that I have been induced to renew and extend my observations; under a conviction, that whenever it shall be thought proper by government to direct their attention to those objects, the most important benefits may be derived to the public from them. I look with equal confidence to the effect of the measures that were submitted to his Lordship, at the same

time, with a view of improving the recruiting service for the European army in India; and I should have left this latter subject without any additional observation, if I were not under the most anxious solicitude, that the mode by which the two corps, that now compose the army in India, are to be assimilated and united, might be formed upon a principle which should meet, as much as possible, the expectation of both parties, and which, by shewing to the officers of the Company, who compose by far the most numerous class, that they are not less considered by their country, than those in conjunction with whom they have extended her empire, may give to their loyalty, experience, and talents, the just recompence of their services, by professional distinction in their own country. If the suggestions I have offered upon this impor-

tant subject, should be found to lead to so desirable an arrangement, I shall derive peculiar gratification from having anticipated the wishes of so distinguished a corps, and from having contributed, in any degree, towards the establishment of a plan which shall consolidate and unite the Indian army.

The observations which were addressed to the Court of Directors, in my letter of 1780, upon the commercial intercourse between England and India, having arisen out of the subject of remittance, upon which that letter was expressly written, they were necessarily compressed within the confined limits of subsidiary argument; but I refer to them, even under this disadvantage, with some confidence, in the persuasion that they will be found to accord with the spirit of the act of parliament of 1793,

which, by renewing the charter of the Company upon the most enlarged principles a regulated commerce is susceptible of, has secured to this country, all the advantages of the trade with India, and has, at the same time, opened a field sufficiently wide, for the enterprising speculation of the British merchant, without exposing the income of the state to hazard, or to interruption in the receipt of the duties which the legislature has thought proper to impose, upon the various articles of that most valuable and extensive trade.

Some circumstances of a more personal nature have concurred, in exciting me to make this Collection. In the Oriental Repertory there appeared last year a Memoir upon the subject of improving the Northern Circars, "by preventing

“ the waters of the rivers Kistnah and
“ Guadavery from running to waste into
“ the sea, as they now do in the freshes.”
Mr. Dalrymple, with the candour which
distinguishes that valuable Repertory, in-
serted at length in his Memoir, all the
information that had been transmitted
to him from India, with the following in-
troduction.

“ The East India Company, in their
“ orders to Madras last year (1792), re-
“ commended this object to attention.
“ But it appears, from papers received
“ lately from thence, that on the 16th No-
“ vember, 1792, Mr. Andrew Ross, whose
“ zeal for the public welfare has, on
“ every occasion been conspicuous, had
“ brought this subject under considera-
“ tion, by communicating to Sir Charles
“ Oakley some papers, and enforcing

“their importance with his accustomed
“energy, and that much to the credit of
“the Governor, he had given it his coun-
“tenance, and from his representation,
“Lord Cornwallis had expressed the
“highest satisfaction at what was pro-
“posed, earnestly recommending the
“speedy execution of it.”

The important object which those valuable communications so strongly recommended to government in 1792, appears to have been suggested, at that time, by the disastrous ravages of a famine, which, during the years 1790 and 1791, had prevailed in the Circars, and which has been computed to have swept off one half of the inhabitants, or near five hundred thousand souls.

A similar calamity had raged in the same provinces in the years 1764, 1765,

and 1766, and had been attended with consequences equally destructive. The melancholy effects of it were still visible in the year 1774, when, as a member of the administration of Mazulipatam, I had an opportunity of visiting the country. The information I then received, and the observations I was enabled to make, impressed me with a full conviction that the return of so dreadful a calamity might be prevented, if the surplus waters of the rivers Kistnah and Guadavery, which at times inundated the low lands, were judiciously directed into a channel, which Providence seemed to have formed for their reception; and if that natural reservoir, which is known by the name of the Colere, were improved by the construction of such works, as should confine and preserve the water, until the season

of cultivation might require its distribution.

Captain Du Good, a very able engineer, was in consequence employed to take the levels of the country from the Kistnah and the Guadavery to the Colere ; and it was intended that he should have prosecuted the work to its completion. But before he had made any considerable progress, he was recalled to Madras, in consequence of some professional misunderstanding, and the survey, even of the rivers, remained imperfect in 1776, when an impaired constitution compelled me to leave India.

It will be seen in my letter to the Court of Directors, of February, 1779, inserted in the present Collection, that the impressions I had received on this subject, were not weakened by time or change

of situation. But that, on the contrary, after I had explained the various measures by which I conceived the industry of the natives and their confidence in British government might be successfully encouraged, I particularly adverted to this important object, in the following words.

“ To secure the permanency of those
“ advantages, the care of government
“ should be extended, to provide against
“ the dreadful accidents of droughts, which
“ sometimes happen in every part of In-
“ dia, and which never fail to bring on all
“ the miseries of famine, &c. The two
“ greatest rivers which flow on this Coast
“ of the Peninsula, have their courses
“ through those provinces, the Kitsnah
“ on the south, and the Guadavery on the
“ north ; the country which lies between
“ them in this direction having a natural

“ fall on each side, until at length it
“ forms into a flat, which for the space of
“ several miles is, at a particular season
“ of the year, covered with water.
“ The vast extent of this natural reser-
“ voir, situated almost midway between
“ those rivers, and capable of receiving
“ more water than all the country between
“ them and the sea could require, would
“ seem to promise an inexhaustible source
“ of plenty to those provinces, if the ne-
“ cessary supplies of water could be pre-
“ served in it; and even to point out a
“ way by which the most easy and expedi-
“ tious communication might be opened
“ between the rivers Kistnah and Guada-
“ very :” I proposed, “ that a survey
“ might be ordered, to estimate the ex-
“ pence, and to form a computation of
“ the time within which the work might

“ be completed :” and I concluded by observing, “ that as it could not mislead, it
“ might not be unsatisfactory to be informed, that from a series of levels and
“ distances, taken with some accuracy,
“ there was reason to believe, that neither
“ the expence nor the labour would be
“ found of the extent they might at first
“ appear.”

The letter from which I have copied the preceding passages, having had no other circulation than what the Court of Directors were pleased to give it, I was induced, upon reading Mr. Dalrymple's Memoir, to send him an extract of what related to the subject of watering the Circars. In an Appendix, which he has since published, he has done me the honour to insert that extract at more length than I have thought it necessary to give

it here; which obliging condescension would have prevented me from introducing any part of it in this place, if I had not felt myself impelled to it, by an observation that has appeared in a later publication.

In the first volume of *British India Analyzed*, page 156, it is observed, “when we consider the length of time “the British sovereignty has been established in the Circars, the peaceable undisputed possession for seventeen successive years, of a country so accessible, &c. it may seem wonderful that, “at this day, so little should be known of “the ways and means, mode of management in raising the public supplies, and “actual amount of revenue collected in “behalf of the state, as to encourage any “individual from private experience, and

“local observation and inquiry, to step
“forth in the ambitious hope, to say some-
“thing new and interesting on a subject,
“which at present so deeply engages the
“attention and inquisitorial powers of
“the nation.”

The passage which I have already recited from my letter of February, 1779, to the Court of Directors, will have shewn, that the author of *British India Analyzed*, was not correctly informed, when he admitted the preceding observation into his work. I allow myself to hope it will be seen in other parts of that letter, that my attention, though it had been particularly directed to the means of providing against the return of a calamity, which unfortunately, it is now too evident might have been averted, if those means had been pursued, was not confined

to that object ; but that, to use the words of that author, “ I did step forth in the “ ambitious hope” of exciting the Company to engraft, upon the ground work of the ancient laws and usages of the Hindoos, such a system for the administration of the revenue, as it appeared to me would produce substantial benefits to the state and to the subject, not only in the Northern Circars, but in every other part of the British possessions in India, without invading the rights, or wounding the prejudices of any class or description of the natives.

In addressing my ideas upon that subject to the Court of Directors, I conceived it could not be necessary to go into much preliminary detail. The author of *British India Analyzed* has fully supplied this and other defects in my work, and

I have particular pleasure in referring to his authority, for the best detailed explanation of the denominations and duties of that chain of public officers, established under the ancient Hindoo government, and continued under the Mahomedans, which, beginning with the village register, ascends gradually through all the subdivisions of the province ; and whose reports exhibit, in prescribed forms, the measurement, quality, and produce of the land, with the enumeration of the villages, farms, husbandmen, and manufacturers, together with the most minute detail of every circumstance that could give information to government.

The plan which I submitted to the Court of Directors was formed upon that basis ; and all the progressive improvements which I suggested, were made to

proceed from it. The principles of that plan have been now ably asserted and maintained in British India Analyzed, and I cannot more forcibly support what I proposed in 1779, than by quoting the words with which, in 1794, the author of that work has expressed himself. Page 886, "It will hardly escape Lord Cornwallis's observation, when he reflects on Sir John Shore's Minute of 1789, that "a sacred register of lands, such as I have shewn the Canangoe register to have been, of itself will prove the simplest evidence of rights;" and again, page 904, "I cannot give a better illustration of the excellence of the native Hindoo management, than by annexing two tables of village accounts, which will shew how easily an official return might be made of the actual

“ produce and population of the whole
“ of British India, only by establishing
“ confidence, and by taking advantage
“ of forms now in use in the villages of
“ the Hindoos.” He concludes, page
928, in the words of Sir William Tem-
ple, “ Those who do not despise the ex-
“ perience of mankind in society, admit
“ that those forms are best, which have
“ been longest received and authorized
“ in a nation, by custom and use, and
“ into which the humours and manners
“ of the people run in the most general
“ current.”

I had not the advantage of being able
to consult the Minute of Sir John Shore,
above alluded to, until after the greater
part of this work was written. That able
and elaborate performance has been justly
denominated a monument of his zeal and

abilities. It seems to have been composed for the purpose of recommending a gradual and progressive course for the improvement of our internal system in Bengal, in preference to one which should attempt to embrace the whole at once; and which, by committing the credit and good faith of our government, might preclude us from extending, and rendering more equal, the great benefits it was our intention to convey to the natives. The arguments of Sir John Shore did not prevail; and therefore it is to be presumed that Lord Cornwallis, who held an opposite opinion, and the Board of Controll, with whom the final decision of this question rested, were satisfied that the information then before them, relative to the state and resources of Bengal, and to the distinct and separate rights of every

description of the natives, was sufficiently full to warrant the immediate establishment of the system in all its extent.

I am not qualified to judge of the propriety of that resolution, as it applied to the provinces immediately under the government of Bengal, neither have I allowed myself to engage in the discussion of it ; but I conceive, no man will be found so sanguine as to maintain, that such a resolution could, with prudence, or any reasonable hope of success, be acted upon in our other possessions. On the contrary, it will, I think, be admitted by all those who have attentively considered the subject, that the attempt to introduce suddenly, into any other part of our dominion, the whole of the system that has been established in Bengal, would be attended with consequences as unfavour-

able to the people at large, as it would prove injurious to the revenue, and dangerous to the security of the state. The arguments and the evidence with which Sir John Shore supported his opinions in Bengal, though they did not succeed in preventing the adoption of the plan in all its extent there, will be found to apply with peculiar force to the Carnatic, and to the Northern Circars, and I refer to them, as decisive confirmation of the suggestions contained in my letter of 1779, to the Court of Directors. With a view of bringing those illustrations more fully and distinctly before the reader, than could be done by the partial introduction of them in notes, I have selected, in an Appendix, such passages as seemed to be most applicable to the subject of Zemindars in general, and to the no less

important question of the rights and property which the ancient usages of the Hindoos vested in the cultivators of the soil.

The universal prevalence of those ancient usages, has been considered of sufficient weight to give them the force of prescription ; and it has not therefore, in general, been thought necessary to refer them to any higher authority ; but it is known to those who are conversant with Indian literature, that they are derived from express laws, which were enacted by the Hindoo government, for the protection and security of the industrious husbandman. In my letter of 1779, I referred to those laws ; and I have inserted an extract from them in the Appendix, to show that they were well adapted to their object. The usages to which we are accustomed to refer, are but the re-

sults of those laws, reduced to practice under prescribed forms, which are to be found in the records of every village throughout Hindoosta

To enable the reader to judge of the nature and extent of the information that may be drawn from those village records, I have given in the Appendix, a translation of one of them, which I received from Mr. Barnard, in the year 1770. It made an article in his valuable, but neglected report, of the territory, known by the name of the Jaghire, which is situated in the vicinity of Madras. In every material point of information it will be found to agree with the accounts that may be seen in *British India Analyzed*; and as those accounts were taken from a village in a part of India, very distant from the other, the coincidence between them

may be considered as no equivocal proof of the general usage before alluded to.

I have already referred the reader to the work just mentioned, for an account of the process by which the detailed information in the village accounts is generalized, and brought in arranged order under the inspection of government; I am induced to renew that reference in this place, because, though that work seems to have been written principally with a view to enforce a mode of proceeding, very opposite to the opinions maintained by Sir John Shore, and from those which I have endeavoured to recommend in the following work, (and therefore we are at a great distance upon the question of policy), we perfectly agree in referring to the ancient ordinances and regulations of the Hindoos, as the true

sources of information and instruction, and as forming the basis upon which the British government may proceed with most safety and advantage towards the establishment of a permanent system.

I have inserted in the Appendix some other materials, which I feared might, in any other place, fatigue the patience of the reader. They relate to the political branch of the subject that is brought under consideration in the following work, and particularly to that part of it which adverts to the mode of government now prevailing in the southern provinces of the Carnatic, where the civil power is held by the Nabob, while the coercive military force, and the collection of revenue from the Polygars, are in the hands of the English. An arrangement so complicated and defective, could only

have arisen out of political necessity; the pressure of which having in some measure subsided, I have ventured to suggest an amendment, by which, I conceive the substantial interests of the Nabob, and of his English allies, would be materially promoted; and which in its effects might prove highly beneficial to the natives, who are now subject to the power of both, without the possibility of their deriving complete protection from either.

I have considered myself to be precluded, by motives of delicacy, from making any reference to the measures that were proposed or adopted by Mr. Hastings in the revenue department. I have studiously avoided to introduce his name, or even to make any allusion to his administration, except in those instances,

where admitted and historic facts have rendered it impossible to misconstrue the intention, or to dispute the application. The compilation of the Hindoo code, which neither Mahomedan power, persecution, or influence, had been able, in the long period of seven centuries, to obtain from the Hindoos, was conceded by the learned Bramins of Bengal to the solicitations of Mr. Hastings; and they voluntarily contributed, by their explanations, to assist Mr. Halhed in his very able translation of their work. The institutes of the Mahomedan Emperor Akbar, were some years after, under encouragement from Mr. Hastings, translated into English by Mr. Gladwin, and we were enabled by that means, to draw instructions from the ordinances and regulations which that great emperor had

composed, for the purpose of securing to his people, the prosperity and happiness he had endeavoured, during the period of a very long reign, to procure for them. The introduction of public granaries in Bengal, upon a scale proportioned to the vast extent and population of that empire, was undertaken by Mr. Hastings; and whenever his plan shall be fully executed, it will constitute a monument of unrivalled munificence throughout Hindoostan. These are instances which stand recorded, as having originated with Mr. Hastings: his property in them has not been controverted or impeached; and it was impossible not to advert to them in a work, the chief object of which is to obtain, for our native subjects in other parts of India, similar benefits, and to inspire them with con-

fidence in our government, by extending towards them the same encouragement and protecting conduct.

These, and a reference to the successful exertions made by Mr. Hastings, at the time when all the powers of India, in conjunction with France and Holland, were confederated against us, are the only exceptions which will be found to occur in this work, to the rule I prescribed to myself, and which I have observed, in deference to the high tribunal whose judgment is still depending, as well as from what I think due to the situation of Mr. Hastings, and of what I owe to my own character, under the circumstances in which I have placed myself as one of his securities.

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LETTER
PRESENTED TO LORD NORTH,

IN OCTOBER, 1780.

“ MY LORD,

“ THE recess of parliament, by giving
“ your Lordship a temporary release from
“ the fatiguing duties of the House, has
“ left you the leisure to examine, with
“ more attention, the various interests of
“ the nation at this important crisis.
“ Possibly there is no one of these so
“ difficult for your Lordship to decide
“ upon, no one, the various relations and
“ combinations of which have hitherto
“ been so little developed, as that which
“ relates to our dominion in India.

“ Aware of the value and importance
“ of your Lordship's time, I will endea-
“ vour to compress, within as narrow
“ limits as possible, such ideas as have

“ occurred to me upon the political
 “ branch of this interesting subject ; and
 “ shall designedly avoid, at this time, to
 “ offer any suggestions either upon the
 “ means of extending our valuable com-
 “ merce with India, or of improving the
 “ revenue and internal police of our pos-
 “ sessions in that quarter of the world.

“ It is not yet a century since the
 “ Mogul empire attained its greatest ex-
 “ tent, and was governed with wisdom
 “ and vigour by the politic Aurungzebe ;
 “ yet the successor of Aurungzebe doth
 “ not at this time possess a town which
 “ he can call his own. Thirty years are
 “ scarcely past, since the Deccan, which
 “ at that time comprehended the whole
 “ Peninsula, was united under the go-
 “ vernment of the celebrated Nizam-al
 “ Muluck ; yet the son of Nizam-al
 “ Muluck finds difficulty in keeping a
 “ small part only of the now dismem-

“bered Deccan subject to his authority;
 “and the vast power of the Mahrattas,
 “which within thirty years imposed
 “tributes throughout Hindoostan, is now
 “divided into three separate and discord-
 “ant states.

“Revolutions so quick, and of such im-
 “portance, shew how much our political
 “ideas upon India should be determined,
 “by the particular characters of its re-
 “spective rulers. If further proofs of
 “this should be thought necessary, they
 “are offered to us in events still nearer
 “to our own time. The government of
 “Mysore, weak and contemptible under
 “its Rajah, became powerful and formid-
 “able as soon as the enterprising Hyder
 “Ally assumed the reins: whilst the
 “provinces of Bengal were no sooner de-
 “prived of the steady rule of Aliverdy
 “Cawn, than they were plunged into
 “disorder, and ripened for revolt. The
 “military abilities of Mahadarow enabled

“ the Mahrattas of Poonah, in the years
 “ 1770 and 1771, to revive the exorbitant
 “ claims of that nation, and to lay the
 “ Deccan and Mysore under contribution :
 “ but the early death of that chieftain,
 “ with the divisions that followed relative
 “ to his succession, prescribed new limits
 “ to the ambition of that aristocracy,
 “ and added whole provinces to the do-
 “ minions of the Soubadar of the Deccan,
 “ and of Hyder Ally Cawn.

“ At present, the preponderating power
 “ is, without a question, in the English.
 “ But this tenure too, my Lord, is preca-
 “ rious ; for we no longer hold military
 “ discipline in monopoly ; and it cannot
 “ derogate from the high reputation of
 “ Lord Clive, to ascribe the rapid growth
 “ of our power, in some measure, to the
 “ enemy’s ignorance in that art. That
 “ ignorance no longer subsists ; every
 “ Mahomedan prince has now his bat-
 “ talions, and artillery ; and the creation

“ of a respectable army, within the space
 “ of three years, by the Nabob of the
 “ Carnatic, not only unaided, but publicly
 “ discountenanced, by the government of
 “ Madras, proves within how short a time
 “ we might be formidably opposed ; for
 “ by the same means, whereby the Na-
 “ bob of the Carnatic succeeded, that is,
 “ by employing the military adventurers
 “ who find their way from Europe to In-
 “ dia, every other prince may form similar
 “ establishments ; and no other will cer-
 “ tainly have the complaisance to disband
 “ them at our desire, as that Nabob has
 “ done.

“ Good policy, therefore, now calls upon
 “ us to provide against a danger which, if
 “ left to extend itself, may threaten the
 “ very existence of our government ; and
 “ happily our own immediate interests,
 “ as well as the general tranquillity of In-
 “ dia, point out to us the remedy.

“ From the situation of our possessions,

“ we have necessarily been led into po-
 “ litical connections with all the great
 “ powers of India ; and from a variety
 “ of causes, it has happened that our arms
 “ are now employed, in the north, to pro-
 “ tect the dominions of Oude; in the south,
 “ to support the Nabob of the Carnatic;
 “ and in the west, to give a chief to the
 “ government of Poonah; whilst we stand
 “ engaged, by treaty, to send a military
 “ aid to Mysore and the Deccan, in the
 “ events of unprovoked hostility against
 “ those powers; and are opening a ne-
 “ gotiation with the Rajah of Berar to
 “ establish a brigade in his dominions.

“ Circumstanced in this manner, it is
 “ no longer a question, whether we can
 “ withdraw ourselves within the limits of
 “ our own possessions, and confine our
 “ attention to their security and improve-
 “ ment ; we are evidently involved, un-
 “ der the sanction of public treaties, in
 “ all the intricacy of a wide and yet

“ unformed system ; but we have it in our
“ power to give shape and consistency to
“ this system ; and in doing so, to secure
“ permanency to our empire.

“ In Bengal, the foundation of this
“ great structure has been already laid,
“ by the treaty with the Nabob of Oude ;
“ which by transferring to the English
“ arms the protection of that country,
“ has converted into a subsidiary ally the
“ only formidable neighbour we had in
“ the north.

“ The treaty with the powerful Rajah
“ of Berar, whose possessions lie to the
“ west of Bengal, has the same objects in
“ view ; and if it should take place, will
“ remove every apprehension of danger
“ from the rich provinces of Bengal, and
“ reduce the charges of the military es-
“ tablishment under that government, by
“ nearly a fourth part of their present
“ amount.

“ Thus far, my Lord, we are well

“ advanced towards this great object in the
 “ north ; nor are we less forward in the
 “ south, where every resource of the Car-
 “ natic lies open to our power ; yet to
 “ complete it, we are still at a distance.
 “ The vast space between those extre-
 “ mities forms such a barrier to our com-
 “ munication, and separates Bombay so
 “ entirely from the other presidencies,
 “ that until we have converted the cold
 “ disregarded treaties of defensive alliance,
 “ which now unite us to Mysore and the
 “ Deccan, into a firm bond of union, that
 “ shall give us military stations in those
 “ countries, we can have no absolute se-
 “ curity for our own possessions ; nor can
 “ we hope to maintain a controlling in-
 “ fluence over the government of Poonah,
 “ without which the tranquillity of India
 “ can never be established and preserved.

“ It may not be unsatisfactory to your
 “ Lordship to advert, in this place, to the

“ causes which have hitherto kept back
 “ a system so advantageous to the public
 “ interest. I will afterwards submit to
 “ your Lordship’s consideration, the rea-
 “ sons which induce to a belief, that the
 “ present time is particularly favourable
 “ for bringing it forward.

“ When the capture of Pondicherry in
 “ 1761 had removed the last and only
 “ formidable obstacle to the establish-
 “ ment of Mahomed Ally Cawn in the
 “ Nabobship of Arcot ; the policy of our
 “ government, which had so successfully
 “ directed our arms to the support of his
 “ power, immediately saw the necessity
 “ of providing, by measures of precau-
 “ tion, against those consequences which
 “ might possibly arise out of the increas-
 “ ed riches and strength of our ally.

“ The general state of India was at
 “ that time little known to us, our opera-
 “ tions had been confined to the Carnatic
 “ Payen Gaut (or the country below the
 “ mountains) which forms the southern

“ division of the Peninsula ; and in that
 “ country, there was only one state, which
 “ even our policy could uphold, as a check
 “ or counterpoise to the power of the Na-
 “ bob.

“ An alliance with Partaub Sing, the
 “ Rajah of Tanjore, was therefore consi-
 “ dered by the English government as a
 “ measure of wise precaution on their part ;
 “ nor was it less anxiously desired by the
 “ Rajah, who saw that he could have no se-
 “ curity against the pretensions of the Na-
 “ bob but in the protection of the English.

“ The declaration of those pretensions,
 “ and the undefined claims which accom-
 “ panied them on the part of the Nabob,
 “ soon furnished the English administra-
 “ tion with an opportunity for inter-
 “ posing their mediation.* This pro-
 “ duced an arrangement between the
 “ Nabob and the Rajah ; and the English,
 “ in the character of guarantees, obtained

* See Tanjore Papers, printed Appendix No. 6,

“ that controlling influence, which the
 “ policy of that time suggested as essen-
 “ tial to the security of their interest.

“ In the year 1766 a more extensive
 “ scene was opened to our policy and to
 “ our ambition, by the promulgation of
 “ a grant, which Lord Clive had obtained
 “ in the preceding year from the Mogul,
 “ and which conveyed to us the sove-
 “ reignty of the provinces known by the
 “ name of the Northern Circars. Those
 “ provinces were at that time, and had
 “ been for many years, under the imme-
 “ diate dependence of the Soubadar of the
 “ Deccan ; and it was necessary, either
 “ to conciliate his acquiescence in the
 “ grant, or to compel his submission to
 “ the act and authority of his nominal
 “ superior, the Mogul.

“ This gave rise to a negotiation with
 “ the Soubadar of the Deccan, which ter-
 “ minated in the treaty of Hydrabad.
 “ By that treaty, and by the grant of the

“ Mogul, out of which it had arisen, we
 “ were led for the first time to extend our
 “ political views in the Peninsula beyond
 “ the Carnatic, and were put in posses-
 “ sion of a valuable and extensive terri-
 “ tory, not only independent of, but en-
 “ tirely separated from that country.

“ It was impossible that Mahomed Ally
 “ could see with indifference this new
 “ connection, or that the principle which
 “ had engaged us to seek a counterpoise
 “ to him in the Carnatic, should not now
 “ operate, on his part, to make him op-
 “ pose the progress of our union with
 “ his former superior (the Soubadar of the
 “ Deccan) as well as that which we af-
 “ terwards contracted with Hyder Ally
 “ Cawn, the friend and supporter of his
 “ late rival Chunda Saheb.

“ Here, therefore, a political dissension
 “ commenced between the Nabob of the
 “ Carnatic, and the East India Company;
 “ and it is in this dissension that we are

“ to look for the cause of the reserve and
 “ want of confidence, which have marked
 “ the limited intercourse that has hither-
 “ to taken place between the English
 “ and the governments of Mysore and
 “ the Deccan : for the Nabob, jealous of
 “ the influence which those powers might
 “ have upon our counsels, and fearful of
 “ the decline of his consequence with us,
 “ in proportion to the dignity and consi-
 “ deration of such allies, opposed any
 “ communication with them, but such as
 “ should pass through his agency ; and
 “ the suspicions which those powers en-
 “ tertained of him, precluded the nego-
 “ tiation of any important object through
 “ him.

“ But it is not my design to lead to in-
 “ vidious retrospection : jealousies are
 “ not to be healed by it ; and besides, the
 “ present state of India requires a more
 “ enlarged scale of conduct than has hi-
 “ therto been pursued. System and vi-

“gorous exertion are become absolutely
 “necessary in the administration of our
 “affairs there ; and neither the one nor
 “the other can be hoped for, until, for-
 “getting past suspicions, we cordially re-
 “turn to our former confidence with the
 “Nabob, and until we adopt some ho-
 “nourable and consistent plan for uniting
 “the power of the Carnatic, and bring-
 “ing it effectually under our direction.

“This subject is probably now under
 “your Lordship’s consideration : I will
 “therefore only observe upon it, that the
 “late revolutions at Tanjore, by making
 “the Nabob feel our power, and by leav-
 “ing him still to hope from our friendship,
 “have now totally removed the cause
 “which kept us so long at a distance
 “from the Soubadar of the Deccan, and
 “from Hyder Ally Cawn ; that the sub-
 “sidy drawn from the Tanjore country,
 “of near £. 200,000 a year, has great-
 “ly increased our resources ; and that no

“ longer alarmed by the ambition of the
 “ Nabob, who in disbanding his army,
 “ must have appeased our jealousy, we are
 “ more than ever prepared to form an
 “ union with those powers, upon the
 “ broad basis of mutual interest and se-
 “ curity.

“ The hour, therefore, seems now ar-
 “ rived, when your Lordship may, and I
 “ must add, when the interest of the na-
 “ tion makes it necessary, that you should
 “ adopt a general and a decided plan of
 “ conduct in respect to our possessions and
 “ government in India. We are at this
 “ moment free even from the intrigues of
 “ the French ; our army is augmented ;
 “ the Soubadar of the Deccan continues
 “ to solicit the aid of our friendship ; the
 “ situation of the Mahratta affairs calls
 “ for vigorous exertion ; and the govern-
 “ ment of Mysore, though still animated
 “ by the spirit of Hyder Ally, is not yet
 “ become powerful enough to dispute our

“ superiority, or to disregard the terms
“ of our alliance.

“ Under circumstances so favourable,
“ can we hesitate to render ourselves the
“ umpires of India ? we want no further
“ extension of territory ; we seek no new
“ revolutions ; we are at the zenith of our
“ power, our interest, our future safety,
“ and the common good of India, all
“ unite in calling upon us, to employ
“ this happy crisis of our influence, for
“ perfecting, with moderation and justice,
“ a system that shall set bounds to the
“ future ambition of our neighbours, pre-
“ scribe limits to our own, and effec-
“ tually secure to them, and to ourselves,
“ the undisturbed possession of our pre-
“ sent respective dominions.

“ I have said, that the Soubadar of the
“ Deccan continues to solicit the aid of
“ our friendship : we impatiently desire,
“ on our part, that he would convert our
“ reversionary right to the province of

“ Guntoor into present occupancy ; for
 “ the most profitable articles of our trade
 “ are drawn from that province, which
 “ abounds with manufactures ; its re-
 “ venue is considerable, and it separates
 “ our northern possessions from the Car-
 “ natic.

“ The government of Madras opened
 “ a negotiation last year upon this sub-
 “ ject with Bazalet-Jung, he being, under
 “ his brother the Soubadar, tenant for
 “ life of Guntoor ; but either the mode
 “ they adopted, or the matter with which
 “ they accompanied their negotiation,
 “ proved so offensive to the Soubadar, and
 “ has been thought so exceptionable by the
 “ superintending council of Bengal, that
 “ it has been judged necessary to inter-
 “ pose the controlling power of that go-
 “ vernment, and the negotiation with
 “ the Soubadar is now in their hands.

“ Under the direction of Mr. Hastings
 “ it cannot fail of success, though it must

“ be believed, that he will think no suc-
 “ cess complete, until, with the full pos-
 “ session of the province of Guntoor, he
 “ can obtain for the Company an absolute
 “ release from the tribute of £. 86,000 a
 “ year, which they are bound by treaty
 “ to pay to the Soubadar, for that and the
 “ other provinces now in their possession,
 “ and known by the name of the North-
 “ ern Circars.

“ But concessions of such importance
 “ are not to be obtained, my Lord, with-
 “ out some return ; and the only one of
 “ any value which we can make to the
 “ Soubadar, will be to lend him the assist-
 “ ance of our troops, to be employed for
 “ the support of his government, and the
 “ protection of his dominions ; that is
 “ to say, for retaining in due subjection
 “ those of his dependants, who, presuming
 “ upon the generally convulsed state of
 “ India, arm upon every occasion to op-
 “ pose his authority ; or those who, seeing

“ an exemption from tribute in the pub-
 “ lic disturbances, cabal with the neigh-
 “ bouring powers to excite them, and in
 “ the moment of necessity stipulate with
 “ their superior, before they will send
 “ him that aid to which he is entitled by
 “ the general constitution of Hindoostan.

“ The impoverished state of the Sou-
 “ badar’s treasury can be no objection at
 “ this time, to our giving him the assist-
 “ ance of our troops, as the charges in-
 “ cident to such a service, might be de-
 “ frayed from the funds we should hold
 “ in our hands ; the tribute of £. 86,000,
 “ and the revenue of Guntoor, which
 “ may be estimated at £. 100,000 a year,
 “ would be more than adequate to the
 “ expence, and should in reason be ap-
 “ plied to it, until the services we might
 “ render to the Soubadar, should enable
 “ him to make us other assignments.

“ Powerful and confident as Hyder
 “ Ally may be in his own resources, the

“ jealous fears of an Indian court would
 “ not suffer him to see without uneasi-
 “ ness, so marked an assurance of our at-
 “ tachment to the interest of the Souba-
 “ dar, whose claim of superiority over the
 “ country of Mysore, is still unimpaired,
 “ even by any pretended concession of
 “ the Mogul. It may too be presumed,
 “ that drawing near the verge of life,
 “ the favourite object of Hyder’s mind
 “ must now be, to establish the succes-
 “ sion in his family : and this might be
 “ endangered, if he were to die at enmity
 “ with us, for he is still considered by the
 “ Mysoreans as an ungenerous usurper ;
 “ and their attachment to the Rajah,
 “ whose place he has assumed, would pro-
 “ bably discover itself under the counte-
 “ nance of an English army, co-operating
 “ on the north with the Soubadar of the
 “ Deccan ; on the south with the Nabob
 “ of the Carnatic ; and in the west up-
 “ holding the government of Poonah.

“ Hyder Ally is too wise and too ex-
 “ perienced a politician not to see all the
 “ extent of such a danger ; and seeing it,
 “ not to provide against it in time, by
 “ soliciting that the government of My-
 “ sore, might not be the only one ex-
 “ cluded from our protection. We may
 “ therefore reasonably conclude that Hy-
 “ der Ally would request a military aid
 “ from us, and propose assignments for
 “ its support : so that our very rivals,
 “ upon the principle of their own interest
 “ and security, would become instru-
 “ ments, to put us in possession of what
 “ we are called upon, from so many mo-
 “ tives, to make the first object of our po-
 “ licy.

“ The balance of India would thus ne-
 “ cessarily be placed in our hands. With
 “ a decrease of expence, we should have
 “ a great increase of force ; and our
 “ attention being drawn from our affairs

“ at home by one object only, we should
 “ be enabled to investigate our internal
 “ system, and to correct its defects. Our
 “ population and industry would increase ;
 “ plenty and happiness would diffuse
 “ themselves amongst our own imme-
 “ diate subjects ; and every inhabitant
 “ of that extensive region would have
 “ cause to pray for the preservation of
 “ that justice, policy, and moderation
 “ which should secure, upon the basis of
 “ British power and wisdom, the peace
 “ and happiness of India.”

OBSERVATIONS.

THE political importance of the ideas that are contained in the preceding pages, had been long and deeply impressed upon my mind. They had been urged by me in the years 1773-4 and 5 to different members of the Indian administration, with a warmth which nothing but a full conviction of the necessity that impelled to them, could have justified. But various circumstances and events, which it is not necessary to detail in this place, and which it is now known could neither have been controlled nor averted in India, under the then limited powers of the Governor General, prevented at those periods, and had still continued, in 1780, to oppose the adoption of any systematic plan of general policy on our part; while the native powers of

India, excited by the intrigues of the French, and stimulated by jealousies and recent irritations from the government of Madras, were encouraged to confederate against us.

It will be a subject of curious and interesting inquiry, to those who may hereafter be disposed to investigate this period of British history in India, to trace the course of those events, and to examine into the various causes, from the concurrence of which it came to pass, that the political state of the Peninsula, as it was described in the preceding letter to Lord North, was so entirely changed in the short space of one year, that the situation of our affairs on that side of India in July, 1780, had become the very converse of the representation that was drawn of them in London, in the autumn of that year, from the latest information that had then reached England.

A discussion of that nature in this place,

would be as invidious as it would be unprofitable. WE ARE NOW FORTUNATELY RETURNED TO THAT STATE OF POWER, OF REPUTATION, AND OF INFLUENCE, which in the year 1780 induced to a belief, that WE OUGHT TO ASSUME A LEAD IN THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF INDIAN POLICY. It will therefore be sufficient to observe here, that in the sudden reverse of our fortune, from superiority and extended dominion in the Carnatic, to depression and limited defence; as well as in the complete recovery of our national credit and character there, the English have furnished two memorable instances of the quick and extraordinary vicissitudes to which public affairs are exposed in India; and that we have, in ourselves, illustrated and confirmed the observation made in the Letter to Lord North, "That our political ideas with regard to India, must be determined by the particular character of its respective rulers."

Whether the invasion of the Carnatic, in July 1780, was a concerted result of the league, which it has been supposed was about that time formed against us; or whether it proceeded from any separate and personal cause of ambition, or of resentment in the mind of Hyder Ally Cawn, are questions which it is not necessary to go into here: neither is it requisite to follow the various operations of the war, which from that time raged in the Carnatic, and extended to the southern boundary of the Peninsula; nor those further operations, which at the same time were carrying on by us, against the united power of the Mahratta state, in the northern extremity of our political connection in India.

It will be sufficient for our present purpose to observe, that in the prosecution of a war, which so materially changed the aspect of affairs, it was still thought advisable to keep in view the

object of rendering the resources of Mysore ultimately subservient to our power. The opportunity of effecting an arrangement of this kind with Hyder Ally Cawn was no longer to be hoped for. He had taken a line of such active hostility against us, and had united himself so closely to our rivals the French, that no reasonable expectation could be entertained, that he would ever again be disposed to form an alliance of friendship and confidence with us.

But the family of the deposed sovereign of Mysore was still in existence; and as the policy of Hyder Ally had made him think it prudent to exhibit the representative of that family, at certain festivals, with all the pageantry of state, it was thought, that in the event of a favourable issue to the war, no circumstance could more facilitate an arrangement for the consolidation of our power, than one which should have the restoration of the

ancient family of Mysore for its object. Under this impression, an intercourse with the adherents of the deposed family was assiduously sought for, and a negotiation was entered upon, under the sanction of the government of Madras, with an accredited person on the part of that family.

In consequence of that negotiation, a preliminary treaty was concluded in November, 1782; the principal stipulations of which were, on our part, that we would endeavour to re-establish, and to maintain by our arms, the deposed family of Mysore in their ancient dominion: and on their part, that they would confide solely in us for protection; and that certain specific funds should be assigned to us, for defraying the charges of the troops we might employ, and of the garrisons that we might think proper hereafter to keep up, throughout the whole extent of Mysore.

It is not necessary, in this place, to go into any detailed explanation of the causes which rendered this treaty abortive. That it was calculated to have produced a very different effect, was the opinion of Lord Macartney and his council, who in a letter of the 5th September, 1782, to the Court of Directors, referring to the then pending negotiation, wrote as follows :

Parag. 85. “ Mr. Sullivan’s plan was,
 “ that Colonel Humberston, with Major
 “ Abingdon and the Bombay troops,
 “ should march northwards, through the
 “ Coimbettore country ; and that a body
 “ of troops should march from the south-
 “ ern countries to meet them.”

Parag. 91 and 92. “ An object of still
 “ greater importance than those above
 “ stated, MIGHT HAVE BEEN, AND WE
 “ HOPE MAY YET BE OBTAINED by march-
 “ ing an army into Hyder Ally’s domi-
 “ nions. Mr. Sullivan has opened a nego-

“ tiation, which goes to the entire dissolu-
 “ tion of the usurped power of Hyder Al-
 “ ly, and the restoration of the legal heir.”

The same sentiments were emphatically expressed at a later period, by the person who had the best opportunities of information, and who was the most qualified to pass judgment on this subject ; I mean Colonel Fullerton, who upon the conclusion of the war, when ordered to evacuate the rich provinces he had conquered from Tippoo Sultan, wrote to me as follows, under date the 22d December, 1783.

“ With respect to the state and senti-
 “ ments of the people of Mysore, it will
 “ afford you satisfaction, mingled with
 “ disappointment, to be informed by me
 “ in the most positive, and, if you please,
 “ in the most formal manner, that the
 “ system of operations, proposed by you,
 “ of restoring the old Rajah, or Canara
 “ interest in that country, is founded on

“ a basis which could not fail to support
 “ the most solid superstructure.

“ I have had better means of judging
 “ on this subject than any other person,
 “ because it was the belief of the people
 “ of this country, that the army under
 “ my command, was immediately about
 “ to penetrate into Mysore.

“ The people, from my conduct to the
 “ Rajahs of Travancore, Cochin, and Ca-
 “ licut, together with my declarations
 “ respecting the old Rajahs of Mysore,
 “ were convinced that I had at heart to
 “ establish the ancient powers of the
 “ country, and I may venture, from every
 “ thing short of demonstration, to assert,
 “ that on this principle I should have
 “ been able to have smoothed much and
 “ many of the innumerable difficulties,
 “ attending such an enterprise as the re-
 “ duction of Mysore.

“ Your negotiation in favour of the

“ Mysore family, was perfectly known
 “ amongst the people, and had effectual
 “ influence, in convincing them of the
 “ sincerity and permanency of those re-
 “ solutions which I held forth. The Ra-
 “ jah’s family is not only extant, but
 “ may be called forth to greater purposes
 “ than any other political machine that
 “ could be used in the course of this ill-
 “ fated war. And I now declare to you
 “ solemnly, that it appears to me, of all
 “ measures the most likely, not only to
 “ produce success in the enterprise a-
 “ gainst Mysore ; but to establish on
 “ sure, popular, and respectable grounds,
 “ the offensive operations of the English
 “ in this country : but what avails it to
 “ say, what might have been, or might
 “ be, when we know that it will not, and
 “ cannot be.”

With such authorities, it will not be
 deemed presumptuous to assert, that the

treaty would not have been abortive, if our counsels and our armies had been at that time governed by one uniform and undisputed authority, such as the legislature hath since wisely vested in the Governor General. But that on the contrary, the great exertions that were made by us, would probably have been rewarded by the subjugation of Tippoo Sultan in that war, and by the re-establishment of the rightful sovereign of Mysore, under conditions that would have placed all the resources of that country, completely under the direction and controll of the British power.

But with an undefined, a disputed, and in many instances a resisted authority, without any concert between those who planned the operations of the war in the Carnatic, and the generals who had the conduct of them; advantages that might have decided the fate of Tippoo's government were rendered nugatory, and

it became necessary to desist from the pursuit of an object, the attainment of which, could only have been effected by the best directed employment of all our force.

Such, however, was the energy of the British character ; so great, and so ably directed were the exertions which were made by Mr. Hastings in every part of India, that under disadvantages of the kind above alluded to, and with difficulties of the most complicated nature pressing upon him, he succeeded in detaching the Mahratta state from the interests of Hyder Ally Cawn ; and in the no less arduous task, of conciliating the alienated mind of the Nizam to the British interest. By which means the foundation was laid of that great political superstructure, which Lord Cornwallis afterwards erected ; and which united us in the last war, upon the principles of mutual interest and security, with the Nizam, and with the government of Poonah.

The brilliant termination of that war, the exemplary good faith with which our allies were admitted to an equal participation in the treasure, and in the territorial cessions, which, our arms alone had extorted from Tippoo Sultan, as the price of the peace; and the scrupulous attention and solicitude, with which we protected and provided for all those who had attached themselves to us in the course of that war. All these circumstances have conspired to raise the British power and character to that ascendancy and controlling influence throughout the Peninsula of India, which, previous to the year 1780, it was supposed were attainable only through the medium of a political union with Hyder Ally Cawn; but which, the events of two hard contested wars, have now established upon a no less solid foundation, by contracting the dominion and resources of Mysore. AN EVENT which has been effected with such ad-

vantages of political and military reputation, as to render it more peculiarly necessary that we should adopt a general and decided plan of conduct; and that assuming the balance of India, we should endeavour to establish, upon the basis of British power and wisdom, a system of justice, policy, and moderation.

In the confidence that the views of the British Administration are now extended to those great and comprehensive subjects, I will proceed to the second part of the letter, which I had the honour to address to Lord North, in 1780.

“ IN THE PRECEDING PAGES I have endeavoured to trace the outline of a political plan for the conduct of our interests in India, and to point out the advantages that might be derived from

“ the adoption of such a system. I must
 “ not, however, conceal from your Lord-
 “ ship, that the national wisdom hath
 “ not yet relieved the India Company
 “ from one great embarrassment in their
 “ military arrangements; and that with-
 “ out this aid, we may, in the very ex-
 “ ertion of our policy, sow the seeds of
 “ our ruin.

“ I allude to the manner of recruiting
 “ the army in India, and the consequent
 “ difficulties, not only of completing the
 “ regiments, but of procuring any men
 “ fit for soldiers, to engage in the service
 “ of the Company ; although it is a fact
 “ beyond contradiction, that the appoint-
 “ ments of the soldier are no where so
 “ high, nor more regularly paid ; and I
 “ may venture to add, that the nation is
 “ no where more interested in having a
 “ well formed European army ; whether
 “ we consider its comparative number with
 “ that of the native troops in the service

“ of the Company, the extent of empire
 “ to be protected, or the vast importance
 “ of its revenue, and of its commerce.

“ I will not intrude on your Lordship’s
 “ time by a detail of the embarrassments
 “ and evils attendant on the present me-
 “ thod of enlisting for India, as I am
 “ confident no man, who can be con-
 “ sulted upon it, will undertake its de-
 “ fence ; nor will I examine, why the
 “ bills that have, at different times, been
 “ proposed to Parliament, for removing
 “ these embarrassments, have failed of
 “ success. The necessity of adopting
 “ some plan, by which the army in India
 “ might be well and completely recruit-
 “ ed, has never before, perhaps, been felt
 “ in its full force.

“ I understand that it is the usage in
 “ his Majesty’s service in time of war, to
 “ attach two additional companies to each
 “ regiment, the officers of which are em-
 “ ployed in England to enlist men, who

“ as they are engaged, are sent to Cha-
 “ tham, where they are disciplined, and
 “ held in readiness to be drafted as the
 “ particular wants of the different regi-
 “ ments, or the exigencies of the service
 “ may render it necessary. In India,
 “ my Lord, we are always to be consider-
 “ ed in a state of warfare ; at least, good
 “ policy requires, that we should be at
 “ all times prepared for active service ; I
 “ would therefore submit to your Lord-
 “ ship’s better judgment, whether an in-
 “ stitution upon the same principle, might
 “ not be permitted, for the purpose of re-
 “ cruiting the army in that country ; and
 “ whether it would not be advisable to
 “ authorize the Company to appoint offi-
 “ cers from the different presidencies,
 “ who should recruit publicly in this
 “ country and Ireland, and to fix a ge-
 “ neral rendezvous, like that at Chatham,
 “ where their recruits may be formed
 “ to discipline, and kept to the healthful

“ exercises of a soldier, until the moment
 “ of embarkation? By means such as
 “ these, the army in India might be made
 “ to receive a disciplined soldier, in every
 “ recruit who might be sent thither;
 “ whereas by the mode at present ob-
 “ served, they arrive raw and untaught,
 “ and one half at least are, from disease
 “ and decay, unfit for service.

“ I know it may be objected, that a
 “ mode so effectual for recruiting an ar-
 “ my, at such a distance, must unavoid-
 “ ably be a great drain upon that part
 “ of our population which is fit for mi-
 “ litary service. But as some effectual
 “ mode must be adopted, and as every
 “ such mode must be attended by a si-
 “ milar consequence, this cannot be main-
 “ tained as an objection peculiar to that
 “ which is here proposed.

“ As a general objection, it must be
 “ considered as of serious import, and
 “ therefore I will hope to meet your

“ Lordship’s indulgence, in proposing a
 “ measure which cannot fail to lessen
 “ this drain, and which, while it pro-
 “ mises to supply our army with some
 “ useful subjects, will, at the same time,
 “ deprive the different powers of India,
 “ of one of the principal sources from
 “ whence they now draw their stoutest
 “ and best disciplined troops ; I mean
 “ the male offspring of our soldiery.

“ All the governments of Europe, even
 “ those where the absolute power of the
 “ sovereign subjects every man to be
 “ called into the field, have seen the uti-
 “ lity of forming military seminaries for
 “ the children of soldiers ; and they are
 “ now adopted almost every where upon
 “ the Continent, as certain and great re-
 “ sources. In this country, and in our
 “ sister kingdom, no institutions of this
 “ kind have hitherto been formed ; the
 “ principles of our government, and the
 “ happy security we live under, render-

“ ing it equally unconstitutional and un-
 “ necessary, to consign any individual to
 “ a military profession, before he is qua-
 “ lified to make a choice for himself.”

“ Were our possessions in India con-
 “ stituted, as these islands are, or were
 “ they capable of receiving such a con-
 “ stitution, it would be criminal to pro-
 “ pose any plan, which should be less
 “ favourable to the liberty of the subject ;
 “ but whilst every profession is consider-
 “ ed by the natives of India as an inhe-
 “ ritage, not only of the family, but of
 “ the cast ; whilst the religious prejudices
 “ of a whole people are found to oppose
 “ the communication of those privileges
 “ to any out of their own tribes ; it
 “ would be impracticable to form estab-
 “ lishments in India, upon the enlarged
 “ principle which it would be necessary
 “ to observe in an institution of the kind
 “ at home.

“ The offspring of our soldiery in India,

“ must therefore, from a necessity which
 “ no authority can controul, become sol-
 “ diers ; or they must fall into that de-
 “ praved and proscribed state, which is
 “ distinguished in some parts of India
 “ by the denomination of Pariars, and in
 “ others, by that of Hallencores ; under
 “ which descriptions, they are consider-
 “ ed as the polluted outcasts of society.

“ Whether then, my Lord, shall we,
 “ under some small abridgment of that
 “ well constituted liberty, which with so
 “ much reason we pride ourselves on in
 “ this country, incorporate these children
 “ into our army, by some public estab-
 “ lishment, which may early direct their
 “ habits ? or shall we, by an inattention
 “ to the common duties of humanity, as
 “ well as policy, leave them to augment
 “ the armies of our neighbours, and
 “ thereby continue to furnish the na-
 “ tive powers of India, with means so
 “ efficient for bringing their troops nearer

“ to the level of our own in discipline
“ and energy.

“ Your Lordship, I am persuaded, will
“ not hesitate to decide in favour of some
“ establishment, which shall secure to the
“ nation the services of this numerous, but
“ hitherto neglected race ; and your wis-
“ dom will direct, that it should be form-
“ ed upon a plan the best calculated to
“ serve as a military seminary, in which,
“ from the habits of early exercise, the
“ boys may be inured to discipline, and
“ fitted for the army.

“ THE MARINE FORCE OF INDIA does
“ not less claim the attention of your
“ Lordship ; nor are the improvements
“ which may be made in its establish-
“ ment, less consequential than those
“ which have been suggested on the part
“ of the military. It is a fact of general
“ notoriety, that the climate of India is
“ particularly destructive to ships built of

“ the materials of Europe, while those
 “ which are constructed in India, of the
 “ materials of that country, are known
 “ to be of very extraordinary duration.*

“ This circumstance amounts in itself
 “ to a demonstration, that it would be
 “ advantageous to the public service, that
 “ the ships of war destined for the In-
 “ dian station, should be built in India ;
 “ provided the timber of that country
 “ should be found of dimensions proper
 “ for ships of the line ; and if there are,
 “ or can be made, docks of sufficient ex-
 “ tent and capacity for such a purpose.

“ With respect to timber, it is known
 “ that the teek wood of India yields only
 “ to mahogany in its dimensions ; and
 “ I question whether even the mahogany

* Voyage en Arabie, &c. &c. par Niebuhr, 1780.

“ Le bois dont les Indiens se servent pour leurs vais-
 “ seaux (Tak) est si dur, que les vers n'osent pas s'y frot-
 “ ter ; et de la vient que l'on trouve souvent chez-eux,
 “ des vaisseaux qui ont 80 jusqu'à 90 ans.”

“ can rival it in its stately growth. This
 “ wood is produced in great abundance
 “ in the countries of Orissa and Malabar,
 “ and in still greater abundance in the
 “ country of Pegu, upon the eastern side
 “ of the Bay of Bengal ; so that whether
 “ we look to Bombay, as the great ma-
 “ gazine for creating our Indian navy ;
 “ or whether we carry our attention in
 “ part to the islands of Nicobar and An-
 “ daman in the Bay of Bengal ; in either,
 “ or in both events, timber fit for the
 “ construction of large ships is to be
 “ found with so little difficulty, that it
 “ would seem no objection could be sug-
 “ gested upon that head.

“ If it should be objected, that the teek
 “ wood is not applicable to all the pur-
 “ poses of the shipwright ; it may be an-
 “ swered, that in most parts of India
 “ there grows another species of timber,
 “ the most eligible, perhaps, in the world
 “ to supply what are termed the knees

“ in ship-building, in general so difficult
 “ to be obtained of sufficient dimensions;
 “ the excellence of this timber results
 “ not only from its tortuous growth, but
 “ from the peculiar property it possesses
 “ of acquiring strength and durability in
 “ the sea-water.

“ How far the docks, already estab-
 “ lished at Bombay, may be proper for
 “ the construction of ships of the line;
 “ or how far it may be practicable to ren-
 “ der them convenient for such a service,
 “ I will not presume to determine. But
 “ there are men of local knowledge, and
 “ of professional ability, now in England,
 “ whose information may decide your
 “ Lordship’s judgment upon these sub-
 “ jects. It were to be wished your Lord-
 “ ship could be referred to sources of
 “ equal intelligence with respect to the
 “ islands of Nicobar and Andaman. Their
 “ situation in the Bay of Bengal, between
 “ the 8th and 12th degrees of northern

“ latitude points them out as particularly
 “ convenient for the command of that
 “ sea, and consequently for the protec-
 “ tion of our commerce and possessions
 “ in Bengal, and on the Coast of Coro-
 “ mandel.

“ But though I cannot pretend to di-
 “ rect your Lordship’s inquiries upon
 “ this subject, I can with great confi-
 “ dence venture to encourage them, by
 “ requesting you will be pleased to turn
 “ for a moment, to any chart of the Bay
 “ of Bengal: your Lordship will there find,
 “ that two of the Nicobar islands (Non-
 “ covery and Camorta), are placed in so
 “ happy a position, opposite to each other,
 “ and formed so particularly for the pur-
 “ pose of giving shelter to shipping,
 “ and of affording them a free passage
 “ at all times, either to the east or to the
 “ west, that our most sanguine imagina-
 “ tions could not picture to us a harbour
 “ with greater advantages for our fleets,

“ than this one possesses. It has depth of
 “ water for our largest ships, and capacity
 “ for a greater fleet than we have ever yet
 “ maintained in the Eastern sea. It lies
 “ between the latitudes of 8 and 9° north.
 “ Its distance from Madras and from
 “ Bengal is inconsiderable, and the pas-
 “ sage is often effected in five or six days :
 “ at the worst season of the year, in
 “ fifteen.

“ With a port like this to the east-
 “ ward, our fleet would at all times be
 “ able to guard the entrance of the Bay ;
 “ for in the violence of the monsoon on
 “ the Coast of Coromandel, all is tranquil
 “ on the Coast of Tenasserim, and in the
 “ neighbourhood of these islands ; while
 “ the port of Mergui, to which the French
 “ retired in the monsoons during the last
 “ war, would no longer afford them a re-
 “ treat ; for without a superiority at sea,
 “ they would never venture to approach
 “ so near the place of our naval strength,

“ Mergui lying still to the eastward of
 “ the Nicobars, on the coast of Tenas-
 “ serim.

“ In addition to these advantages of
 “ situation, the vicinity of those islands to
 “ the kingdom of Pegu, gives them a par-
 “ ticular recommendation; not only on
 “ account of the teek timber, with which
 “ that country abounds, but for the many
 “ valuable articles of commerce that may
 “ be drawn from it. We want but the
 “ countenance of such a support as our
 “ fleet, to revive our trade with Pegu,
 “ and to make the silver mines of that
 “ country contribute to incite the indus-
 “ try of our Indian manufacturers: the
 “ painted calicoes of Bengal, and of the
 “ Coast of Coromandel having been, till
 “ of late years, in great request in Pegu;
 “ where a large vent would again be
 “ opened, the moment the farmers of the
 “ customs there should be made to re-
 “ spect the English flag, and to allow us

“ the privilege of a free commerce, to
 “ which we are entitled by former trea-
 “ ties, though it has been denied us of
 “ late, by the exacting avarice of these
 “ men.

“ THE CLIMATE OF INDIA, though not
 “ so destructive of our seamen as of our
 “ ships, does nevertheless, by exposing
 “ them to the ardent influence of the sun,
 “ subject them to very violent and dan-
 “ gerous disorders. I say, my Lord, by
 “ exposing them to the ardent influence
 “ of the sun ; for, abstracted from that, I
 “ am convinced the climate of India is
 “ not unfriendly to Europeans: it is
 “ therefore particularly upon that ac-
 “ count, that I am induced to suggest to
 “ your Lordship the idea of allotting to
 “ each ship of war, while in India, a cer-
 “ tain number of Lascars, or Indian
 “ sailors, who should be charged with
 “ the boat service, and such other duties
 “ as might relieve the English sailor

“ from the violence of the heat, and
 “ which might be performed by the na-
 “ tive Indians without danger ; for, ac-
 “ customed from their infancy to the
 “ hot sun of the East, there would be
 “ neither hardship nor inhumanity in
 “ imposing such duties upon them.

“ If I may be allowed to extend this
 “ idea, I would carry it to a temporary
 “ exchange in India, of the marines be-
 “ longing to the squadron, for an equal
 “ number of disciplined Lascars, to be
 “ returned when the fleet should be call-
 “ ed back to Europe, or relieved by other
 “ ships. We have such unquestionable
 “ proof in our Sepoys, of what the na-
 “ tives of India are to be brought to, by
 “ discipline and regulations, that it can-
 “ not now be doubted but that, under
 “ proper management, they may be made
 “ equal to any service. The regimented
 “ Sepoys, being composed of men drawn
 “ indiscriminately from the different casts

“ of the country, it would be impossible
 “ to prevail on them to submit to the
 “ duties of marine service; but a corps,
 “ under the denomination of Lascar Se-
 “ poys, might be formed for that pur-
 “ pose; and they would, without a mur-
 “ mur, take the place of the marines
 “ who might be landed, and who, by be-
 “ coming temporary reinforcements to
 “ the European establishment, would en-
 “ able us to make exertions of our
 “ strength, at times when it might not
 “ be prudent to hazard them without
 “ such assistance. This further advan-
 “ tage would attend such a plan, that in
 “ the event of any foreign expedition
 “ against Manilla, or to the continent of
 “ America, a body of men would be ready
 “ formed for embarkation, upon whose
 “ willing services we might safely rely.”

OBSERVATIONS.

BEFORE the end of the year in which the preceding letter was written, I had an opportunity of observing, that the ideas I had suggested, of employing the natives of India in our ships of war upon that station, might be extended to a much greater degree, and with more important effect, than I had conceived at that time.

In October, 1781, I sailed from Bombay in a fleet consisting of seven sail of the Company's armed vessels, some carrying 10 and others 20 guns. The seamen and petty officers in every ship were natives of India, who had been trained in the service. The greatest degree of order, cleanliness, and arrangement prevailed throughout the ships; the manoeu-

vres were executed with promptitude and correctness; and the business of every department seemed to be conducted with that systematic regularity, which so peculiarly distinguishes the discipline of the British navy.

. I had the satisfaction to learn at the same time, that the number of such seamen might be augmented, by moderate encouragement, to any extent to which it might be thought proper to raise the marine establishment in India; and that the expences of pay, and of provisions, might be estimated at one half less than the lowest rates that are allowed by the regulations of the Admiralty for British seamen.

The advantage of so efficient a resource for keeping up, and for increasing the number of our seamen, and the economy with which this might be accomplished, would seem sufficiently to recommend the formation of a marine corps in India;

but considerations of still greater national importance will be found to present themselves in support of such a measure, when it is recollected that the valuable acquisitions which we have lately obtained on the Coast of Malabar, offer us an inexhaustible supply of teek timber, for the construction of the largest ships, and that the manufactories of India can furnish every species of canvas and of cordage, necessary for their equipment.

Under circumstances which so strongly recommend this subject to the consideration of Government, it cannot be doubted but that their attention will soon be directed to the establishment of a well regulated marine-yard in India; and that it will be formed upon a scale that shall render it adequate to all the purposes of naval protection, to our extensive commerce, as well as of defence and security to our valuable empire in the East. New incitements to industry might in this

manner be opened to our Indian subjects, which would ultimately contribute to the riches of this country; and benefits of great national importance might be made to flow from those sources, which the policy of Great Britain should open, for relieving her own finances, for recruiting her navy, and for increasing her marine.

On what coast of our possessions a great naval arsenal could be established to most advantage, is a question of infinite importance, involving a great variety of combinations; and the decision of which must be determined from the result of minute information, assisted by nautical knowledge and experience. I will not therefore enter upon the discussion further than by general observations.

Bombay, though detached from all our continental possessions, and situated at the distance of six degrees of latitude from the newly ceded countries on the Coast of Malabar, has considerable

recommendations as a marine-yard. First, from the advantage of having docks already formed, of having storehouses erected, and of having within the confined circuit of the island, shipwrights and artizans of every kind in sufficient number, to enable Government to proceed immediately in the construction of ships. Secondly, from the strength of its fortifications, which, without any addition of expence, would give security to whatever might be laid up there: and thirdly, from the facility of procuring on the island, and from its northern dependency of Surat, seamen of the character already described.

On the other hand, the extensive and commodious harbour which has been discovered by late surveys at the island of Andaman (for the protection and security of which a settlement has been formed there by order of Lord Cornwallis), offers us a station in the Bay of Ben-

gal, which may be thought to unite more advantages, from its relative situation, and from the resources which so extensive an island may furnish, than Bombay has been described to possess, or than might be found at the harbour which lies to the southward of Andaman, and is formed, as has been before observed, by two of the Nicobar islands.

But whatever may be the ultimate result of this question, it will be proper, from considerations of common prudence, to conciliate the affections of the natives of the Nicobar islands, and to obtain from them a grant, which should secure to us the exclusive right of establishing there. If this precaution should be neglected, it is to be apprehended that the French may be induced to attempt an establishment upon the small islands which form the harbour; and by that means obtain a port in the Bay of Bengal, perhaps the most commodious to be

found in it, for annoying our commerce. To provide against such an attempt, and to render effectual the concession which we might obtain from the natives of those islands, it will be proper to open a negotiation with the court of Denmark, for the purpose of procuring from that government a surrender of the pretensions upon which they assert their right to the Nicobars.

It is extremely doubtful whether the Danes can support their pretensions upon any solid ground. But as those pretensions were seriously advanced at the court of Vienna in the year 1780, and were then considered of sufficient weight to induce the Emperor to withdraw the factory which Mr. Bolts had established under the Imperial flag at the Nicobars, it may be more just, as well as more politic on our part, to purchase their right, than to dispute it.

The mode of recruiting the Company's army in India has not received any alteration since the year 1780, but still continues to be conducted under the disadvantages that were adverted to in the letter of that year to Lord North.

The consequences of a mode so defective, have been strongly represented at different times by the governments in India ; and as the best evidence of the abuses that are practised in that very important branch of the public service, they have referred to the number of recruits whom it had been found necessary to reject after their arrival in India, as unfit for service, and whom in consequence they were obliged to send back to England.

But although no alteration has yet been made in the mode of recruiting for the military service of the Company, a very important change has taken place since the year 1780 in the military establishment of India, where ten regiments

of his Majesty's troops are now permanently stationed, and form nearly one half of the European army in that quarter of the British dominion.

A plan for assimilating and incorporating into one uniform body, those regiments of his Majesty and the troops of the Company, has been some time under the consideration of Government; and the Minister for India has said in his place in the House of Commons, that as soon as the sentiments of Lord Cornwallis could be obtained upon the subject, the plan would be proposed to Parliament.

Whenever a well digested plan for effecting so necessary a purpose shall be adopted, we may presume that it will provide not only some satisfactory mode for blending the two establishments of the King's and of the Company's troops into one, but that it will immediately correct the defective mode under which the

Company's army has hitherto been recruited, by the introduction of the more regular and approved method which universally prevails in the King's service.

It has been made a question, in treating of a plan for uniting the army in India into one corps, whether the incorporation of the two establishments would best be effected, by extending to all the officers in the service of the Company, commissions from his Majesty, and thereby rendering the whole one establishment under the Crown ; or, whether it might not be more easily accomplished, by encouraging the officers of the King's regiments now in India to accept of commissions from the Company, so that the whole army in India, should become in name, what it is in fact, the army of the Company. It has also been suggested, that in whichever way this incorporation should be brought about, the Indian army, so composed, should be formed

into one local corps, distinct and unconnected with the establishments of Great Britain and Ireland, in the strict military sense of the word ; that is, the officer belonging to the British army should not be allowed to exchange his rank, or be entitled to promotion in the Indian army, and vice versa.

It would be out of my province to offer any opinion upon this subject, if military detail were supposed to be concerned in it. But I conceive the arrangement of a system for bringing the military establishment of the Crown and that of the Company into one uniform corps of army, will be found to involve a question of policy, rather than of profession. And I confess it appears to me, that the decision of it must depend rather upon a judgment to be drawn from the moral character of man, than upon the limited rules of military detail.

I apprehend that neither the discipline

of an army, nor military detail of any sort, can much depend upon the denomination of the authority under which commissions are held. But I conceive, on the other hand, that the conduct of an army when formed, must materially depend upon the extent of the incitements to fame, that are held out to the officers who are to lead and direct it.

The separation of the military establishment in India, from the army establishments of Great Britain and Ireland, in a strict military sense, which should preclude exchanges from the one to the other, would necessarily tend to narrow those incitements ; and by confining the line of promotion, and by limiting the professional rank, it could not fail to operate as a discouragement to men of superior talents, and of military ardour, from engaging in the service of India.

Another consideration, which strongly claims the attention of Government,

arises out of the situation of the officers now in India, as well those attached to the regiments of the Crown, as those immediately in the service of the Company. It is conceived that the just pretensions of each of those two descriptions of officers, will be found to oppose any mode, the object of which should be to confine the military promotion in India, solely to the separate establishment that may be formed there.

The officers attached to the King's regiments would probably represent, that when they embarked for India, they had the whole extent of professional preferment open to them; and that they cannot have forfeited that right by their conduct and services in India. That therefore it would be a breach of the compact under which they had entered into the army, to cut them off from the flattering hope of arriving, in their turn, at the first honours of their profession, and of enjoying

that distinction (which military men have ever considered as the best reward of their services) in the bosom of their own country.

The officers of the Company's army, whose merit is not inferior to those above alluded to, might reasonably urge against such a limitation, that they had of late years seen those commands of distinction and advantage, which they had been used to consider as their own peculiar right, conferred upon the officers of his Majesty:——but that they had seen this without murmur, because they had encouraged a hope, that the participation of LOCAL distinctions and advantages to which the King's officers were admitted, to the prejudice of those in the service of the Company, would be compensated for, by the admission of the latter to professional honours in England in common with the former.

If the view which I have now taken of this subject should be thought a just one, it may be hoped that the idea of separating, by a POSITIVE BARRIER, the army establishment in India from that of Europe, will not be insisted upon; but that on the contrary, a plan will be adopted, which, while it shall hold forth all the incitements of an united establishment, and thereby remove those invidious distinctions that have hitherto prevailed between the troops of the Crown and those of the Company, shall discourage the frequency of exchanges between officers on the Indian and those on the British establishment.

The great expence of the voyage, which each party in an exchange must incur, will in itself operate as a strong corrective against the frequency of such a practice; and if all regimental promotion in the army upon the Indian establishment, should be confined to the officers actually

serving there, it would be found that none would remove from that establishment, but those, who from impaired health might be compelled to return to Europe, or those, who from length of service might be included in a promotion of general officers at home, and for whom there might not be vacancies at the time upon the staff, which it is presumed must make a part of the new military establishment for India.

THE NATIVE TROOPS compose so large a proportion of our army in India, they have so materially contributed by their discipline, by their courage, and by their fidelity to our safety in many instances, and to our success upon every occasion, that it would be highly improper not to take some notice of their situation here.

The constitution of a Sepoy battalion differs from the constitution of an European regiment principally in this, that

in addition to the complete establishment of a native colonel or commandant, and of a native captain and two subalterns to each company, the Sepoy battalion has an European officer at its head, who commands the whole; that each company is in like manner commanded by an European officer, and under him by an European serjeant; that the authority of the native commandant in the battalion is subordinate to that of the youngest European officer; and that all the other native officers are subject to the command of a serjeant.

The gradations of rank amongst the native officers (under the controll above described) have been established upon the model of those that are observed in the European corps. Promotion is in general confined to each regiment, and as the policy of the English government has for the most part made that promotion to originate in the ranks, the native officer,

by the time he can arrive at the situation of commandant, must have acquired great professional experience; and from his continued habits in one particular corps, he must have gained considerable influence and weight in the battalion.

Under circumstances which, while they imply professional merit, must necessarily preclude from the distinction of military command, it were to be wished that some mode could be devised for rendering our military service more an object of interest to the native officers; and that by holding out to them some prospective improvement in their condition and establishment, we might the more fix their attachment to our government and dominion.

It was the established usage of the Mogul empire, and it has been and is the practice of all the native governments that have been formed out of the ruins of that empire, to recompense military merit

by grants or orders upon the land rents of the sovereign, during pleasure, or during the life of the grantee.

The introduction of a similar principle into our system of government for India, under limitation as to the extent of the grant, and under all the other corrections which the different circumstances of our situation, compared with that of the native governments, will necessarily suggest, would enable us, at a very small charge to the state, to reward the native officers in our service for their approved fidelity ; to fix their attachment, by the proper direction of that principle of interest, from which otherwise danger is to be apprehended ; and to encourage the best exertion of their talents, by holding out to them as a recompense, an establishment of some distinction and emolument amongst their fellow-subjects.

It would be out of place here to go into any detail of the manner in which this

principle might be applied, under the present system of our land revenue; as a general rule, subject however to exception and distinctions, the mode which we have found established, and which we continue to act under, in what is called the Charity, or Inaumdarry Lands, might be adopted. For although the grant of an inaum professes it to have arisen in charity, while the one here proposed should announce itself as proceeding from approved military service; yet as a temporary alienation of public revenue, the operation and effect of each would be the same.

Instances of eminent merit would require more distinguished and permanent marks of public reward. In such cases, small tenures in perpetuity might be conveyed to the native officers of that description, either by grants of lands, which from the default of heirs, or by forfeiture, may have reverted to Govern-

ment ; or by grants of waste lands, the domainial property of which may be in the sovereign.

But under whatever mode benefits of this nature may be extended to the native officers attached to our army in India, it will be necessary to give the grants, under which they may be conveyed, the denomination of Jaghire ; a term which the usage of India hath made almost appropriate to military reward. If, in addition to the encouragement here proposed, the male children of the native officers and Sepoys in our service, were assured of a provision in military seminaries, upon the same principle that has been already suggested with respect to the European regiments, the interests of the army would become united with those of the state, by relations, which would evince to all our troops the benevolent care of British Government, and which, while they provided the most ef-

fectual security for the fidelity of our armies, would furnish the most efficient stock from which our battalions could be recruited.

I have thought it a duty incumbent on me to point out the peculiarity of situation under which the native officers in our army are placed, to dwell on their merits, and to propose those measures which appeared to be best calculated to improve their prospects out of the line of their profession, before I would allow myself to suggest an idea for increasing the controll over the native corps, by attaching to each battalion of Sepoys a subaltern's command of European artillery, with whom all the ammunition of the battalion should be lodged, and who, in possession of the guns and stores, would, it may be presumed, form a sufficient check upon the native soldiers.

This idea arose in my mind many years ago, and was proposed by me to

Lord Macartney in May, 1784, in consequence of some disorders which had recently broken out amongst the native corps in different parts of the Carnatic, and which had uniformly commenced with the imprisonment of the European officers.

It is but a justice due to our native troops in general to observe here, that the disorders which then took place were not, even at the time, supposed to have proceeded from disaffection. They evidently originated in a cause of real distress, occasioned by the long arrear of pay that was due to those troops in common with the rest of the army, and for the discharge of which they grew impatient, upon the termination of the war.

But although this explanation of their conduct may be urged, and certainly must be considered as a great extenuation of their offence, the circumstances that attended it must be admitted to

prove, that the native troops do feel they possess the power of controlling their European officers; that they have known how to exercise the power to effect, in all the instances to which they applied it; and that, although no danger has hitherto accrued to the state from it, we can have no security that it may not, upon some future occasion, take a more alarming direction, and that therefore we cannot err in guarding, by the timely adoption of measures of prevention, against a danger, the consequences of which might be so serious.

It was not my intention to have gone into this subject at so much length; but I have been led on by an anxious desire to prevent the operation of prejudice against a most meritorious description of men on the one hand, and to point out the danger of a too confident reliance upon their attachment on the other.

Our empire in India, however strongly

it may appear established, must always be considered, as having inseparably connected with it, the disadvantages of a foreign as well as of a distant dominion. It must be remembered, that the army which protects it is principally composed of the natives of the country, over which we have fixed our rule ; that we differ from them in laws, in religion, in language, and in all the relations of society ; and that under these circumstances, the best constituted government cannot secure permanency to such an empire, without employing an attentive and a guarded policy, that shall constantly be directed to correct the weakness and defects, which must inevitably grow up with such a state.

These reflections, and the observations that have preceded them, upon the several parts of the letter which I had the honour of presenting to Lord North in

1780, have been offered with an intention of bringing under view the present state of our army, the resources we have at command for erecting a navy, and the political relation in which we stand with the native powers of India.

If from the review that has been now taken, it should be thought that the suggestions which were submitted to his Majesty's Minister in 1780, have derived any additional weight and consequence from subsequent events, I may encourage a hope, that the warmth with which they were urged, will be considered, at this time, with the indulgence and candour which my feeble efforts then met with from the noble Lord at the head of the administration, to whom they were addressed.

In this hope, and with a view constantly directed to the great interests of the nation in that distant part of the empire, I will now beg the attention of the

reader to a Memoir, which was drawn up by me in March, 1788, and then presented to Mr. Dundas.

It was written at the desire of that Minister, and for the express purpose of conveying a detailed relation of what appeared to be the political situation of the English interest in the south of India; but particularly to point out the danger that might attend a well combined direction of the united forces of Tippoo Sultan, and of the French, against us in that quarter.

The changes which have taken place since that time, in the political state of the Peninsula, and the effects which the glorious termination of the last war have more particularly produced in Mysore, by contracting the dominion, by exhausting the resources, by diminishing the military force, and by weakening the frontier of Tippoo Sultan, are circumstances which, as they are subsequent in point of

time to the date of this Memoir, it is imagined they will more properly come under review after the observations that are contained in it.

MEMOIR,
PRESENTED TO MR. DUNDAS

IN MARCH 1788.

“THE southern provinces of the Car-
“ natic, including Tanjore, have been
“ described at such length in some late
“ publications,* that I shall beg to refer to
“ those works for particular information
“ on the subject; and shall only observe
“ in this place, that they yield an annual
“ revenue of nearly a million sterling, and
“ that they furnish abundantly those ma-
“ nufactures, which for some years have
“ made the staple of the Danish trade
“ from the Coast of Coromandel, and
“ have contributed to support that of
“ France, though they have hitherto had

* See Fullarton on India, pages 81 to 93.

“ no place in our exportation from that
“ coast.

“ Under this impression of their value,
“ it may be considered as not the least
“ important consequence of the late re-
“ volution in Holland, that the danger of
“ an invasion of those provinces from
“ Ceylon, is no longer to be apprehended.

“ Had our European enemies in the
“ last war known how vulnerable we
“ were from that side, with what facility
“ troops might have been transported
“ from Ceylon to Tondy, and Tutaco-
“ rin,* and what resources of provisions
“ and cattle the country could have fur-
“ nished them, favoured and invited as
“ the Dutch were, by the most powerful
“ of the Polygars: had our European
“ enemies known this, or knowing it,
“ had they profited by the information,
“ it cannot be questioned, by those who

* Sea-ports in the Gulf of Manar, and opposite to Ceylon.

“ are acquainted with the distressed state
 “ in which our affairs were during the
 “ whole of 1782, but that the southern
 “ provinces might have been separated
 “ from the Carnatic.*

“ Fortunately for our interest, no con-
 “ certed plan of operations for India had
 “ yet been formed between the French
 “ and Dutch. The success of Hyder Al-
 “ ly had directed the attention of his
 “ European allies to preparation for the
 “ siege of Madras. The armament under
 “ the Marquis de Bussy made the reduc-
 “ tion of Cuddalore its first object ; and
 “ the seat of war was confined to the
 “ province of Arcot.

“ But though danger was in this man-

• In February, 1782, the southern army surrendered to Tippoo Sultaun. In March, 1782, an army of three thousand French was landed at Porto Novo. During the months of April, May, and June, Tanjore and all the southern provinces were ravaged by the enemy. Our garrisons were weak ; and from long arrears of pay, from the scarcity and from the high price of provisions, were distressed, dispirited, and discontented.

“ ner averted from our southern pro-
“ vinces, the opportunity and the advan-
“ tages of invading them from Ceylon,
“ still remained open to the French and
“ Dutch, while their union continued;
“ and in the event of another war, with
“ those powers in confederacy against us,
“ it cannot be doubted but that their ear-
“ liest attention would have been direct-
“ ed to a quarter, where their operations,
“ though concerted with Tippoo Sultaun,
“ could not have been controlled by
“ him; where their conquests might have
“ been maintained, without the aid of his
“ troops; where they might have re-
“ newed the contest for Asiatic empire
“ with us, upon equal terms; and where,
“ instead of the humiliating condition of
“ dependent auxiliaries upon Tippoo Sul-
“ taun, they would have become an es-
“ tablished and a formidable power, in
“ the vicinity of the richest and most
“ defenceless provinces of his empire,

“ namely, Coimbettore, and all the coun-
 “ try south of the Gauts, and east of the
 “ Cauvery.

“ The separation of Holland from the
 “ interest and intrigues of France, having
 “ now deprived the latter of all the ad-
 “ vantages which Ceylon offered to her,
 “ while in alliance with the Dutch; the
 “ cabinet of Versailles must either re-
 “ nounce all pretension to political con-
 “ sideration in India, or it must submit
 “ to throw the whole weight of the
 “ French name into the scale of Tippoo
 “ Sultaun; and however humiliating this
 “ alternative may be, however strong
 “ may be the recollection of past insults
 “ and grievances, it cannot be doubted
 “ but that the policy of France will yield
 “ to it.

“ The partial attachment of that na-
 “ tion to their old establishments of Pon-
 “ dicherry and Carical, which the habit
 “ of former consequence, and some re-

“gard to the property of individuals,
 “hath hitherto supported, cannot, much
 “longer, prevent the French cabinet
 “from perceiving the peculiar disadvan-
 “tages, to which Pondicherry and Cari-
 “cal are exposed, from their local situa-
 “tion, in the centre of a line, every part
 “of which is encompassed by the rival
 “force of the English, and where the
 “French are separated, by that formid-
 “able barrier, from all the posts of Tip-
 “poo Sultaun.

“It must therefore be presumed, that
 “the policy of France will now be di-
 “rected, to the choice of some situation,
 “where, free from such disadvantages,
 “they might hope to re-establish their
 “power, and to recover that political
 “consideration which they formerly held
 “in India. No situation could more fa-
 “vour those views, than that which they
 “have long possessed, although it has
 “been hitherto neglected by them, in

“ their factory at Mahé, on the Coast of
 “ Malabar; unless it be the still more ad-
 “ vantageous position of Calicut, which
 “ is situated about thirty miles south of
 “ Mahé, on the same coast, and which,
 “ being the immediate property of their
 “ ally, Tippoo Sultaun, may be consider-
 “ ed as equally open to them.

“ The distance from either of those
 “ places to Seringapatam, is not one hun-
 “ dred miles, and the communication be-
 “ tween that capital and Calicut, has
 “ been already rendered practicable for
 “ an army, by Tippoo Sultaun and his fa-
 “ ther, who have each, at different times,
 “ marched large bodies of men in that
 “ direction. A navigable river flows near
 “ to Calicut, by means of which, troops
 “ and stores may be conveniently con-
 “ veyed to that place, where ships of
 “ considerable force have been construct-
 “ ed. The possessions of Tippoo Sultaun
 “ surround it on every side; and his im-

“portant fortress of Palicaudcherry com-
 “mands the pass that leads into those
 “southern provinces of the Carnatic,
 “which are immediately under our pro-
 “tection, and which are removed but at
 “the distance of four marches, through a
 “country in his dependence, from that pass.

“The country through which that
 “route lies, includes the fertile districts
 “of Coimbettore and Daraporum. The
 “various and abundant productions of
 “grain for which those districts are re-
 “markable, and the numerous herds of
 “cattle with which they are stocked,
 “furnish resources of the first necessity
 “to an army; while the strong forts of
 “Palicaudcherry and Dindigul present
 “themselves as depots of security, for
 “forming magazines of the greatest ex-
 “tent, and in positions the most favour-
 “able. The former having a free commu-
 “nication, by the river Paniany, to the
 “sea, and being situated at a sufficient dis-

“ tance from our frontier, to favour every
 “ preparation for attack, with little ha-
 “ zard of discovery ; and the latter, which
 “ is built upon a rock, extremely difficult
 “ of access, being situated immediately
 “ upon our frontier, and commanding the
 “ pass into the Madura and Tinevelly
 “ countries.

“ Before the operations of the last war
 “ had opened to European information,
 “ the facility of penetrating with an ar-
 “ my from the west, by Calicut and
 “ Panyany into the Carnatic ; Monsieur
 “ Bellcombe is said to have meditated a
 “ change in the seat of French govern-
 “ ment, seeing, as an officer of his expe-
 “ rience and discernment could not fail
 “ to do, the impracticability of acting to
 “ effect against us in the Carnatic from
 “ Pondicherry. And it is probable, had
 “ not the Mahrattas (with whom we
 “ were then engaged in war) diverted
 “ his attention to other objects, he would

“ have carried into execution the plan
 “ that is ascribed to him, and have trans-
 “ ferred the seat of government from
 “ Pondicherry to Mahé.

“ The successful operations of Colo-
 “ nel Humberston in the last war, from
 “ Mahé and Calicut to Palicaudcherry;
 “ and the subsequent movements of Co-
 “ lonel Fullerton in an opposite direc-
 “ tion, from Tritchinopoly to the same
 “ point of Palicaudcherry, have furnished
 “ such additional arguments of policy to
 “ France, in favour of the western side
 “ of the Peninsula, that Mahé and Calicut
 “ must become objects of the first im-
 “ portance to that government; and un-
 “ less the vigilance and care of our Ad-
 “ ministration, should prepare in time
 “ against the machinations of an enemy,
 “ possessed of such advantages, our va-
 “ luable provinces in the south of the
 “ Carnatic, may yet be wrested from us.
 “ It may be said, that the force cantoned

“ near Tritchinopoly, has been stationed
 “ there expressly to provide against any
 “ attack upon those provinces ; and that
 “ this force is kept in a state of pre-
 “ paration that should establish security.
 “ It is not intended to question this opi-
 “ nion of security, as far as it applies
 “ to the danger of an invasion by the
 “ power of Tippoo Sultaun alone ; but
 “ the danger to be provided against, is
 “ supposed to be of much greater extent.

“ It implies the collected force of
 “ France from the Mauritius, with every
 “ preparation and aid that Tippoo’s am-
 “ ple resources can furnish them with.
 “ It implies a powerful diversion on his
 “ part, both in the northern and central
 “ provinces of the Carnatic, which di-
 “ viding our attention, may make us the
 “ less equal to oppose a sudden and well
 “ conducted invasion of the south. It
 “ implies the inroads of a force, which
 “ the troops cantoned near Tritchinopoly

“ could not meet in the field, and which
 “ passing from Dindigul to Madura,
 “ would immediately separate the latter
 “ country, Tinevelly and the two Mara-
 “ wars from our dominion ; and lastly, it
 “ implies the use which an active and in-
 “ telligent enemy might make of those ad-
 “ vantages, for extending his operations
 “ into the rich provinces of Tritchino-
 “ poly and Tanjore. A measure to which
 “ he would be particularly encouraged,
 “ by seeing that his first conquests would
 “ be completely covered by the thick
 “ woods which extend from Dindigul,
 “ Nattam, Melloor, and Marawar to the
 “ Straits of Manar, and which form a
 “ strong line of separation from north to
 “ south, through our provinces.

“ Should this picture be thought over-
 “ charged, let it be recollected, that the
 “ navigation from Mauritius to the Coast
 “ of Malabar may be performed in a
 “ month or five weeks, at that parti-

“ cular period of the year, when the
 “ monsoon on the Coast of Coromandel,
 “ and as far as our possessions extend in
 “ the south, prevails in its utmost vio-
 “ lence ; and that the heavy rains, which
 “ then fall, are generally considered to be
 “ a preclusion to all military operations,
 “ and almost to imply a security against
 “ attack.

“ Under such circumstances, will it be
 “ considered as an ill-grounded apprehen-
 “ sion, that France may be tempted, on
 “ the eve of a rupture with Great Britain,
 “ to send a large European force from
 “ Mauritius to Calicut or Panyany in Oc-
 “ tober ; and that every preparation of
 “ conveyance may be provided for them
 “ by Tippoo Sultan, with an army of ca-
 “ valry and Sepoys to act with them ?
 “ Will it be considered beyond the reach
 “ of Tippoo’s policy, in support of such a
 “ plan, to direct a force through Cuddapa
 “ towards the northern frontier, where

“ we have nothing to oppose him, and
 “ where he may effectually cut off our
 “ communication with the Circars ?

“ If these are not questions of idle ap-
 “ prehension, may they not be urged fur-
 “ ther, to ask, what would be our situa-
 “ tion under this complicated danger,
 “ with the main force of Mysore collected
 “ in the Barra-Maul ? Could our army
 “ at Arcot, in such an event, detach
 “ troops to Tritchinopoly, at the distance
 “ of two hundred miles, in support of the
 “ southern division of our force ? or could
 “ it send a body to dispute the passage
 “ of the Gondegama in the north, at
 “ nearly as great a distance. Could it
 “ prevent Tippoo Sultan from pouring in
 “ reinforcements by Erroad and Carroor
 “ to support the operations of the French
 “ in the south: and with such an aid, in
 “ addition to the other advantages we
 “ have supposed, may it not be asked,
 “ what could prevent the French from

“ establishing themselves in that quar-
“ ter ?

“ If the deductions we have made,
“ should appear to be fairly drawn from
“ the relative situations of force and
“ country, it must follow, that even in
“ the present increased strength of our
“ military establishment on the Coast of
“ Coromandel, we are not sufficiently
“ prepared, to resist a well concerted
“ attack, from the united powers of
“ France and of Tippoo Sultaun. Perhaps
“ by carrying our attention to the pro-
“ posed establishments of Bengal and
“ Bombay, we may find in them, the
“ means of giving full security to the
“ Carnatic, without exposing those va-
“ luable possessions, to any new danger,
“ or weakening our general political in-
“ terest.

“ The experience of two unfortunate
“ wars has furnished melancholy proof,
“ that the force of Bombay can never be

“ employed to effect against Mysore,
 “ unless it can be made to act in concert
 “ with another force, towards which it
 “ may advance, or from which it may
 “ retire, without being exposed to mea-
 “ sure strength with the collected power
 “ of the enemy.

“ From an opposite principle of con-
 “ duct in our first war with Hyder Ally,
 “ we lost Mangalore to him, in as short
 “ a time as we had taken it from his
 “ deputy ; and though in the last war,
 “ we possessed uncommon advantages of
 “ strength, and were favoured by the de-
 “ fection of Tippoo’s officers, the con-
 “ quests we made in Bidenore were soon
 “ wrested from us, and the greater part
 “ of the troops to whose gallantry we
 “ were indebted for them, fell a sacrifice
 “ to the enemy.

“ The fact is, that the distance from
 “ the Carnatic to Bidenore and Manga-
 “ lore is so great, and the route so im-

“ practicable, without first reducing My-
 “ sore, that whatever force may enter the
 “ dominions of Tippoo Sultaun by Bide-
 “ nore or Mangalore, must inevitably be
 “ left to depend on its own strength and
 “ resources ; and however great that
 “ strength may be, it is apprehended that
 “ no exertions can make its resources
 “ equal to the undertaking ; for Bombay,
 “ insulated and unfertile, cannot supply
 “ draught and carriage cattle for convey-
 “ ing the guns, stores, and provisions ne-
 “ cessary for enabling an invading army
 “ of great force, after it shall have effect-
 “ ed a landing, to ascend the difficult
 “ mountains of the Balagat, and to trans-
 “ port with it the means of advancing,
 “ or of maintaining its ground there.

“ If then no exertions of the Bombay
 “ government can promise any extensive
 “ and permanent success to our opera-
 “ tions against Mysore, either on the
 “ side of Mangalore or of Bidenore ; if

“ there be reason to imagine that the
 “ route by Calicut and Palicaudcherry,
 “ which in the last war opened to us so
 “ fair a prospect, is to become the quarter
 “ of danger to our own possessions, would it
 “ not seem to follow, that Bombay should
 “ now be considered, rather as a naval
 “ station, than as a military post for as-
 “ sembling an army; that the garrison
 “ there should be formed, more upon the
 “ principle of defence against an Euro-
 “ pean enemy, than of attack upon an
 “ Indian foe; and that all the troops
 “ upon that establishment, except such as
 “ should be judged necessary for the
 “ protection of Bombay, and the safety
 “ of its dependencies, should be stationed
 “ where the general interest may be most
 “ benefited by their services, and where,
 “ in the event of a war, the distinguish-
 “ ed talents of General Medows may
 “ find employment?

“ Before we proceed to name the situa

“ tion to which this description (it is
 “ believed) will be found peculiarly to
 “ apply, it will be necessary to advert to
 “ what the influence of long established
 “ opinion will probably suggest against
 “ such a measure.

“ The great armaments that were fitted
 “ out in support of Ragobah, and the sub-
 “ sequent operations of General Goddard
 “ in Guzerat and in Concan, may be
 “ urged as arguments to shew that Bombay
 “ has furnished the resources, the want of
 “ which is here so much insisted on. It
 “ may be said, that the conquest of Bi-
 “ denore affords a positive proof that the
 “ dominion of Tippoo Sultaun is open to
 “ invasion in that direction, while the
 “ loss of it may be ascribed to any cause,
 “ but the want of means for preserving
 “ it. The movements of Colonel Hum-
 “ berston’s little army may be insisted
 “ on, as evidence of the facility of our
 “ penetrating by the southern extremity

“ of the countries which were conquered
 “ by Hyder Ally from the Samorin of
 “ Calicut ; and the situation of Telli-
 “ cherry, encompassed by the country of
 “ the Cотиotee Rajah our ally (whose
 “ territory approaches within forty miles
 “ of Seringapatam), may be thought to
 “ offer us as favourable an opening for
 “ invading Mysore, as any that has yet
 “ been attempted.

“ To such arguments it may be an-
 “ swered, that Ragobah and his friends
 “ furnished the greater part of the re-
 “ sources for the war, which was carried
 “ on by us in his support. That Gene-
 “ ral Goddard carried with him from
 “ Bengal, the draught and carriage cattle
 “ for the army which he commanded ;
 “ and that he drew fresh supplies from
 “ his alliances and conquests in Guzerat.
 “ That General Mathews’s army, when
 “ it first entered Bidenore, had not con-
 “ veyance for a field train, and for the

“ transport of ten days provisions. That
 “ Colonel Humberston, without any
 “ carriage for provisions, was not able
 “ to move his battering train from Pa-
 “ niany to Palicaudcherry, from the want
 “ of cattle to draw it ; and, I must add,
 “ as a well grounded inference from all
 “ the preceding circumstances, that should
 “ the French make Mahé or Calicut
 “ their place of arms, it is seriously to be
 “ apprehended that Tellicherry will be-
 “ come to us, what Pondicherry has been
 “ to the French, the prison of its garri-
 “ son ; and probably will be seized on by
 “ them, as the first measure of the war ;
 “ for neither the woods nor the hills of
 “ Cotiottee could cover it from an enemy,
 “ as was proved by the blockade it suffer-
 “ ed during sixteen months in the last
 “ war with Hyder Ally.

“ After this exposition of the presumed
 “ inability of Bombay to equip an effi-
 “ cient army for the field, and of the

“ positive dangers that must surround
 “ Tellicherry ; it may be inferred, that
 “ any situation which should appear free
 “ from those disadvantages, would have
 “ sufficient recommendation.

“ If, in addition to this, it can be
 “ shewn that a station may be found,
 “ which would give that protection to
 “ the southern provinces of the Carnatic,
 “ which we have seen them to be so
 “ much in need of, and that would en-
 “ able us, upon the return of war, to con-
 “ vert our covering army in the south
 “ into an army of attack. If circum-
 “ stances such as these can be thrown
 “ into the scale, it will be admitted that
 “ the most fit station for the field army
 “ of Bombay, must be that which shall
 “ seem to unite those advantages in the
 “ greatest extent ; and it is presumed
 “ that a position in the vicinity of Ma-
 “ dura, will be found peculiarly to pos-
 “ sess them.

“ In describing the insufficiency of the
 “ cantonment established at Tritchino-
 “ poly, for protecting the southern pro-
 “ vinces of the Carnatic, it has been ob-
 “ served, that Dindigul must be looked to
 “ as the nearest post of the enemy, and
 “ as the probable depot for all the in-
 “ cumbrances of an invading army. The
 “ slightest inspection of our maps will
 “ shew, that no position could be more
 “ favourable for checking the progress
 “ of an enemy from Dindigul, than the
 “ one above suggested near Madura.
 “ It is imagined that it will not be found
 “ less favourable to the movements of
 “ our own force, whenever it may be
 “ judged necessary to direct it against
 “ Tippoo Sultaun.

“ The experience of the two wars we
 “ have been engaged in with Mysore, is
 “ the best evidence of this fact, and its au-
 “ thority will warrant the assertion, that
 “ in one well concerted campaign, with

“ such a force as the proposed arrange-
 “ ment would give us, we might reduce
 “ the richest portion of the dominion
 “ of, Tippoo Sultaun ; the possession of
 “ which, by carrying us to the range of
 “ the Balagaut mountains for our fron-
 “ tier, would remove all danger of future
 “ invasion from Mysore, and would give
 “ us an accession of strength, of far more
 “ consequence than the extension of do-
 “ minion, though that extension should
 “ be found to yield a million sterling per
 “ annum, without requiring the addition
 “ of a single soldier to the establishment,
 “ which must be kept up for the defence
 “ of the countries now under our protec-
 “ tion.

“ The authority referred to, will shew in
 “ the public correspondence of 1768, that
 “ the whole country from Kistnagherry
 “ on the north-east, to Coimbettore in the
 “ west, was reduced, in six months, by
 “ the small and ill-equipped force, which

“ Madras could then send into the field ;
 “ and the same records will bear evi-
 “ dence, that in the short space of three
 “ weeks, those valuable provinces, which
 “ we had so fortunately acquired, were
 “ re-taken from us by Hyder Ally.

“ The rapidity with which those con-
 “ quests were both made and lost in that
 “ year, marks strongly the facility with
 “ which an army might extend itself,
 “ from the northern extremity of the Bar-
 “ ra-Maul, to the western boundary of the
 “ country below the mountains at Co-
 “ imbettore ; and it will hardly be ques-
 “ tioned, but that the same success, with
 “ more permanent effect, would attend a
 “ well concerted plan of operations, di-
 “ rected to the same object, when we
 “ should have three powerful armies in
 “ the field, one moving from Arcot, ano-
 “ ther from Tritchinopoly, and a third
 “ from Madura to effect it ; and when a
 “ well regulated ambition, by confining

“ our views to such acquisitions as our
 “ own security might point out, should
 “ leave us in full possession of the means
 “ for preserving the whole.

“ With this important object in view,
 “ it may not appear an unnecessary mea-
 “ sure of precaution, to provide against
 “ the possible danger of a descent at Mu-
 “ tapilly, or Nizampatam, on the north-
 “ ern coast of the Carnatic, where the
 “ newly acquired dominion of Tippoo
 “ Sultaun, in Cuddapa, and the unpro-
 “ tected country of Guntoor, lately ced-
 “ ed to the Company by the Soubadar
 “ of the Deccan, but still open to the
 “ power of Tippoo Sultaun, might tempt
 “ the French, disappointed on the Ma-
 “ labar side of India, to resume the plan
 “ which one of their former governors,
 “ Monsieur Law, made the favourite ob-
 “ ject of his administration, and which,
 “ under the conduct of the partizan

“ Lally, engaged the attention of the government of Madras for several years.

“ In the present state of Tippoo’s power, it is not probable that he would encourage the French to direct their attention to a quarter, where success would soon render them independent of him, and where our Northern Circars, once the seat of their power, could not fail to excite their ambition.

“ But should he and they see the fullness of our security in the south of the Carnatic, and perceive our weakness and improvidence in the north; in such an event, it would seem an unpardonable confidence to say, that we were free from all danger, because we had provided against it in the most probable quarter of attack; or, that as this danger in the north can only come upon us by sea, we might depend upon our ships for protection.

“ But, though policy should forbid our
 “ relying altogether upon such security,
 “ it will allow of our regulating the mea-
 “ sure of defence by it; and on this
 “ ground, it is imagined, that a small
 “ force, cantoned between Mutapilly on
 “ the sea coast, and the possessions of
 “ Tippoo Sultaun, (in support of the mi-
 “ litary station already established at El-
 “ lore in our Northern Circars) would
 “ shew us in a state of preparation, which
 “ might establish a security as complete
 “ in the north, as we have seen it in the
 “ south; and which, like that, might be
 “ made, in the event of a war, to add to
 “ our dominion, while it strengthened
 “ our frontier; as may be seen by the
 “ position of Ellore and the relative si-
 “ tuation of that place, and of the Port
 “ at Mutapilly, with the country of Cud-
 “ dapa.

“ It must be confessed, that the army
 “ on the Coast of Coromandel will not be

“ in strength, even with the reinforce-
 “ ments now destined for it, and with
 “ those proposed to be drawn from Bom-
 “ bay, to furnish the troops necessary to
 “ form a military station at Mutapilly.
 “ It remains for us to examine, whether
 “ this deficiency can be supplied from
 “ Bengal, without exposing that most va-
 “ luable part of our dominion to danger.

“ It will be proper, upon this occasion,
 “ to have recourse to that authority,
 “ which has been already called in aid to
 “ support a difference from received opi-
 “ nion ; the authority of our own expe-
 “ rience in the wars of 1768 and 1781.
 “ In each of those wars, it was found
 “ necessary to send troops from Bengal
 “ to the Coast of Coromandel ; in each
 “ of them, much time was lost, before
 “ those troops could be transported by
 “ sea, or marched from such a distance ;
 “ and in each, but particularly in the last,
 “ infinite danger might have attended the

“ undertaking ; for a powerful army of
 “ Mahrattas from Berar, threatened to
 “ dispute the passage through Cuttack,
 “ and our European enemies were su-
 “ perior to us at sea.

“ If, under such discouraging circum-
 “ stances, it was judged expedient to de-
 “ tach a force from Bengal, in support of
 “ our interest in the Deccan ; if, while
 “ we were at war with the whole Mah-
 “ ratta nation, and when all the great
 “ powers of India were in confederacy
 “ against us, Bengal was considered not
 “ only safe from the dangers of invasion,
 “ but able to send forth armies to Surat,
 “ to Madras, and to Malva, may it not
 “ be inferred, that upon any return of
 “ general danger, the same exertions
 “ would be renewed by the superintend-
 “ ing government of India.

“ If this inference should be admitted,
 “ and it is presumed that it cannot be
 “ disputed, it must further be admitted,

“ that the more expeditiously the force of
 “ Bengal can be thrown into the scale of
 “ the war, and the fewer obstacles are
 “ left in the way of its progress, the more
 “ our general interest must be benefited
 “ by its support.

“ It is confidently believed, that these
 “ two important advantages, of time and
 “ opportunity, are to be found in fixing
 “ the station of one of the Bengal bri-
 “ gades somewhere in the province of
 “ Ganjam, from whence we have an un-
 “ interrupted communication, through a
 “ country in our dependence, to the ex-
 “ tremity of the Peninsula ; and where
 “ from our vicinity to Berar, from whence
 “ only danger can approach Bengal in
 “ the west, we should become possessed
 “ of the best security against that dan-
 “ ger, by having it in our power, either
 “ to seize upon Cuttack and oppose the
 “ passage of an army ; or to obstruct its
 “ return, or to enter Berar in force our-

“ selves, as circumstances at the time
“ might direct.

“ We should further have it in our
“ power, upon the adoption of this plan,
“ by the single operation of moving the
“ Madras troops now stationed in the
“ Ganjam and Cicacole Circars, to Mu-
“ tapilly, to complete the protection of
“ the Carnatic, and of all the northern
“ Circars, against every possible danger,
“ either from our European or Indian
“ enemies; and to present a force and
“ strength of preparation in every direc-
“ tion, which might enable us to pre-
“ scribe limits to the power of the Ni-
“ zam, and of Tippoo Sultaun, which
“ could not fail to have some influence
“ upon the turbulent ambition of the
“ Mahratta nation, and which in its con-
“ sequences might render us the happy
“ ministers of general peace to Hindoos-
“ tan.

OBSERVATIONS.

It would be foreign to the object of this little work, and it would be a very unnecessary intrusion on the time of the reader, were I, even superficially, to take a view of the rise and progress of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun. The official dispatches of the noble Lord, who so ably directed, and so successfully conducted the operations of that war, will be found to contain full information upon those interesting subjects. Those readers who may wish for a more detailed explanation, will be gratified by referring to the well arranged history of the campaigns by Major Dirom.

The general result of the war, and the immediate effects which may have been

produced by it, upon our internal security, and upon our political relation with the other powers of India, are alone the points to which I wish to draw attention.

It has been seen in the Memoir that was presented to Mr. Dundas in March, 1788, that the positions from which, it was conceived, we had most reason to apprehend danger in a war with Tippoo Sultaun and the French, were, the positions of Calicut and of Mahé, on the Coast of Malabar; the position of Pali-caudcherry, commanding the principal pass leading from the Malabar Coast, through Coimbettore and Daraporam, into the southern provinces of the Carnatic, under our protection; the position of Dindigul, situated upon the frontier of those provinces, and threatening them alike in an eastern and a western direction; together with the various strong hill forts that are, as it were, in-

sulated throughout the whole extent of the Barra-Maul, from whence the ravaging plunderers of Mysore had so often been enabled to desolate the Carnatic.

All those positions, heretofore of such danger and alarm, have been converted by our late success, into posts of security and protection to the dependencies of the English. We are now enabled, by the possession of those posts, to present a frontier of great strength towards Mysore, in those directions where formerly we were most exposed ; and we see open to our power, the rich provinces of Caroor, Daraporam, and Coimbettore, which, instead of serving as heretofore to fill the magazines of the enemy at Palicaudcherry and at Dindigul, (then the depots of an invading army from Mysore) may now be considered, from their defenceless state, as the best guaranty for securing to us, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, a faithful observance of the stipulations en-

tered into by him in the treaty of Seringapatam.

In addition to advantages of such importance in a military point of view, territorial cessions which yield an annual revenue of more than £500,000, have been made to us by Tippoo Sultaun. The Mahratta nation and the Nizam have been taught, by the discipline and enterprising courage of our troops, to consider them with an admiration equal to what was produced in India by the first achievements of Europeans, and which can be exceeded only by the respect that has been excited in the minds of our allies, from the moderation and good faith, which made them equal parties with ourselves, in all the advantages of the peace, and by which the dominion and strong holds of Tippoo Sultaun are as much reduced on the north-west in favour of the Mahrattas, and on the north-east in favour of the Nizam, as has been already

described to have happened, in favour of the British interest in other directions.

If, under circumstances of so much humiliation and reduction of power, the imperious mind of Tippoo Sultaun can accommodate itself to his situation, it may be hoped that, taught by such fatal experience, he will form a more just estimate of his remaining resources, and of our comparative means of resistance, than he did when he provoked us to contend with him in the last war.

I have no hesitation to say, that in my humble opinion, the policy of the English Government cannot be better directed, than in conciliating, by every proper and dignified means which may occur, a disposition to peace, in this ferocious and ambitious character. He should find us ready to meet him in every reasonable desire, that may have for its object the increase of the internal trade of his country, or the improvement

of the compact and valuable dominion still under his government, of which Bidenore forms a part, not more considerable from the extent of its revenue, than from the circumstance of its capital having been for ages the centre of commerce in the Deccan.

He should experience from us the same rigid adherence, to every stipulation under which we have entered towards him, that we have, or may hereafter exact from him towards us; and he should see us, on every side, in a state of such military preparation, and with our power so fortified by political alliances, as might lead him to adopt for a rule of conduct, that principle which it is known was the original policy of his father,* and which might make him solicit for a union of interests with us, in the great system of India, as the best means of assuring stability to his own family in the government of

* See Tanjore Papers, Printed Appendix, No. 14.

Mysore, and of drawing to himself, some portion of that political weight and consideration, which he formerly aspired to, and had obtained, amongst the powers of India.

Perhaps no measure could more tend to excite sentiments of this kind in the mind of Tippoo Sultaun, than that which the wisdom of Lord Cornwallis has already acted upon, in support of our ally the Nizam, whose government, in the newly ceded countries, is now upheld by a detachment of our troops, and towards whom, it is hoped we shall continue to observe, in the fullest extent, the obligation which we contracted in the treaty of 1766, whereby it was stipulated, that we should furnish him, at his separate expence and charge, with a military aid for the protection of his dominions.

If a station had been sought for, within the limits of our own territories, in a direction that could most have favoured

all our political views, it is probable that no one could have been fixed upon, that would have united so many advantages, as it is thought may be found in a position within the countries lately ceded to the Nizam.

For, whether the selection of such a station were to be determined, by a consideration, how we could most effectually give protection and security to the extended line of the Carnatic, from Vellour to the Kishua ; and to the no less extended line of our northern Circars, from the Kishua to Ganjam ; or whether, in the event of a rupture with Tippoo Sultaun, (the possibility of which must ever be kept in view) we were to take into consideration, how the war might be carried into Mysore, from the north, to the most effect, either for distressing the enemy, or for securing to ourselves those immense convoys of Banjarees, by the assistance of which, our operations in the last war

were so much forwarded. In each of these points of view, it is conceived, that no circumstance could have been more favourable to our political interests, than that which has enabled us to establish a fixed station of our troops, in the quarter where they are now employed, in the service of the Nizam ; where, while they enable him to collect a considerable revenue, with the greatest œconomy and security, they at the same time relieve the English treasury from the burthen of pay, and other charges, which would be necessarily incident to such a detachment wherever they might be stationed within our own territories.

If our other ally in the late war, the Mahratta state, were disposed to accept a military aid from us, upon the same conditions under which it is now granted to the Nizam, and to be employed for similar purposes, in the countries which have been lately ceded to them by Tippoo

Sultaun, it is imagined, that many political advantages might be derived therefrom, without incurring the risk of any material danger to our troops, and with additional security to our allies.

It must however be acknowledged, that those advantages would consist rather in the effect which such a measure might produce on the mind of Tippoo Sultaun, and in the œconomy that would result from it to ourselves, than in those great and substantial benefits, which have been adverted to, in support of a similar establishment of our troops in the country of the Nizam. The Mahratta states possess within themselves the means of giving sufficient cover and protection to all those provinces of their empire that confine upon Mysore. The resources of their government are great, and the local advantages of their situation, on the Coast of Malabar, are such as must, in common policy, lead Tippoo to conciliate

them, because he must consider them as the Indian power, whose alliance would most favour any future views which, in concert with the French, he might hereafter be encouraged to entertain.

IN OUR PRESENT STATE OF WELL FOUNDED SECURITY, it may perhaps be thought an unnecessary precaution, to suggest any ideas of guarding against views, the accomplishment of which must depend upon the defection of the Mahratta state from our alliance; upon the establishment of a solid government in France; and upon the renewed strength of the treasury, and of the army of Tippoo Sultaun.

But however distant a danger of this kind may appear, it is of a nature too serious to be totally disregarded. The interests and views of the Mahratta states are complicated, and often seem to be in contradiction. Their government is composed of members too powerful to be con-

trolled or directed. Faction has frequently produced revolution at Poonah ; and the venality of that administration is proverbial throughout Hindoostan.

It may be presumed, that the French nation cannot much longer be kept in subjection by the ferocious despotism which now convulses that country ; and it is imagined, whatever form of government may arise out of that scene of disorder, both the interests and the tranquillity of Europe will require, that all former channels of commerce and industry should be opened to France.—The habits of war, to which every description of persons in that country is now formed, cannot be made to subside into the occupations of peace, by any less powerful means than the stimulus of interest. The re-establishment of the French at Pondicherry and at Mauritius, (if we should take that island) may therefore be considered as necessary consequences of the

return of peace. Those are objects to which they have at all times attached great value and consideration. The restitution of them would be grateful to the feelings of that nation, and it would not be any great sacrifice of interest on our part to give them up.

It is to be expected, that wherever the French may fix the seat of their government in India, the revival of their political connection with Tippoo Sultaun will suggest itself as an early object of their attention ; and if his interest should not have led him into a close alliance with us, we shall probably see an union between those two powers, established upon a ground more solid than it has been at any time heretofore ; because, to give it effect, they must concentrate their force ; and, because, the experience of past misfortunes will have taught them the necessity of concerting their measures without jealousy of command.

The ports of Carwar and Mangalore, with an extensive territory, that includes three degrees of latitude on the Coast of Malabar, are still in the possession of Tippoo Sultaun. Those ports are conveniently situated for the debarkation of troops, and their position would be favourable for enabling the French to effect a junction with the army of Mysore.

In the event of such a junction, the dominions of the Nizam on the north of the Carnatic, or the provinces newly ceded to us on the Coast of Malabar, would alike excite their attention; or both of those objects might be pursued at the same time, if the Mahrattas were to be led, either by motives of jealousy or ambition, to take part with the French and Tippoo Sultan, in a war against us. For while the united forces of the two latter powers were directed towards Calicut and Palicaudcherry, the Mahrattas

might be employed in endeavouring to sever from the dominions of the Nizam, and to subject to their own power, the countries of Belharry, of Adoni, and of Canoul.

It is hoped, that those suggestions of what the policy of our rivals might lead them to attempt, will not be construed into an apprehension of any probable danger. They are offered under a very opposite impression. What I have stated, has proceeded from the full conviction I feel, that we are in possession of means and resources so ample and efficient, as must enable us to defeat the best concerted schemes of our rivals. I have thought myself justified in endeavouring to discover what those schemes might be, from a belief, that the most certain way of discouraging our rivals from forming such schemes, would be to shew them,

that we foresaw the utmost extent of their range, and that we were prepared to meet them in every possible direction.

That the same policy which has heretofore influenced the counsels of France, with respect to India, should be resumed by them, cannot be thought improbable. It is therefore the more necessary that we should embrace the opportunity which now presents itself, to strengthen ourselves in those quarters, from which experience has taught us danger might have been apprehended; and, by every means in our power, to guard against the consequences of that spirit of intrigue and ambition in the French nation, which our good fortune, wise policy, and military success, have hitherto enabled us so effectually to counteract on the Peninsula of India.

The various measures that have been proposed in the preceding pages, have all been directed to that end; it is con-

ceived that they will have shewn us to be in a state of complete security in the north, where, from the various separate stations of our own troops, we should be enabled to reinforce the detachment established with the Nizam, and where, in conjunction with him, we should be in force to oppose any army that an enemy could collect in that quarter.

In the south, our possessions are already rendered so secure, that we can have nothing to desire in point of DEFENCE on that side, unless it be that the strength of the Bombay army should be cantoned between Tellicherry and Palicaudcherry, in preference to a station in the vicinity of Madura, as was recommended at the time when Tippoo Sul-taun was in possession of the important post of Dindigul, but which has ceased to be advisable, since Dindigul has become a part of our own dominion.

It is indeed to be wished that the im-

mediate direction and controul over that army, and over the newly ceded provinces on the Coast of Malabar, were vested in the government of Madras, with which they have an uninterrupted line of communication, instead of being lodged in the government of Bombay, from which they are separated by four hundred miles of country, subject either to Tippoo Sultaun, or to the Mahratta state, and with which therefore they can have neither communication nor correspondence, but by the precarious, and sometimes hazardous navigation along the sea coast of Malabar ; a disadvantage which has been particularly pointed out by my friend Major Rennell, who has observed that “ during “ the south-west monsoon, those districts “ might as well be subject to Fort Mal- “ brough as to Bombay.”*

A general idea of the value and importance of the southern provinces of the

* See Memoir, section II.

Carnatic, has been given in the Memoir which I had the honour of presenting to Mr. Dundas in 1788. But they have received so great an increase of value and of political consideration since that time, by the cessions which were made to us in the peace of 1792 by Tippoo Sultaun, that it will be proper to take another view of them in their extended and improved relation.

To render this view of our interest in the south of India the more perspicuous, it will be necessary to refer to the line of geographical demarkation, which in 1788 separated the southern provinces of the Carnatic from the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun, and to compare that line with the one that marks our respective boundaries at this time.

By a reference to the accurate map of Major Rennell, and to the explanation and judicious reflections with which that able geographer has illustrated this sub-

ject in his last Memoir,* it will appear, that, in addition to local advantages, which, in a military point of view, have converted danger into security, our territorial line of contiguous possession (including the dependant state of Travancore) has been extended 250 miles in a direction from north to south, on the Coast of Malabar, and that an encrease of revenue has been thereby obtained by us of more than three hundred thousand pounds a year on that side of India.

With such an extension of connected dominion, and of encreased revenue, and with the keys of Coimbettore placed in our hands, by the possession of Palicaudcherry and Dindigul, it would seem that no addition was wanting to render our political situation in the south of India complete. It must, however, be confessed, that though we are thus effectually secured against the attempts of

* See Memoir, section II.

foreign powers, we remain exposed to a danger of another kind, not less serious in its nature, proceeding from the collision of authority in the provinces immediately under the dependance of the Nabob of the Carnatic ; and it is feared, that until some amicable arrangement can be made with that old and faithful ally of the British nation, which shall place the power of government in that quarter, solely in the hands of the English administration, no effectual provision can be established against the return of those internal disorders, which have heretofore so frequently interrupted the tranquillity of the country ; and which, in their own operation and consequences, have been the occasion of heavy loss to the state, and of distress and wretchedness to the peaceable and industrious inhabitants.

To form a just estimate of the importance of the measure here suggested, it will be necessary to take into our view,

the peculiar character of the Polygars, who have for ages inhabited, and who now possess almost in sovereignty, the greater part of the strong country, extending from Trichinopoly on the east, to the frontier of Travancore on the west, and whose depredations have too frequently rendered the revenue of the open country precarious.

The Polygars, from long practised habits of plunder and pillage, (to which they have been excited by the unsteady, and therefore oppressive government of the Nabob, as much as by the attraction of gain) have usually been distinguished by the denomination of Colleries, or Robbers, and they are to this day so described, unless we except those of them who inhabit the pollams or thick woods of Tinnevelly. An exception, which indeed includes a very numerous and powerful class, but who no otherwise deserve the distinction, than as they pursue a

more systematic course of plunder, and as they are more formidable to the authority of government, from the absolute sway of their chiefs, who, to the number of thirty-two, exercise the most despotic authority, each in his separate and independent pollam.

To counteract the turbulent and rebellious spirit of the Polygars and Colleries, it is absolutely necessary that the authority under which they are governed, should oppose to that spirit, a character of steady and rigid justice; that an invariable adherence to good faith on the part of the rulers, should be made the principle, upon which obedience to the state, and respect to the rights and property of individuals, should be exacted and enforced; and that, until time shall have corrected the prejudiced habits of this hardy and high spirited race, the attention of the state should be directed rather to the prevention of offences,

by vigilance and timely interposition, than to the punishment of crimes by military execution, which, whatever the temporary operation may be, never fails to encrease the evil it is intended to correct.

An attempt has been lately made towards effecting this saluary purpose, by a stipulation in the Treaty of July 1792, with the Nabob of the Carnatic, by which the amount of the sums to be paid annually by each Polygar to government, has been ascertained and fixed; and an assignment of that amount has been made by the Nabob to the Company, in part of the subsidy, which he has engaged to pay them, as his proportion towards defraying the expences of the peace establishment on that side of India.

But as the military service of the Polygars has been stated in that Treaty to be a duty to which they are bound by their tenures, and has been reserved to the

Nabob, as a right inherent in the superior government of the country, it is to be apprehended that two very material evils will be found to arise out of this arrangement, and that the object, which the Treaty had principally in view, may be defeated by them. First, because it leaves the Polygars exposed to a service of considerable and undefined expence, which may be extended to a degree that would be more burthensome and oppressive than a temporary exaction of money could be. And, Secondly, because it must inevitably operate to sanction and confirm the Polygars in the feudal practice which they have introduced into their districts, and under which the greater part of the lands, which should yield a revenue to the state, have been parcelled out by them, to their military retainers, with scarcely any other reservation, than an acknowledgment of superiority and military service; while other

large portions of their districts have been diverted from cultivation, for the purpose of converting them into pollams, or thickets of almost impenetrable thorn, with a view of rendering the access to the strong holds which they have established, more difficult and hazardous.

It is a fact, confirmed by the experience of all the wars in which we have been engaged in India, that our operations have been more impeded than assisted by the presence of Polygar troops; that our supplies have been as often obstructed, as they have been forwarded, by their means; and that in every military point of view, the Polygar soldiers are to be considered as an useless and a burthensome rabble.

It were therefore to be wished, that the stipulations in the treaty with the Nabob had been left more open; and that by relieving the Polygars on the one hand, from every kind of military ser-

vice, and by binding us on the other, to account to the Nabob for every increase in the revenue, which, under such release, we might be enabled in the course of time to draw from the Polygars, we had acquired the right of correcting the vices of the existing system, so that, while we enforced the submission and obedience of the Polygar chiefs, by a well directed and steady exercise of authority, we might have had it in our power to encourage the active and robust inhabitants of their pollams to habits of industry and peaceable occupation.

Under the arrangement made by the treaty, this cannot be attempted with any hope of success. We cannot expect that the Polygars will concur with us, in any measure which may tend to render the people less dependant on them; neither can we hope that our endeavours will be supported by the civil officers of the Nabob. On the contrary, we must

be prepared to see our views counteracted, by the intriguing spirit of both, but particularly of the latter, who will be stimulated by interest, as well as by disappointment, to employ every art, for the purpose of endeavouring to prevent the Polygars, from considering their present separation, from the authority of the Nabob, as a fixed and permanent measure. By their means, distrust will be excited where confidence should be established ; and a defalcation in the Polygar payments will be encouraged by them, as the most probable way, of making us wish to exchange that assignment, for some other more certain and secure.

The default of payment on the part of the Polygars will, as heretofore, be followed by their predatory incursions into the open country. To repel those disorders, troops must be marched against the Polygars; resistance will aggravate their offence ; and we shall see renewed those

ruinous scenes of warfare, which have so frequently employed the English arms, in punishing the subjects of the Nabob for offences which too evidently originated in the weakness and disorder of his government, and which, it is feared, will continue to proceed from similar causes under the modification we have introduced.

A divided authority can never be adequate, to the arduous and difficult task, of effectuating a reform, in the long established habits and manners of the Polygars and Colleries; neither can we expect to see any material improvement in the conduct and condition of those people, while their attention is called off, on one side, by the civil administration of the Nabob, and on the other by the coercive power of the English.

The only remedy from which a radical cure of this great political evil can be hoped for, would be the adoption of a

systematic arrangement, which should resolve all the powers of government into one controlling authority, to which, and to which alone, all classes and descriptions of persons should be made to direct both their hopes and their fears.

Such was the system which Isoof Cawn introduced when he assumed the government of those provinces; and although he held them, for some time, under all the disadvantages of an usurped authority, yet so great was the vigour of his administration, and so forcible was the example which he set of a rigid adherence to the letter of the engagements he entered into, that the tribute from the Polygars was regularly collected; the property of individuals was secured from the depredations of the Colleries, and the public revenue was considerably augmented.

The two short periods of English administration, at the time of the assumed

revenue, from 1782 to 1785, and from 1790 to 1793, were distinguished by consequences not less favourable to the interest of the state and to the general tranquillity of the country, without having been accompanied by that rigorous, and, in some instances, too severe an exercise of authority which characterized the government of Isoof Cawn.

With evidence so decisive of the beneficial effects that have attended a strong and an equal rule over those provinces ; with evidence not less decisive, derived from the experience of all preceding and intermediate times, that the government of the Nabob does not possess the energy and steadiness necessary for such a purpose, it would seem to be as essential to the real interests of the Nabob, as it would be to those of Great Britain and of humanity, that an arrangement might take place, which should establish an administration in those provinces, to which

the united authority of civil and military power might be entrusted.

I am aware of the objections which would immediately suggest themselves to the mind of the Nabob against such a proposition ; but I do not despair of being able to shew that those objections might be obviated, and that the honour, the dignity, and the prosperity of the Nabob, and of his family, might be advanced and established by such an arrangement, properly tempered and defined.

By the treaty of 1792, the Nabob has engaged, that upon the commencement of any war in which we may hereafter be involved in India, the management and collection of ALL his revenues shall immediately devolve upon, and be assumed by the Company ; and that the administration of them shall continue to be exercised by their officers, during the whole continuance of such war.

In a country so subject to the inter-

ruption of peace, as India has been since Europeans have interfered in its politics, the revolution of government, which this treaty provides for between the Company and the Nabob, must be frequent. Every suspension of the authority of the Nabob, will necessarily be attended by the removal of his confidential servants, and by the employment of those immediately in the service of the Company. New officers, under a new and temporary authority, are not likely to pay much regard to a former system, the supposed inefficiency of which had led to their appointment. During the suspended state of the Nabob's power, HE must be a passive spectator of every innovation; it is therefore but too probable, that when the period of his deposition shall cease, his first object will be to establish his old servants, and to introduce the regulations which the preceding government may have endeavoured to do away.

The dependants of the English, who

may have been employed in the collection of the revenue during the period of the suspended authority of the Nabob, must therefore expect to experience the same treatment from him, while in the exercise of power, that his officers may have experienced from the Company under similar circumstances. By these means it will happen, that in addition to the evils necessarily incident to fluctuating governments, there will be seen in the Carnatic, two rival bodies of revenue officers, who will be disposed to counteract each other in every instance, but where their private interests may make them see the necessity of acting in concert.

It would be a waste of time to go into a detail of the evils which must inevitably result from a connection, such as has been just described, in which, while it is acknowledged that the English, as one party, have assumed no more than what,

under the circumstances of the case, seems necessary to the preservation of the whole, it must be admitted that the Nabob, as the other party, has yielded every thing that can be considered to constitute the value of sovereignty.

Under those circumstances, it is presumed, that each of the two parties would equally find their interest, in acceding to a proposition, which should promise to provide as effectually for the security of the whole, as the discordant arrangement in the treaty of 1792 has done, and which should, at the same time, give to each, a permanency of rule and control over a determined portion of the empire, so that without any collision of authority, the competition between them might be known only, by the endeavours, which they should separately make, to improve the state of the country, and to render the condition of the people, living under

their protection, more prosperous, and secure.

It has been with a view directed towards the attainment of so desirable an end, that I have been led to suggest the idea of converting the security for the stipulated payments of the Nabob to the Company, FROM THE CARNATIC AT LARGE, upon which they are now made to bear, in time of war, to a permanent assignment of the countries south of the Coleroon; and it is in explanation of that idea, and with a view of rendering the assignment adequate to its object, that I am induced further to propose, that the northern province of Palnaud should be included therein. The detached situation of that province from the Carnatic, and its contiguity with the possessions of the Company in the Northern Circars, clearly pointing out, that it ought in sound policy to be annexed to this latter division of the empire.

A proposition of this kind, introduced by a candid statement of the evils and inconveniences, inseparable from the mode established by the treaty of 1792, (which necessarily implies frequent changes in the governing power) could not fail to make impression on the mind of the Nabob; and it is conceived that it would carry conviction with it, if it were accompanied by a solemn and formal assurance on the part of the British Government, that no further demands should, at any time, whether in peace or in war, be made upon him, but that the authority of his civil government should prevail uncontrolled, over all the countries that are situated between the Coleroon on the south, and the Gondegama on the north, extending from the latitude of $11\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ to $15\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, and including a territory of more productive revenue than was held by his father Anwer ud dien Cawn, or by any preceding Nabob of Arcot.

With an establishment of such extent and importance, protected by British power, and inclosed within British possessions, it is conceived that the situation of the Nabob would be as splendid as it would be secure; the provision for his family would be rendered ample, and a large field would be left for his adherents and dependants, to display their talents, in the improvement of a country comprehending four degrees of latitude.

On the other hand it must be confessed, that the Company would derive a full proportion of the resources of the Carnatic, from the countries which it has been proposed should be assigned to them; and it is presumed, that from motives of principle, as well as of policy, they would be disposed, under such circumstances, to evince, by their conduct towards Mahommed Ally Cawn, the old and faithful ally of the British nation in India, the advantage which the other powers of

India may expect to derive from British alliance and protection.

In the persuasion that a measure from which such important benefits might be expected, cannot fail to recommend itself to the attention of government; and in the belief that every suggestion will be candidly discussed, which shall have for its object the welfare of the natives of India in any part of our dominion or dependency. I have been led to revise a letter which I had the honour of presenting to the Court of Directors in 1779, upon the subject of revenue and internal regulation. The encouragement with which they were pleased at that time to distinguish my feeble endeavours, by causing my letter to be printed, and the confirmation which, I conceive, the opinions I then submitted to them, have received from subsequent experience,

now embolden me to introduce that letter into this work.

For although the title of the letter expressed, that its object was confined to the provinces, known by the name of the Northern Circars, (in the administration of which I had been employed) I am led to believe, that the reflections which are contained in it, and the principles from which those reflections are deduced, will be found to apply generally, to all our possessions in India; and that the relation between the sovereign and the subject, upon the important question of the tenure under which landed property is held in those provinces, will appear to be exposed in every other part of India to similar doubts and uncertainty.

It will be found, for instance, that the description given in that letter, of the situation of a Zemindar in the Northern Circars, would form a picture equally applicable to every Raja and Polygar in the

Carnatic. It will be found, that the insecurity of tenure which produced oppression and exaction in the one, has been attended with similar consequences in the other; and it is confidently believed, that the correction of that radical evil, by the substitution of leases or grants in perpetuity, in the place of periodical settlements with the landholders, would be found universally to produce those effects, which it is supposed in that letter would arise from it in the Northern Circars; namely, that it would relieve, in the most effectual manner, the landholders of every denomination; that it would be the means of extending, in the greatest degree, the general industry of the country; and that it would tend, more than any other measure, to augment the income of the state, and to extend the reputation and credit of the English government.

With these impressions on my mind,

I can experience no other anxiety in now producing the letter I addressed to the Court of Directors, than I felt at the time I wrote it, and which the consciousness of my inability to do justice to a subject of such extent and importance must always make me feel. But this consideration is counterbalanced by the conviction I have, that if I should but succeed in engaging attention to the points which that letter suggests, the consequences must be favourable to the public interest, as well as greatly beneficial to the natives of India.

LETTER

TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

DATED 3d FEBRUARY, 1779.

GENTLEMEN,

“THE great political arrangements of
“India, from their variety and extent,
“have unavoidably engaged so much of
“your attention, that the subordinate
“departments of internal police, which
“pressed not so immediately upon you,
“cannot have been enquired into with
“the same degree of precision. From
“the same causes it must have happened,
“that the governments abroad have been
“obliged, in some instances, to forbid
“themselves too minute an enquiry, lest
“the time given to investigation, should
“have drawn their attention, too much,

“ from the more important concerns
 “ committed to their charge.

“ Under these circumstances it may be
 “ permitted to hope, that every endeavour
 “ to convey information will be favour-
 “ ably received by you ; and that any
 “ attempt to promote the interest of the
 “ Company, and to increase the confi-
 “ dence and security of the natives of In-
 “ dia, living under their protection, will
 “ be sure to find advocates in those, who
 “ are so particularly entrusted with the
 “ management of their affairs.

“ In this persuasion, I am encouraged
 “ to submit to your consideration, the
 “ following observations and reflections
 “ upon the subject of the provinces, com-
 “ monly known by the denomination of
 “ the Northern Circars. They are the
 “ result of local knowledge, and of some
 “ experience in the administration of
 “ those valuable provinces ; and being
 “ derived from minute enquiry and in-

LETTER

TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

DATED 3d FEBRUARY, 1779.

GENTLEMEN,

“THE great political arrangements of
“India, from their variety and extent,
“have unavoidably engaged so much of
“your attention, that the subordinate
“departments of internal police, which
“pressed not so immediately upon you,
“cannot have been enquired into with
“the same degree of precision. From
“the same causes it must have happened,
“that the governments abroad have been
“obliged, in some instances, to forbid
“themselves too minute an enquiry, lest
“the time given to investigation, should
“have drawn their attention, too much,

“ from the more important concerns
 “ committed to their charge.

“ Under these circumstances it may be
 “ permitted to hope, that every endeavour
 “ to convey information will be favour-
 “ ably received by you ; and that any
 “ attempt to promote the interest of the
 “ Company, and to increase the confi-
 “ dence and security of the natives of In-
 “ dia, living under their protection, will
 “ be sure to find advocates in those, who
 “ are so particularly entrusted with the
 “ management of their affairs.

“ In this persuasion, I am encouraged
 “ to submit to your consideration, the
 “ following observations and reflections
 “ upon the subject of the provinces, com-
 “ monly known by the denomination of
 “ the Northern Circars. They are the
 “ result of local knowledge, and of some
 “ experience in the administration of
 “ those valuable provinces ; and being
 “ derived from minute enquiry and in-

“ vestigation, they are offered with some
 “ degree of confidence, to your atten-
 “ tion.

“ With a view of giving as much per-
 “ spicuity as may be within my power,
 “ to a subject so complicated, and in
 “ which such a variety of interests are
 “ involved, I will first endeavour to ex-
 “ plain the nature of the tenure, under
 “ which landed property was held, under
 “ the ancient government of the Hin-
 “ doos ; to describe the securities which
 “ were provided by their institutions, in
 “ favour of industry and cultivation ; and
 “ to shew the influence which the con-
 “ quests of the Mohammedans had, upon
 “ those tenures and institutions.

“ Upon those preliminary grounds
 “ I will attempt to trace the introduc-
 “ tion and establishment of Zemindars
 “ in those provinces ; to give a general
 “ view of the causes which had raised
 “ them to the degree of power and con-

"sideration they were found to be pos-
 "sessed of, when they fell under the
 "government of the English ; to ex-
 "hibit their present fallen and impo-
 "verished state, with the influence it
 "has had upon the revenue and upon
 "the industry of the country ; and,
 "lastly, to suggest and explain such
 "measures as, in my humble opinion,
 "would tend to improve the condition
 "of the landholder and of the husband-
 "man, and at the same time to extend
 "and render secure the income of the
 "state.

" It would be foreign to the object of
 "this enquiry, to enter upon an investi-
 "gation of the origin and establishment
 "of the Hindoo nation in India, or to
 "examine under what form the distri-
 "bution of land was first made amongst
 "a people, whose antiquity seems to
 "have eluded the enquiry of the earliest
 "writers, and whose improvements in

“ arts and manufactures, excited the
 “ wonder and admiration of those who
 “ first visited their country.

“ Leaving therefore this research to
 “ those who have more ability and better
 “ opportunities of pursuing it, the design
 “ of this letter will be sufficiently answer-
 “ ed, if a satisfactory account can be given
 “ of the general tenure under which land-
 “ ed property was held, at an improved
 “ period of the Hindoo government,
 “ when the progress of science had esta-
 “ blished regulations, the forms of which
 “ still continue in use.

“ For this purpose, it may be sufficient
 “ to observe, that however the general
 “ property of the country might have been
 “ disposed of, or whatever form of govern-
 “ ment might have been exercised by the
 “ ancient Rajahs, the subdivisions of the
 “ land were made with all the security and
 “ encouragement which industry could
 “ require. For by an express law of the

“ Hindoos, it was declared, that the cul-
 “ tivation of the soil conveyed a right to
 “ the husbandman who first brought it
 “ into improvement, of being continued
 “ in the management of it; and directed
 “ that his industry should be rewarded
 “ by certain shares in the produce, which,
 “ where no private agreement deter-
 “ mined otherwise, were thus regulated :
 “ in improved lands which had not been
 “ uncultivated more than two years, five
 “ sixths of the crop ; in lands which had
 “ been uncultivated for three or four
 “ years, seven eighths of the crop ; and in
 “ lands which had been waste for five
 “ years, nine tenths.

“ But lest this extraordinary encou-
 “ ragement for improving waste lands,
 “ should induce the husbandmen to ex-
 “ tend their views beyond their ability,
 “ or tempt them to neglect the cultiva-
 “ tion of such lands as had been first en-
 “ trusted to their industry, it was pro-

“ vided by the same law, that the hus-
 “ bandmen who should neglect to culti-
 “ vate such lands, should be bound to
 “ give to the proprietor, the amount of
 “ one sixth part of the crop which should
 “ be produced upon other lands of the
 “ same quality and extent, and to a fine
 “ of the same value to the govern-
 “ ment.*

“ As the means of obtaining the most
 “ authentic information upon a subject
 “ of such importance, and of enabling the
 “ government to judge of the abilities of
 “ the husbandmen, a public officer was
 “ established in every village, whose duty
 “ it was to form an exact register of the
 “ quantity of land held by each husband-
 “ man, the part of this which was culti-
 “ vated, and the number of working cat-
 “ tle of which he was possessed. The
 “ produce of each man’s industry became
 “ afterwards an article in this register;

* See Gentoo Code, chapter 13.

“ and the proportion he received of the
 “ crop, with the price of the market at
 “ the time, concluded the account.*

“ The accounts of each village taken in
 “ this detail, were transmitted to other
 “ officers, charged with similar duties in
 “ the subdivisions of the provinces, who
 “ formed from them, abstracts of the
 “ state of cultivation, of the produce
 “ and capacity of their several divisions ;
 “ those abstracts were again reduced by
 “ the provincial registers to a still more
 “ general scale, so that a particular state
 “ of the industry and cultivation in each
 “ province was constantly exposed to the
 “ eye of Government

“ Besides the advantages of this parti-
 “ cular information, a further security
 “ was established in favour of industry
 “ by the policy of the Hindoo institu-
 “ tions, which, connecting the interest
 “ of those officers of the revenue with

* See Barnard's Survey of the Jaghire, East India Records.

“ the improvement of the land, regulat-
 “ ed their salaries, by a commission upon
 “ the whole produce of the soil in their
 “ respective departments; and, to encou-
 “ rage them to a faithful discharge of
 “ their duties, their offices were made
 “ hereditary. By these means a tie seem-
 “ ed established, too powerful to be af-
 “ fected by any temporary advantages
 “ that could be derived either from op-
 “ pression or indulgence.

“ But lest this should not be a suffici-
 “ ent check upon their conduct, a further
 “ controll was instituted in every village
 “ by the association of the husbandmen,
 “ who, jealous of their rights, united for
 “ their common security ; and, to make
 “ their union the more effectual, they
 “ named certain persons from amongst
 “ themselves, who, under the character
 “ of Headmen of the Village, were charg-
 “ ed with the care of the common inte-
 “ rests, and employed in transacting all

“ the business of the society with the
 “ deputies of government.

“ And finally, as every regulation for
 “ the security of property would have
 “ been imperfect, where the property
 “ itself remained in any respect unde-
 “ fined, it was provided by the Hindoo
 “ institutions, that where particular a-
 “ greements were made to supersede the
 “ established regulations, with respect to
 “ the shares of the crop, such agreements
 “ should be executed in writing, before
 “ the tillage was commenced, specifying
 “ the exact terms of the contract, and de-
 “ termining in the most unquestionable
 “ manner, the extent of the husband-
 “ man’s rights, before he yoked his oxen
 “ to the plough.

“ Such were the securities and encou-
 “ ragement held out by the Hindoos in
 “ favour of industry. Under the protec-
 “ tion of institutions which seemed par-
 “ ticularly formed for their advantage,

“ the husbandmen exerted their utmost
 “ abilities for the improvement of their
 “ lands, and, by the most simple opera-
 “ tion, obtained through their industry,
 “ a right of property in the soil, descend-
 “ able to their heirs, upon the easiest and
 “ most equitable condition; for it requir-
 “ ed only a continuation of that indus-
 “ try, which first established their claim,
 “ and by the exertion of which the par-
 “ ticular interests of the family could not
 “ fail to be extended.

“ Subject to this general tenure were
 “ all the lands of Hindoostan held, under
 “ the ancient government of the Hin-
 “ doos; and though in the course of
 “ time property must have suffered many
 “ changes, purchase and sale having been
 “ permitted under certain restrictions;
 “ yet, whether the husbandman grew
 “ into the absolute proprietor of the soil,
 “ or the labourer into a husbandman,
 “ the general system experienced no al-

“ teration, the country continued to flourish, and those riches were accumulated which the Mahomedans afterwards plundered and dispersed.

“ The violence which marked the first
 “ invasions of those conquerors, and the
 “ persecuting spirit which, for a time, followed them in their devastation must,
 “ while they prevailed, have shaken every
 “ kind of security ; but as soon as the
 “ establishment of their authority made
 “ them feel a property in the country,
 “ their policy discovered to them the advantages of a system, which besides
 “ conveying particular information with
 “ regard to the value and capacity of the
 “ lands, established checks in every department of the revenue, and the Mahomedans are accordingly found, in
 “ a great measure, to have adopted the

“ regulations of the Hindoos in the ad-
 “ ministration of the revenue.

“ For although, instead of the mode-
 “ rate demands of the Hindoo govern-
 “ ment, the claims of the Emperor were
 “ raised, in the year of Christ 1300, to
 “ one half of the annual produce of the
 “ lands; yet the protection which was
 “ extended to the husbandmen, by the
 “ appointment of officers to restrain the
 “ collectors from exacting more than the
 “ established rates, and the care which
 “ was taken on the other hand, to pre-
 “ vent the husbandmen from undertaking
 “ to cultivate more land than they had
 “ the ability to improve,* afford argu-
 “ ments in point, not only of an atten-
 “ tion to the ancient usages of the Hin-
 “ doos, but of the continuance of those
 “ registers, which have been before de-
 “ scribed, as constituting the basis of their

* Dowe's Ferishta, vol. II. p. 274.

“ system; for without ascertaining the par-
 “ ticular stock of every husbandman, and
 “ the number of farm-servants employed
 “ by him, it would have been impossible
 “ to have determined to what extent they
 “ might engage in cultivation; and with-
 “ out the assistance of those registers, in
 “ which every particular was already in-
 “ serted, this information could not have
 “ been obtained.

“ In the year 1346, these regulations
 “ having been found insufficient, an in-
 “ spector general was appointed for every
 “ thing that related to husbandry, under
 “ the denomination of Amir Kohi, who
 “ divided the country into districts of
 “ sixty miles square, under a Shickdar,
 “ who was to be answerable for its cul-
 “ tivation and improvement; and it is
 “ said, that above one hundred Shickdars
 “ received their appointments at once,
 “ and were furnished from the treasury
 “ with seventy lacs of rupees, to enable

“ them to encourage and assist the in-
 “ dustrious husbandmen.

“ But the instability of the Maho-
 “ medan government, the frequent re-
 “ volutions which happened in the em-
 “ pire, and the rebellions which were
 “ perpetually breaking out in the pro-
 “ vinces, rendered it impossible to ac-
 “ complish the establishment of any ge-
 “ neral system, and made it necessary to
 “ adopt some mode by which a certainty
 “ might be established in the resources
 “ of government.

“ Upon this account the custom of
 “ farming out the revenue of the pro-
 “ vinces to the Omrahs, who were ap-
 “ pointed to govern them (which had
 “ already obtained in some places), was
 “ extended over the greatest part of the
 “ empire ; * and as these governors had,
 “ for the most part, the power of admi-
 “ nistering and collecting the revenue at

• Dowe's Ferishta, vol. I. p. 329.

“ discretion, the modes of collection, and
 “ the powers and denominations of the
 “ several officers employed in it, differed
 “ with local circumstances, and the ideas
 “ of the governors for the time; and this
 “ may account for the different descrip-
 “ tions of officers, which are to be met
 “ with in the public acts of the Mahome-
 “ dan government, and for the different
 “ duties, which officers of the same de-
 “ nomination are found to be charged
 “ with in different provinces:

“ Without attempting further to fol-
 “ low the general regulations of the em-
 “ pire, or to explain the duties of the se-
 “ veral officers who were employed in
 “ the administration of the revenue,
 “ throughout that extensive region, which
 “ would necessarily create confusion, it
 “ will be sufficient here to confine the
 “ inquiry to what happened in the pro-
 “ vinces now subject to the Company,
 “ and dependent on Mazulipatam.

“ These provinces composed a part of
 “ that division of the Peninsula of India,
 “ which is known by the name of Gol-
 “ conda, and which probably was for-
 “ merly comprised in the country of
 “ Telingana, as the people are still fre-
 “ quently distinguished by the denomi-
 “ nation of Telingas, and their language
 “ is called the language of Telinga, in
 “ contradistinction to that of Malabar,
 “ which prevails on the Coast of Coro-
 “ mandel from Cape Comorin to Pulicat,
 “ where a different language and na-
 “ tional character, with a different cur-
 “ rency of money, subsist, and are found
 “ to extend as far as the northern branch
 “ of the river Guadavery, which nearly
 “ bounds these provinces on the north.

“ The first invasion of Telingana by
 “ the Mahomedans, appears to have
 “ taken place in the year of Christ 1303,
 “ when it was prosecuted with so much
 “ vigour, that in less than three years the

“ country was reduced to a tributary de-
 “ pence on the Emperor of Delhi.
 “ Under this dependence it continued,
 “ with some short interruptions, until
 “ the year 1344, at which time the Ra-
 “ jahs of the Carnatic and Telingana
 “ having confederated together, they
 “ drove the Mahomedans back into the
 “ northern parts of the Deccan.

“ This effort on the part of the Hin-
 “ doos to repress the Mahomedans, was
 “ greatly favoured by a dissension which
 “ broke out at that time between the Pa-
 “ tans, who were Soonnis, and at whose
 “ head the reigning Emperor ranged
 “ himself, and the Sheeas, who appear to
 “ have been principally employed in the
 “ frontier provinces.

“ It is not necessary in this place to
 “ inquire into the cause of that dissen-
 “ sion. Its effects were manifested by
 “ the most violent proscriptions on the
 “ part of the Emperor, and by efforts of
 “ despair on the part of the Sheeas.

“ During this struggle, the Hindoos
 “ were enabled to maintain and extend
 “ the advantages they had gained; and
 “ the important fortress of Dowlatabad
 “ having been taken from the Emperor
 “ by the Sheeas, the Mahomedans of that
 “ sect became a barrier to Telingana
 “ on that side. By these means a politi-
 “ cal connection was established between
 “ them, which enabled the Sheeas to as-
 “ sert and establish their independence,
 “ and left the Hindoo princes at liberty
 “ to govern their countries in peace.

“ The history of the events which suc-
 “ ceeded this revolution, forms an inte-
 “ resting period in the annals of India.*
 “ I cannot in this little work go into a
 “ detail of them; but it is necessary to
 “ observe, that the powerful Mahome-
 “ dan dynasties of Bijapoor and Golconda
 “ grew out of this revolution. That the
 “ Hindoo Rajahs continued to maintain
 “ their independence, and to govern al-

* See Scott's History of the Deccan, published 1794.

“ most all the Hither Peninsula, until the
 “ year 1467, when having imprudently
 “ confided extensive governments to the
 “ Mahomedan adventurers whom they
 “ employed in their armies, and probably
 “ having been too little attentive to the
 “ growing strength of their Mahome-
 “ dan neighbours, whole provinces were
 “ wrested from them ; so that before the
 “ end of the fifteenth century, the govern-
 “ ment of the Hindoos is said to have
 “ been confined to the countries south of
 “ the river Kistnah.

“ In what particular year the Maho-
 “ medans penetrated to Mazulipatam
 “ and reduced the Coast of Golconda, is
 “ not well ascertained. But it must have
 “ taken place before the year 1565, be-
 “ cause it is related that the Mahome-
 “ dan princes of the Deccan were em-
 “ ployed in that year on an expedition
 “ against the Hindoos, to the south of the
 “ river Kistnah, whose country they

“plundered and laid waste. This opi-
 “nion appears the better founded, be-
 “cause the revenue of the country in the
 “neighbourhood of Mazulipatam was
 “administered under the Mahomedan
 “authority, in the year 1596, at which
 “time the ancestor of the present Ze-
 “mindar of Muglatore, rented some vil-
 “lages in one of the districts which
 “now compose the Zemindary of that
 “family.

“This imperfect sketch of the progress
 “of the Mahomedans in the Deccan,
 “until they extended their government
 “over the provinces now subject to the
 “English, has been attempted with a
 “view of connecting the subject of this
 “letter, and of fixing the æra at which
 “the history of those provinces becomes
 “interesting to the Company. The ori-
 “gin of the family of Muglatore, now
 “the most considerable amongst the
 “Zemindary establishments, has been

“ traced in the records of the country to
 “ the year 1596, from which time it is
 “ found to have been progressively ad-
 “ vancing in power and extension of ter-
 “ ritory. The families of Noozed, of
 “ Peddapore, and of Pattapore have, in
 “ like manner, their progress registered
 “ in those records; and they appear to
 “ owe their introduction and establish-
 “ ment to the custom which, in 1596,
 “ first took place in the family of Mugla-
 “ tore, of farming at a stipulated rent the
 “ reserved interest of government in the
 “ produce of the lands. The hill and
 “ wood Zemindars have, it is true, a te-
 “ nure of much older date. But whatever
 “ degree of importance they may for-
 “ merly have possessed, they are now too
 “ much fallen in credit and in considera-
 “ tion, to make an exception to this rule.

“ If a conjecture were now to be
 “ formed of the motives which gave rise
 “ to the mode of letting the revenue to

“ farm, the particular situation of the
 “ Deccan government at that time, would
 “ induce to a belief that it was adopted
 “ with a view of establishing a greater
 “ certainty in their resources, by reliev-
 “ ing the revenue from a precarious de-
 “ pendence on the seasons, and of thereby
 “ providing against the invasion with
 “ which the Emperor Akbar then threat-
 “ ened their countries; for it appears
 “ gradually to have extended itself with
 “ the progress of the imperial arms,
 “ which were soon afterwards carried
 “ into the Deccan, until at length the
 “ weakness of the government discover-
 “ ing itself on every side, it became ne-
 “ cessary to enlarge the powers of the
 “ renters; and commissions were accord-
 “ ingly granted, constituting them Ze-
 “ mindars; and by that appointment in-
 “ vesting them with judicial authority
 “ over the lands they held at rent. The
 “ earliest instance of this kind appears to

“ have happened in the year 1624, when
 “ the ancestor of the Muglatore family,
 “ who has been seen, in 1596, renting a
 “ few villages, was constituted Zemindar
 “ of three entire districts. Similar ap-
 “ pointments, soon after this, took place
 “ in favour of other renters, and in the
 “ the year 1687, when Aurungzebe, after
 “ having finally reduced the Deccan
 “ princes, had annexed their countries
 “ to the dominions of the empire, the
 “ greatest part of these provinces was
 “ found to be held under Zemindary
 “ Saneds, which were then confirmed by
 “ the conqueror, and afterwards extend-
 “ ed; so that at his demise, in the year
 “ 1707, the whole country was possessed
 “ by the ancestors of the present Zemin-
 “ dars.

“ From that time the confusion which
 “ prevailed in every part of the empire;
 “ encouraged the Zemindars in these dis-
 “ tant provinces to relax in their obedi-

“ence ; in which they were supported by
 “the disputed title to the government
 “of the Deccan, where Nizam-al-Mu-
 “luck, maintaining himself in opposi-
 “tion to the orders of the Mogul, excited
 “them to disregard an authority, which
 “possessed not the means of enforcing
 “their submission. In the year 1722,
 “some of the more powerful of them
 “were nearly reduced by the Soubadar
 “of the Golconda division of the Dec-
 “can, who opposed the pretensions of
 “the Nizam-al-Muluck ; but the ap-
 “proach of the Nizam having obliged
 “his competitor to turn his arms to the
 “defence of his own government, they
 “were again left at liberty to strengthen
 “themselves, and the situation of affairs
 “being favourable to their views, they
 “were soon enabled to affect the state
 “and independence of the ancient Ra-
 “jahs.

“But the success of Nizam-al-Muluck

“ having, in the year 1725, effectually es-
 “ tablished his authority over all the
 “ Soubahships of the Deccan, and the
 “ assistance of the Zemindars being no
 “ longer necessary to his ambition, his
 “ policy would not suffer a power which
 “ might become formidable, to establish
 “ itself in his dominions ; and therefore
 “ finding an excuse in his ambition, and
 “ possibly justified by the conduct of the
 “ Zemindars, he marched an army into
 “ these provinces ; and after a long siege
 “ he reduced the fort of Noozed, which
 “ was built in the year 1700 by the Ze-
 “ mindar of that country, whom he now
 “ displaced, and deprived of his Zemin-
 “ dary Saneds. He afterwards entered
 “ the country of Muglatore, which he
 “ also took possession of, and then re-
 “ turned to Hydrabad.

“ But these were rather temporary
 “ advantages, than the reduction of the
 “ Zemindars. Nizam-al-Muluck was

“ scarcely returned to his capital, when
 “ the adherents of the families of Noo-
 “ zeed and Muglatore, secretly assisted
 “ by the other Zemindars, appeared in
 “ arms, plundering and laying waste the
 “ country: and though in the year 1729
 “ they were forced to yield to the supe-
 “ rior power of the Nizam’s arms, and to
 “ fly before his deputy Rustum Jung
 “ Chan, who expelled them all from
 “ their lands; yet the country remained
 “ such a scene of disorder from their in-
 “ cursions and depredations, that no re-
 “ venue was drawn from it, until, at
 “ length, the expedient of admitting them
 “ in the character of temporary renters
 “ was adopted, and they were allowed, in
 “ 1737, to farm small parts of the lands
 “ they had formerly possessed.

“ From this time, favoured by the in-
 “ trigues which brought Nadir Shah into
 “ the empire, and by the revolution at
 “ Delhi, in which Nizam-al-Muluck was

“ principally concerned, the Zemindars
 “ were again enabled gradually to ex-
 “ tend themselves ; and though the re-
 “ turn of Nadir Shah into Persia, left the
 “ Nizam in possession of the person of the
 “ emperor, and of all the remaining
 “ power of the Mogul government, his
 “ absence from the south occasioned dis-
 “ turbances in that quarter, which were
 “ only to be quelled by his presence and
 “ abilities. Those disturbances had pro-
 “ ceeded to the greatest length in the
 “ Carnatic ; and the attention of Nizam
 “ al-Muluck was in consequence parti-
 “ cularly directed to that quarter. This
 “ necessarily assisted the views of the
 “ Zemindars in these northern provin-
 “ ces ; and they are accordingly found,
 “ between the years 1737 and 1743, to
 “ have recovered all their former posses-
 “ sions, and to have held them with the
 “ permission of Nizam-al-Muluck, if not

“under the sanction and authority of his
 “Saneds.

“During the few remaining years of
 “the Nizam’s life, the Zemindars appear
 “to have submitted to the authority of
 “his government, and a short interval of
 “quiet was given to the inhabitants of
 “these provinces. But upon his death,
 “which happened in the year 1749, the
 “whole state having been thrown into
 “confusion by the disputed succession to
 “the government of the Deccan, the Ze-
 “mindars were again encouraged to re-
 “new their schemes of independence,
 “and the opportunity of a disputed title
 “authorizing them, under the pretence of
 “attachment, to take up arms, they easily
 “re-established their power, and as easily
 “obtained new Saneds from the prevail-
 “ing Soucadar.

“In this state were the affairs of these
 “provinces when the French obtained a

“ grant of them, in the year 1753, from
 “ the third son of the old Nizam, Salabet
 “ Jung, who then ruled the Deccan. In
 “ the commencement of their administra-
 “ tion, some of the Zemindars were made
 “ to feel the weight of their power : but
 “ this was not of long duration, nor did
 “ their government in general prove un-
 “ favourable to the Zemindars. Before
 “ the French authority had time to es-
 “ tablish itself in those provinces, they
 “ were called, by their political engage-
 “ ments with Salabet Jung, to march
 “ their troops into different parts, for the
 “ purpose of upholding his government
 “ in the Deccan. This rendered the
 “ collection of the revenue, upon the re-
 “ ceipt of which the payment of their
 “ army depended, an object of the first
 “ importance, and necessarily engaged
 “ them in a temporizing system.
 “ The capture of Mazulipatam (which
 “ place surrendered to the English arms

“ in the year 1759) having deprived the
 “ French of all influence in that part of
 “ India ; and the situation of the Com-
 “ pany’s affairs having made it prudent
 “ to reconcile the Soubadar to their suc-
 “ cess, these provinces were then suffered
 “ to return under his government.

“ It would be a tedious detail of op-
 “ position and disputed power, to follow
 “ his deputies in the management of
 “ these provinces, and in their ineffectual
 “ attempts to controll the Zemindars ;
 “ nor would the subject be at all eluci-
 “ dated, by enlarging upon the different
 “ negotiations which were opened by us,
 “ after the fall of Pondicherry, with the
 “ present Soubadar Nizam Ally Cawn,
 “ the fourth son of Nizam-al-Muluck,
 “ for obtaining a grant of these provinces
 “ to the Company.

“ It may be sufficient therefore to ob-
 “ serve, that the Zemindars, paying little
 “ regard to the authority of Nizam Ally

“ Cawn, dissipated the revenues in quar-
 “ rels amongst themselves; and that a
 “ general confusion continued to prevail
 “ throughout the country, when the
 “ Phirmaunds of the Mogul conveyed
 “ the sovereignty of these provinces to
 “ the Company in the year 1766. Ni-
 “ zam Ally Cawn, who had flattered
 “ himself that the Company would at
 “ length be induced to accept these pro-
 “ vinces from him, upon the condition of
 “ granting him a military assistance for
 “ the general support of his government,
 “ as the French had done to his brother ;
 “ and who in this hope had, but a few
 “ months before, refused an offer from us
 “ of a very considerable annual tribute
 “ for them, received the news of this
 “ event with indignation and disappoint-
 “ ment ; and immediately made prepa-
 “ rations to dispute the authority of a
 “ grant, the authenticity of which he af-
 “ fected to deny. But the appearance of

“ a formidable army having soon opened
 “ the way to a negotiation, the treaty of
 “ Hyderabad was concluded towards the
 “ end of the year 1766, by which all
 “ pretensions to these provinces were re-
 “ linquished by the Soubadar, and the
 “ authority of the Company became ad-
 “ mitted without further opposition.

“ As there was reason to suppose that
 “ the first arrangements with the Zemin-
 “ dars, for the tribute of their lands,
 “ would be attended with difficulty, and
 “ as the agents of the Company were
 “ not acquainted with the language of
 “ the country, and but imperfectly in-
 “ formed in the usages of the people, it
 “ was judged expedient to administer the
 “ government, for a time, in the manner
 “ which had been found established. For
 “ this purpose all the authority of the
 “ Company was delegated to Hussain
 “ Ally Cawn, who in the character of
 “ their deputy, and supported by their

“ power, proceeded through the provin-
 “ ces, making such agreements as he
 “ could with the Zemindars ; but under
 “ an engagement to the Company of pay-
 “ ing annually into their treasury the
 “ sum of, Madras pag. 3,16,666, including
 “ the charges of the troops employed in
 “ his support.*

“ In this manner was the government
 “ of these provinces administered till the
 “ end of the year 1769, when it being
 “ thought that the servants of the Com-
 “ pany were qualified to undertake the
 “ management of the country themselves,
 “ it was determined to abolish the use of
 “ intermediate agents, and to settle with
 “ each Zemindar for the tribute of his
 “ lands ; a resolution which was imme-
 “ diately rewarded by an increase in the
 “ revenue from, Madras pag. 3,16,666, to
 “ 4,91,941, at which rate the Zemindars
 “ continued to pay until the year 1773,

* The extensive and rich province of Chicacole was placed under another delegate.

“ when a small increase was made upon
 “ the renewal of their leases, though not
 “ to take place till 1776.

“ Having now followed the Zemindars
 “ through all the variety of their fortune,
 “ from the time of their establishment in
 “ these provinces, to an advanced period
 “ of the English administration ; it will
 “ be necessary, before we treat further of
 “ them, to look back to the former insti-
 “ tutions of the country, and to take
 “ another view of the particular temper
 “ of the government under which the
 “ Zemindars received their appointment.

“ It has been seen, in the first part of
 “ this letter, how careful the government
 “ of the Hindoos had been to provide
 “ every security and encouragement in
 “ favour of industry ; and with what at-
 “ tention the rights of the husbandmen
 “ seemed to have been guarded against
 “ every kind of violation. It would how-

“ ever be presuming too much to sup-
 “ pose, that injustice and oppression had
 “ never invaded these regulations, until
 “ the conquest of the Mahomedans had
 “ subverted the government, or that the
 “ virtues of the Hindoos had yielded only
 “ to the miserable necessities of their si-
 “ tuation.

“ The multiplicity of their penal laws,
 “ said to have been enacted long before
 “ the name of Mahomed was known,
 “ proves that the vices common to all ex-
 “ tended societies, had introduced them-
 “ selves amongst them ; and though the
 “ peculiar wisdom of their political insti-
 “ tutions, blended as they were with the
 “ principles of their religion, and sup-
 “ ported by the authority of the Bramins,
 “ prevented any material decline in the
 “ industry of the people, while under
 “ the government of their Rajahs, yet
 “ wherever the delegated authority of
 “ the Mahomedan government has since

“ given them the power, it must be ac-
 “ knowledged that the Hindoos have
 “ been found to exercise it with relent-
 “ less severity over their brethren, prac-
 “ tising every species of oppression, and
 “ discovering uncommon ingenuity in the
 “ modes of exaction; while, on the other
 “ hand, the histories of Bengal and of
 “ the Carnatic furnish two instances of
 “ Mahomedan administration, which will
 “ cause the government of Sujah Cawn
 “ in the one, and of Sadutullah Cawn in
 “ the other, to be remembered as æras
 “ that may well bear a comparison with
 “ the reigns of the most celebrated
 “ Rajahs.

“ Possibly it would be but doing jus-
 “ tice to the Mahomedans, to suppose
 “ that the same moderation which was
 “ exercised for a time in Bengal and the
 “ Carnatic, would have been continued
 “ in those countries, and even have been
 “ extended to every part of their con-

“quests, if the same advantage of a well
 “established authority, had enabled them
 “to have directed their attention to the
 “happiness of their subjects; at least
 “this is an acknowledgment which seems
 “due, where the spirit of persecution was
 “made to yield to humanity, and where
 “the usages of the conquered were adopt-
 “ed, in preference to the customs and
 “ideas of the conquerors.*

“It has been seen that a Zemindar,
 “besides the superintendence of the re-
 “venue, was officially invested with ju-
 “dicial authority within the limits of his
 “zemindary; and of course it may be
 “inferred, that the Hindoos were left, in a
 “great measure, to be governed by those
 “usages which long establishment had
 “rendered sacred, and to which they
 “were attached by every moral and re-
 “ligious obligation.

* See Ayeen Akbarry, vol. I. part 3; and British India analyzed, vol. I. published in 1793.

“ How those usages came to be per-
 “ verted, and why countries, which the
 “ Mahomedans found redundant in every
 “ kind of plenty, should, when reduced
 “ to their domination, present the me-
 “ lancholy picture of misery and desola-
 “ tion, even though favoured by the con-
 “ tinuance of their ancient usages, are
 “ questions which would require a parti-
 “ cular investigation; though possibly,
 “ after the most minute inquiry, no bet-
 “ ter solution could be given, than that
 “ which has already appeared, in the
 “ confusion and disorder of the times :
 “ causes which could hardly fail, in any
 “ country, to pervert the wisest regula-
 “ tions into sources of oppression, and to
 “ produce those evils so heavily but so
 “ justly complained of in India. It has
 “ been seen, however, that they were not
 “ there beyond remedy; and the inter-
 “ vals of good government which were
 “ felt in Bengal and the Carnatic, may

“ serve to prove, that possessed of the
 “ means to enforce authority, and of abi-
 “ lities to direct the machine of govern-
 “ ment, every thing may still be hoped
 “ for in that country.

“ Happily those means are in the pos-
 “ session of the Company. It has been
 “ already seen, with what effect they
 “ have been employed, in these provin-
 “ ces, for increasing the revenue. It
 “ may be added, that the investments
 “ have received a like increase; and that
 “ by restraining the power of the Zemin-
 “ dars, industry has been relieved from
 “ those interruptions of war and devas-
 “ tation, to which it was exposed before
 “ the government of the Company came
 “ to be established.

“ How much further these improve-
 “ ments might be extended, and what
 “ measures should be pursued for that

“ purpose, shall be submitted to your
 “ consideration in the course of this
 “ letter; but previous thereto, it will be
 “ proper to go back to the subject of the
 “ Zemindars, and to explain how far the
 “ internal police of these provinces was
 “ found to have been affected by their
 “ conduct, during the anarchy and con-
 “ fusion which prevailed in the govern-
 “ ment, from the death of Nizam-al-Mu-
 “ luck, till the establishment of the Com-
 “ pany’s authority.

“ It has been already seen, that a dis-
 “ puted title to the succession, encou-
 “ raged the Zemindars to seek the means
 “ of security in their own resources; and
 “ that in a little time their authority,
 “ countenanced rather than controlled
 “ by those whose cause they had assist-
 “ ed, grew into a power, which enabled
 “ them to assume the title and independ-
 “ ence of the ancient Rajahs.

“ For a time, a common interest united

“ them in the support and defence of the
 “ advantages they had obtained ; and
 “ while the little remaining power of the
 “ government required any general exer-
 “ tion of their strength, the Zemindars
 “ continued in some degree to be con-
 “ nected by the same principle ; but from
 “ the time when this necessity ceased to
 “ exist, the jealousies of uncontrolled
 “ power, and of equal rank with unequal
 “ ability, gave rise to divisions amongst
 “ them. The means which before had
 “ been employed to oppose the authority
 “ of government, were directed to mu-
 “ tual encroachments ; and at length
 “ their animosities rose to such a height,
 “ that every difficulty was preferred to
 “ the acknowledgment of superiority.

“ The expences of those violent con-
 “ tests, which spread desolation on every
 “ side, and exposed the unhappy hus-
 “ bandmen to all the misery of arbitrary
 “ oppression. The payments which were

“ occasionally made to government, and
 “ the necessity of sometimes buying off
 “ its resentment, caused such drains of
 “ money from the Zemindars, as could
 “ not fail to involve them in heavy debts,
 “ and their necessities increasing, while
 “ the uncertainty of payment enhanced
 “ the demands of the money lenders, the
 “ whole property of the country soon be-
 “ came subject to the will of their cre-
 “ ditors.

“ The policy of the Mahomedans, who
 “ had long encouraged the agency of
 “ money lenders, for the convenience of
 “ speedy payment, and from the advan-
 “ tages which are to be drawn from the
 “ influence of a monied interest, where
 “ authority is but ill supported, operated
 “ with particular force in favour of the
 “ Soucars, or money lenders, upon this
 “ occasion, so that their credit soon came
 “ to be the prevailing influence in these
 “ provinces. Employed on one side by

“ government with the collection of its
 “ rents from the Zemindars, and on the
 “ other side by the Zemindars with their
 “ collections from the husbandmen, they
 “ grew to be a centre of union, without
 “ whose agency no part of the great ma-
 “ chine could be put in motion, and
 “ whose influence was, at all times, suffi-
 “ cient to govern its direction.

“ Such was the state of these provinces
 “ when the grant of the Mogul, and the
 “ treaty of Hydrabad subjected them to
 “ the dominion of the Company; and
 “ though from that time, a watchful at-
 “ tention to the conduct of the Zemin-
 “ dars, an invariable resolution to repress
 “ every attempt in them, for terminat-
 “ ing their own differences, and an un-
 “ remitted steadiness in keeping them to
 “ the punctual discharge of their rents,
 “ have marked the administration of the
 “ Company’s agents, and effectually re-
 “ duced the power of the Zemindars; yet

“ the husbandmen still labour under op-
 “ pression ; the Zemindars still feel the
 “ weight of accumulating debts, and the
 “ Soucars, possessed of all the specie of
 “ of the country, still continue to enjoy
 “ all the influence of their profession.

“ If the foregoing pages express the
 “ ideas it is intended they should con-
 “ vey, they will have shewn that there
 “ is a connection of interests, so intri-
 “ cately interwoven in these provinces,
 “ that the greatest care will be requisite
 “ in forming any plan for improvement.
 “ The state of landed property, from the
 “ simplest, but most secure, dependence
 “ upon industry, is become precarious
 “ and uncertain. The Zemindars, from
 “ wealth and power, are involved in all
 “ the difficulties of debt, without a hope
 “ that the embarrassments of govern-

“ ment will, as heretofore, enable them
 “ to withhold their tribute ; and the Sou-
 “ cars, countenanced and supported as
 “ formerly, for the convenience of their
 “ agency, have now the sanction of the
 “ Company for their engagements with
 “ the Zemindars, and demands upon their
 “ justice, for the liquidation of such debts
 “ as have been contracted since the es-
 “ tablishment of the English government.

“ It has been suggested that the speedi-
 “ est and most effectual way of restoring
 “ good order in these provinces, and of
 “ extending the blessings of freedom and
 “ security to the industrious inhabitants,
 “ would be to displace the Zemindars,
 “ and return to the system which pre-
 “ vailed under the mild administration
 “ of the Hindoos. In support of this
 “ measure, it has been urged that the
 “ revenue of the Company would be in-
 “ creased by the addition of the sums now
 “ received by the Zemindars.

“ If the Zemindars were still in posses-
 “ sion of that power which made them
 “ so formidable to the Mahomedans, and
 “ if the collection of the revenue depend-
 “ ed upon the precarious strength of the
 “ government, the policy of this measure,
 “ however hazardous, could not be ques-
 “ tioned. But as it has been shewn that
 “ the revenue, though increased, is paid
 “ with punctuality ; that the power of
 “ the Zemindars, heretofore so formid-
 “ able, is reduced to an absolute depen-
 “ dence upon the authority of the Com-
 “ pany, and that their engagements with
 “ the Soucars, having the sanction of
 “ government, has involved the public
 “ faith ; it may be permitted to doubt,
 “ whether the expulsion of the Zemin-
 “ dars might not be productive of conse-
 “ quences, more prejudicial to the public
 “ interest, than those abuses, which it is
 “ proposed to correct, are found to occa-
 “ sion ; and whether, instead of bringing

“ an increase of revenue to the treasury,
 “ it might not be the means of hazard-
 “ ing, for some years, the loss of that
 “ which is now collected.

“ It surely cannot be supposed, that
 “ the influence of the Zemindars, which
 “ has had such time to establish itself,
 “ should expire with their power; that
 “ the prejudices of long habit and de-
 “ pendence should immediately dissolve;
 “ or that the husbandmen, accustomed as
 “ they have been, under the unsteady
 “ administration of the Mahomedans, to
 “ see Zemindars displaced and restored,
 “ without any improvement of their
 “ own situation, should, at once, adopt
 “ new ideas; that they should now
 “ confide in the declarations of govern-
 “ ment, which all former experience has
 “ taught them to distrust, and that they
 “ should expose themselves to the hazards
 “ of a revolution, the benefits of which
 “ they could see but at a distance, and

“ which even then must seem precarious
 “ to them ; because in the lands con-
 “ quered from the French, or those ceded
 “ by the Nabob, over which the Zemin-
 “ dars have no authority, the condition
 “ of the husbandmen has hitherto re-
 “ ceived no improvement, nor are they
 “ sensible of any other change, than that
 “ of seeing a temporary renter in posses-
 “ sion of that authority which they had
 “ been used to respect in their Zemindars.

“ It may therefore reasonably be in-
 “ ferred, that until time should imper-
 “ ceptibly wear out the influence of
 “ the Zemindars; until their adherents,
 “ whether of family, tribe, or attach-
 “ ment, should die away, or be involved
 “ in their ruin, no material improve-
 “ ment could take place. On the con-
 “ trary, it might justly be apprehended,
 “ that their followers (as happened in
 “ the time of Nizam-al-Muluck) would
 “ infest the country, and disturb the in-

“dustrious husbandmen, destroying their
 “cattle and their crops ; and that all
 “the vigilance of government, or the
 “activity of Sepoys, would be insuffi-
 “cient to protect a country of four hun-
 “dred miles in length, and of difficult
 “access in many parts, from their depre-
 “dations.

“Under these disadvantages, which
 “would inevitably involve the current
 “revenue, and render it precarious, the
 “policy of displacing the Zemindars,
 “may well be questioned. Probably,
 “upon further inquiry, it will appear,
 “that the real interest of the Company
 “may be found in continuing and sup-
 “porting them ; and in such an event,
 “it will not be unsatisfactory to discover,
 “that there are claims upon their justice
 “in favour of the Zemindars.

“When the Phirmaunds of the Mo-
 “gul, conveying the sovereignty of these
 “provinces to the Company, were first

“ published, circular letters were sent to
 “ all the Zemindars, inviting them to ac-
 “ knowledge the authority of the English
 “ government ; some of them, influenced
 “ by the intrigues and directions of the
 “ Nizam, disregarded the summons ; but
 “ the greater number of them assembled
 “ at the place which was appointed for
 “ receiving their obedience, and articles
 “ were there entered into with them,
 “ promising them a confirmation of all
 “ their just rights and privileges.

“ It would be unnecessary now to enter
 “ into an explanation of what those
 “ rights and privileges were then under-
 “ stood to be, as it is not designed here
 “ to establish any claims for the Zemin-
 “ dars, beyond the mere security of their
 “ possessions ; for though the articles re-
 “ ferred to, may be thought to convey
 “ privileges of more extent, yet when it
 “ is considered what infinite advantages
 “ are included in the undisturbed pos-

“ session of property, and when it is re-
 “ collected that the Zemindars could ne-
 “ ver have enjoyed this security under
 “ the anarchy and confusion of the Ma-
 “ homedan government, it will readily
 “ be admitted, that the exchange of any
 “ adventitious benefits, for so essential a
 “ good, would be greatly in their favour.

“ Hitherto, however, it must be con-
 “ fessed, that this security has not been
 “ COMPLETE, nor can it be hoped that it
 “ will ever be considered so, while the
 “ POWER of making an ARBITRARY in-
 “ crease in the revenue is reserved by
 “ government. For no confidence in its
 “ justice and good intentions can be suffi-
 “ cient to relieve the apprehensions of
 “ such a power.

“ It may indeed be urged, that this
 “ custom is justified by the general usage
 “ of India ; that it was found established
 “ in these provinces, when they submit-
 “ ted to the dominion of the Company ;

“ and that in the agreements made with
 “ the Zemindars in 1769, and those which
 “ have been since concluded, it was ad-
 “ mitted without opposition. So far as
 “ the right to exercise this power is con-
 “ cerned, it would certainly seem justi-
 “ fied by these authorities ; but it is not
 “ the right, it is the policy of the mea-
 “ sure that is questioned ; and in this
 “ view, it is presumed, it will not meet
 “ with advocates in a country where the
 “ advantages of property are so generally
 “ and so well understood.

“ It may therefore now, with some
 “ confidence, be said, that the measure
 “ from which the most extensive influ-
 “ ence might be expected in these pro-
 “ vinces, and that which would most
 “ favourably proclaim the intentions of
 “ government, would be to convert the
 “ PRECARIOUS and DISCOURAGING TE-
 “ NURE, under which the Zemindars now
 “ hold their lands, into one ABSOLUTE

“ and DEFINED, ASCERTAINING THE IN-
 “ CREASE which should be made upon
 “ RENEWING the leases at stated periods,
 “ and the FINES which should be exacted
 “ upon the accession of an heir.

“ The only material objection to this
 “ measure, would seem to lie in the diffi-
 “ culty of ascertaining the value of the
 “ improvements which might be made
 “ between the periods of renewal. But
 “ this, it is imagined, will be found of little
 “ weight in the present case ; for as the
 “ registers which were before mentioned
 “ to have been instituted by the Hindoo
 “ government, are still regularly taken in
 “ every village and district, * and as by
 “ means of these, the state of cultivation
 “ may be at all times contrasted with
 “ the quantity of waste lands belonging
 “ to every Zemindar ; it would require

* British India Analyzed, vol. I. p. 147 to 196 ; Cap-
 tain Read's Report of Ceded Districts, 1792.

“ only to ascertain the first rent, and to
 “ specify the PROPORTION which, at the
 “ expiration of the term of that rent, go-
 “ vernment should take of the INCOME
 “ from the IMPROVEMENTS ; and this
 “ would appear the more easy, as the re-
 “ gisters not only mark the quantity of
 “ land cultivated, and its produce, but
 “ the market price of such produce, at
 “ the time of the harvest.

“ Let it be supposed, for instance, that
 “ the rents now paid, were to be conti-
 “ nued for ten years, and that upon a re-
 “ ference, at this time, to the registers,
 “ it should be found that one HALF part
 “ of the IMPROVABLE land lies WASTE.
 “ Let it be supposed farther, that upon a
 “ like reference at the end of ten years,
 “ it should appear, that one QUARTER
 “ part of such improvable land had been
 “ brought under cultivation, and that its
 “ PRODUCE, upon a MEDIUM of ten years,
 “ had yielded a certain sum ; in such an

“ event, it would not seem difficult, the
 “ proportion being fixed, and being rated
 “ by per centage upon this medium, to
 “ increase the rent for the next term by
 “ the amount of such proportion.

“ The spirit of industry so constantly
 “ attaches itself to the security of pro-
 “ perty, that the Zemindars, no longer
 “ dependent upon the precarious tenure
 “ of preference, but established in their
 “ possessions, and sure of sharing largely
 “ in the profits of their improvements,
 “ would seriously turn their attention to
 “ the cultivation of their lands, and filled
 “ with confidence in the justice of go-
 “ vernment, they would easily be induced
 “ to pay attention to such regulations as
 “ might be proposed for the general be-
 “ nefit.

“ Before any such regulations could
 “ be introduced with success, it would be
 “ necessary to adopt some expedient, by
 “ which the Zemindars might hope to be

“ freed, in time, from the heavy load of
 “ debt in which they are involved, the
 “ mere interest of which now keeps them
 “ in poverty, and by restraining their in-
 “ dustry, must ever retard the progress
 “ of improvement. While they remain
 “ under this pressure, all the efforts of
 “ government, and every mode of encou-
 “ ragement that may be proposed, will
 “ be found insufficient for restraining op-
 “ pressions, which originating in neces-
 “ sity, must continue while the weight
 “ of that necessity is felt.

“ An arrangement therefore with the
 “ Soucars, for the liquidation of the debts
 “ due to them from the Zemindars, seems
 “ a measure as necessary to the interest
 “ of the Company, as it would be essen-
 “ tial to the relief of the Zemindars ; but
 “ how to effect this, without occasioning
 “ distrust in the minds of the Soucars, is
 “ a question of as much difficulty as it is
 “ of importance. It can hardly be ima-

“ gined that the public credit of the Com-
 “ pany in India, is supported by that con-
 “ fidence which the national faith pro-
 “ cures to it in England ; nor, if it were,
 “ would it be prudent to propose that the
 “ Company should adopt the expedient
 “ of funding, and by taking upon them
 “ the debts of the Zemindars, make them-
 “ selves responsible for the payment.

“ But though it might be too hazardous
 “ to propose a measure of this kind, it
 “ may not be impossible to qualify the
 “ idea; and by substituting the guaran-
 “ tee of the Company instead of their
 “ security, and by employing mediation
 “ instead of authority, so far to gain the
 “ confidence of the Soucars, as to engage
 “ them to see their own interest in an
 “ equitable arrangement.

“ It has already been observed, that the
 “ income of the Zemindars may be ascer-
 “ tained from the registers which are
 “ kept in every district: by a similar re-

“ference to their leases, their rents may
 “be compared with their receipts; and
 “as their ordinary expences might be
 “limited until their debts were paid off,
 “it would seem an easy calculation to
 “judge of their abilities for discharging
 “their debts. For instance, suppose that
 “a Zemindar in the receipt of fifty thou-
 “sand pounds a year, stands charged with a
 “rent of thirty thousand, and that his ordi-
 “nary expences amount to ten thousand,
 “it must appear evident that, in such a
 “case, there can remain but ten thousand
 “to be applied towards the payment of
 “his debts, and that of course the ex-
 “pectations of the Soucars must be li-
 “mited to that sum.

“In such a case as is here supposed, it
 “certainly could not be considered as an
 “act of severity towards the Zemindar,
 “to oblige him to appropriate this sum
 “for the discharge of his debts; neither
 “could there be any danger, or risk of

“ loss to the Company, if they were to
 “ charge themselves with the receipt of
 “ it, and to account annually for the
 “ amount to the Soucars. This would
 “ secure to the latter, the effectual inter-
 “ position of the Company’s authority
 “ for the recovery of their debts; and it
 “ would seem, that the opportunity of
 “ such an indulgence would be most
 “ fortunate for urging the necessity of
 “ lowering the rate of interest; particu-
 “ larly, as from the statement just given,
 “ it might be made evident, that without
 “ such reduction, the Zemindars who are
 “ most involved, could never be relieved;
 “ for the premium of twenty per cent.
 “ would absorb the whole sum which
 “ could, in reason, be appropriated.

“ It would be expecting too much to
 “ imagine, however reasonable such an
 “ arrangement may appear, that the Sou-
 “ cars would immediately come into the
 “ views of the Company. It may how-

“ ever be hoped, that some amongst them
 “ might be induced to accede to them,
 “ and that by a proper improvement of
 “ every favourable opportunity, they may
 “ all, in the course of time, be engaged
 “ to adopt a measure, grounded so evi-
 “ dently upon the public and general be-
 “ nefit, and ultimately providing for the
 “ entire discharge of their debts. As a
 “ further inducement, they might be as-
 “ sured, that in proportion as the im-
 “ provements in the country should, upon
 “ the renewal of leases, enable the Com-
 “ pany to increase their revenue, in the
 “ same proportion would they interest
 “ themselves in favour of the Soucars, to
 “ have the payments increased for the
 “ discharge of their debts.

“ It may possibly be objected to this
 “ mode of accommodation, that the Sou-
 “ cars do not merit the protection and
 “ support it proposes to give them ; and
 “ that their agency having been ruinous

“ to the Zemindars, the sooner and the
 “ more severely they can be restrained
 “ in their exactions, the sooner the Com-
 “ pany may hope to see industry extend
 “ itself.

“ But before an objection of this kind
 “ should be admitted, it would seem ne-
 “ cessary to inquire, whether the rate of
 “ interest required by the Soucars, should
 “ be imputed solely to a spirit of usury
 “ in them, or whether it should not more
 “ properly be charged, in part, to the
 “ peculiar circumstances of the times,
 “ which by rendering the recovery of
 “ property precarious, might have made
 “ it but a reasonable compensation ; at
 “ least, if it might be permitted to apply
 “ the experience of other times and other
 “ countries to this subject, it would not
 “ be difficult to prove, that the insecurity
 “ of property, whether occasioned by
 “ want of confidence in the government,
 “ or its inability to protect, has always

“ produced a similar increase in the pre-
 “ mium upon money, and that the re-
 “ turn of good order and equitable admi-
 “ nistration, have always proved suffi-
 “ cient to remedy the evil.

“ And so it would certainly happen in
 “ these provinces, if the authority of go-
 “ vernment should be made but gently
 “ to interpose, and an unprejudiced con-
 “ duct should be observed towards the
 “ Soucars. If unhappily a different line
 “ should be pursued, and the power of
 “ the Company should be directed, sud-
 “ denly to compel the Soucars into any
 “ method of arrangement, less favourable
 “ to their interests, the public credit
 “ could not fail to be wounded, and the
 “ views of the Company to be counter-
 “ acted in every part of India ; for the
 “ influence of the Soucars has extended
 “ itself to every Durbar, and their agen-
 “ cy has been as much encouraged, be-
 “ cause it has been found as necessary,

“ by Hyder Ally, by Nizam Ally Cawn,
 “ and by the Mahrattas, as it has been
 “ seen in the provinces under Mazulipa-
 “ tam, and as it was experienced in the
 “ family of the Seets in Bengal.

“ Every improvement which should by
 “ these means be made, in the situation
 “ of the Zemindars, could not fail to pro-
 “ duce some amendment in the condi-
 “ tion of the husbandmen ; but the aid
 “ of such accidental benefits would never
 “ bring forth those exertions of industry,
 “ which arise from security and the cer-
 “ tainty of enjoyment. The husband-
 “ men would still be at a great distance
 “ from the happy state, in which the
 “ wisdom of the Hindoo administration
 “ had placed their ancestors, and until
 “ some prospect could be shewn them of
 “ returning to their ancient establish-
 “ ment, it is to be apprehended, their la-

“ bours would be restrained by diffidence
“ and distrust.

“ A variety of regulations might be
“ proposed, which would seem to pro-
“ mise them every security, and to pre-
“ clude every interference of the Zemin-
“ dars, beyond the necessary business of
“ collecting their rents ; but REGULA-
“ TIONS are seldom found sufficient, to
“ prevent the strong from oppressing the
“ weak, or to counteract the habits of
“ established usage ; the mind long ac-
“ customed to submission, has not strength
“ enough to assert the rights which new
“ regulations may confer, nor can the
“ haughty tone of authority be immedi-
“ ately softened, into the mild expression
“ of justice.

“ Some expedient should therefore be
“ suggested, which, without seeming to
“ look beyond the immediate relief of
“ the husbandmen, might tend to inspire
“ them with confidence, and to revive

“ that independence of spirit, which alone
 “ can secure to them the benefit of new
 “ regulations ; possibly this expedient
 “ might be found in the very distresses it
 “ is proposed to relieve.

“ It is a fact well ascertained, that the
 “ embarrassments of the husbandmen
 “ reduce them, for the most part, to the
 “ necessity of borrowing money, and
 “ that the lowness of their credit, obliges
 “ some of them to take it at an extrava-
 “ gant interest, while even the most re-
 “ sponsible are glad to receive it at 24
 “ per cent. and all upon the security of
 “ a mortgage upon the small share they
 “ are allowed in the produce of their la-
 “ bour. Might not the treasury of the
 “ Company, upon the same security of a
 “ mortgage, be made to furnish the small
 “ necessary aids, which the husbandmen
 “ might have occasion for ? and would not
 “ the mortgages they might receive from
 “ them, supply the best materials for

“ judging of their situation, and afford
 “ the most unquestionable evidence, of
 “ the necessity for occasionally interpos-
 “ ing the authority of government in
 “ their behalf? Would not interpositions
 “ of this nature operate in the most ef-
 “ fectual way to inspire the husbandmen
 “ with confidence; and in the simplest
 “ manner, establish those principles of
 “ justice and of right, which courts of law
 “ might afterwards extend and sustain?

“ The detail of such a business would
 “ appear to be its only objection; but this
 “ will probably be found of little weight,
 “ when it is recollected, that the chain of
 “ connection established by the Hindoo
 “ government, from the village register
 “ to the register of the province, is still
 “ kept up;* and that the salaries which
 “ were drawn by a commission upon the
 “ produce of each division, are still re-

* See Sir John Shore's minute of June 1789, paragraphs
 242 to 262; and Captain Read's Report.

“ ceived, and appropriated by those who
“ inherit these offices by grant or succes-
“ sion, and who, in consequence, are
“ bound to whatever duties the business
“ of the revenue may require from them
“ in their several departments. May it
“ not be hoped that the objection to de-
“ tail would vanish, when it is seen that
“ the proposed aid might be administered
“ to the poorest husbandman, through
“ the agency of these established officers,
“ and by the simple operation on the part
“ of government, of an advance to the
“ provincial registers of the necessary
“ sums. The particular wants of each
“ individual being known to the registers
“ of the villages, and being reported by
“ them to the registers of the districts,
“ and these being again collected together
“ in their reports, every necessary inform-
“ ation would be conveyed to the provin-
“ cial officers; and as all advances from
“ the treasury would be made to this lat-

“ ter description of officers, their receipts
 “ would necessarily attach responsibility
 “ on them, in the first instance, and from
 “ them to the subordinate officers, until
 “ the mortgage of the husbandman’s pro-
 “ perty, in the produce from the land,
 “ should ultimately establish a security,
 “ and until, upon the sale of that pro-
 “ perty, the money should be recovered,
 “ and made to flow back to the treasury
 “ through the same channel.

“ It would be an injury to the justice
 “ of government to suppose, that any ar-
 “ guments of immediate profit, could be
 “ necessary to recommend a measure,
 “ which has evidently the general bene-
 “ fit for its object. It may not, however,
 “ be improper to observe, that this end
 “ might in some measure be disappoint-
 “ ed, by an excess of liberality; as the
 “ sudden transition from a burdensome
 “ and wasting interest, to a total exemp-
 “ tion from it, might, by the too rapid

“ introduction of plenty, check the spirit
 “ of industry.

“ To prevent this, and to keep a re-
 “ serve for further indulgence, where
 “ the peculiarity of situation might make
 “ it necessary, it would be prudent to
 “ charge these loans with a moderate in-
 “ terest ; and in a country where credit
 “ is seldom necessary beyond the harvest,
 “ or six months at the most, the rate es-
 “ tablished by Parliament might be made
 “ the standard ; always, however, except-
 “ ing from this charge, such debts as
 “ should appear to be contracted for the
 “ purchase of seed-grain, or for buying
 “ such implements of husbandry as might
 “ be necessary for cultivating to advan-
 “ tage the grounds already under tillage.
 “ Debts of this kind being evidently of
 “ necessity, and incurred to preserve the
 “ inheritance of the family ; which being
 “ held upon the tenure of constant culti-
 “ vation, would become subject to for-

“ feiture without the assistance of such
“ aids.

“ The husbandmen, relieved by these
“ means from the weight of a consuming
“ interest, and encouraged to regard the
“ Company as their guardians and pro-
“ tectors, would soon become sensible of
“ the improved security of their situa-
“ tion, and no longer apprehensive of the
“ exactions of the Zemindars, who in-
“ deed would no longer have an interest
“ or an excuse for oppressing them,
“ every exertion of their industry would
“ be called forth, and grounds which for
“ ages have been untilled, would be
“ brought into cultivation.

“ To secure the permanency of these
“ advantages, the care of government
“ should be extended to provide against
“ the dreadful accidents of droughts,
“ which sometimes happen in every part

“ of India ; and which never fail to bring
 “ on all the miseries of famine. With-
 “ out the aid of such assistance, the spirit
 “ of industry would, too often, be ex-
 “ erted in vain, and the endeavours of
 “ the husbandmen, instead of being re-
 “ warded with plenty, would, in such
 “ events, be productive of want and dis-
 “ tress, from the loss of their labour and
 “ of their seed-grain. Happily the means
 “ of providing against so dreadful a mis-
 “ fortune in these provinces, are within
 “ the power of government, and may be
 “ attained without any considerable ex-
 “ pence, and with the advantage of oc-
 “ casioning a great increase in their cul-
 “ tivation and productions.

“ The two greatest rivers which flow
 “ on this coast of the Peninsula, have
 “ their courses through those provinces.
 “ The Kistnah to the south, and the
 “ Guadavery to the north. The coun-
 “ try which lies between them in this

“ direction having a natural fall on each
 “ side, until at length it forms into a flat,
 “ which for the space of several miles is,
 “ at a particular season of the year, co-
 “ vered with water.

“ The vast extent of this natural re-
 “ servoir, situated almost midway be-
 “ tween these rivers, and capable of re-
 “ ceiving more water than all the country
 “ between it and the sea could require,
 “ would seem to promise an inexhaust-
 “ ible source of plenty to those provinces,
 “ if the necessary supplies of water could
 “ be preserved in it, and even to point
 “ out a way, by which the easiest and
 “ most expeditious communication might
 “ be opened between the rivers Guada-
 “ very and Kistnah.

“ The idea of forming a communica-
 “ tion between these rivers, by means of
 “ this flat, which is distinguished by the
 “ name of the Colere lake, most probably
 “ occurred to the Hindoos, as a channel

“ is still open, with but few interruptions,
 “ from the eastern end of this lake to
 “ the Guadavery, which appears to have
 “ been the work of art ; and as the re-
 “ mains of a like design are still dis-
 “ coverable, for many miles, on the side
 “ of the Kistnah.

“ But whether these channels owe their
 “ form and direction to the policy of for-
 “ mer governments, or to the natural in-
 “ clination of the country, and the vio-
 “ lence of inundations ; in either case,
 “ they seem to point out a way by which
 “ the necessary aids of water might be
 “ secured, and to invite government to
 “ perfect a communication, the advan-
 “ tages of which would be immediate,
 “ and which might, in time, be made of
 “ importance to the security, as well as
 “ to the trade, of these provinces. For
 “ bounded as they are on the N. E. by
 “ the sea, and nearly inclosed to the N. W.
 “ by the Guadavery, and on the S. by

“ the Kistnah, they would seem to want
 “ only the advantage of this channel, to
 “ be secured against the sudden irrup-
 “ tions of cavalry ; and to be prepared
 “ for yielding those mutual aids, which
 “ their situation, and the nature of their
 “ productions, so particularly point out.
 “ For while the country in the neigh-
 “ bourhood of the Guadavery, the soil of
 “ which is peculiarly adapted for the cul-
 “ tivation of rice, is most favoured by the
 “ heavy and continued fall of the mon-
 “ soon rains, the lands on either side of
 “ the Kistnah lying high, and being fit
 “ only for the culture of dry grain, yield
 “ the most plentiful harvests when the
 “ seasons are most moderate ; so that it
 “ rarely happens but that one of these
 “ provinces possesses the means of influ-
 “ encing the price of the necessaries of
 “ life in the other.

“ The want of water communication,
 “ has hitherto prevented the inhabitants

“ from receiving any material benefit
 “ from these advantages of their situa-
 “ tion; nor can they ever be made to re-
 “ ceive them effectually, unless assisted
 “ by a canal to open this communication.
 “ For, denied a constant intercourse by
 “ sea, from the violence with which the
 “ monsoon winds blow for several months
 “ in the year, supplies must, for the most
 “ part, be sent by land; the expence of
 “ which, in a country where the only
 “ conveyance is upon the backs of bul-
 “ locks, and where the imposts of the
 “ road are very high, must necessarily
 “ enhance the prices so much, as to
 “ amount almost to a prohibition.

“ The expence of opening a channel
 “ of such extent, with the distant pros-
 “ pect of the advantages to be derived
 “ from it, will necessarily occur as objec-
 “ tions to this undertaking. It is hoped,
 “ however, that they will not appear of

“ such weight, as totally to discourage
 “ from the attempt ; but that, at least, a
 “ survey will be ordered, to estimate the
 “ expence, and to form a computation of
 “ the time within which the work might
 “ be completed. In the mean while, as it
 “ cannot mislead, it may not be unsatis-
 “ factory to be informed, that from a se-
 “ ries of levels and distances taken with
 “ some accuracy, there is reason to be-
 “ lieve, that neither the expence nor the
 “ labour will be found of the importance
 “ they at first appear.

“ But, whatever may be the result of
 “ a survey, and with whatever diffidence
 “ the proposal for forming a navigable
 “ canal is here submitted, the smaller
 “ work of opening a more sufficient
 “ course for the water to flow from the
 “ Kistnah and Guadavery into the Colere,
 “ is recommended with all the confi-
 “ dence, that a certain conviction of its

“ general and great utility, and of the
 “ small expence at which it might be ef-
 “ fected, can inspire.

“ The annexed sketch of the country
 “ between those rivers,* will best shew
 “ the extent to which the benefit of these
 “ supplies might be carried; for all the
 “ lands between the sea and the chan-
 “ nels there described, may be water-
 “ ed from them. It will shew too (from
 “ the number of towns and hamlets)
 “ with how little burthen, the trifling
 “ expence of this work would be defray-
 “ ed; as by the established usage of the
 “ country, each landholder is obliged to
 “ contribute two and an half per cent.
 “ from the produce of such lands as are
 “ watered from any new canal, or reser-
 “ voir, until the expence of forming it
 “ has been discharged.

* Mr. Dalrymple published in 1793, with his Memoir on watering the Circars, an improved sketch, from more correct materials, to which the reader is referred,

“ The only objection which it would
 “ seem could be opposed to this measure,
 “ is the danger that it might draw off
 “ the labouring people too much from
 “ the business of cultivation, an objec-
 “ tion which would certainly have great
 “ weight, if a particular institution of the
 “ Hindoos had not removed the diffi-
 “ culty, by separating from all other or-
 “ ders of the society, those people who
 “ are employed in the digging of canals.
 “ This class of people, distinguished in
 “ India by a name expressive of their oc-
 “ cupation (tank diggers), have no fixed
 “ residence, but move about with their
 “ families in search of business, and en-
 “ camp around the place of their work
 “ until it is finished. Instead, therefore,
 “ of apprehending any temporary neg-
 “ lect of cultivation, from the opening
 “ of these channels, and forming the pro-
 “ posed communication, the husbandmen
 “ would rather have a new incitement to

“ industry, from the increased consump-
 “ tion of the produce of the land which
 “ these tank diggers would occasion.

“ It may be some further recommen-
 “ dation of the measure to know, that
 “ from the great number, and the pecu-
 “ liar robustness of the people who com-
 “ pose this society, a work of this kind
 “ might be completed in India, in a very
 “ short time. For the tank diggers, dis-
 “ persed throughout a country which has
 “ every where occasion for their assist-
 “ ance, are easily collected in whatever
 “ numbers it may be thought necessary,
 “ and their work being generally paid
 “ for by measurement, is executed with
 “ an expedition which even Europeans
 “ could not surpass, in the temperate cli-
 “ mate of their own country.

“ It will not be deemed impertinent
 “ to digress here for a moment, to offer

“ the tribute of acknowledgment to the
 “ Hindoo nation, whose institutions have
 “ been seen to furnish resources, where-
 “ ever they were necessary, and whose
 “ simplicity of manners have enabled them
 “ to preserve and to support regulations,
 “ which distinguish them from all other
 “ people, and still more peculiarly dis-
 “ tinguish each class of their society from
 “ the other, separating without causing
 “ divisions or dissensions amongst them.

“ To this peculiarity in the institu-
 “ tions of the Hindoos, is to be attributed
 “ the remains of industry which are still
 “ to be found throughout India, and
 “ which, under every revolution, has ena-
 “ bled the manufacturer to continue his
 “ work, changing only his situation, as
 “ his security, the means of his subsist-
 “ ence, and the demand for his labour,
 “ have rendered it necessary. From
 “ hence too it has proceeded, that at diffe-
 “ rent periods, commerce has flourished

“ in different parts of India ; at one time
 “ shewing itself at Mazulipatam, where
 “ for above a century it diffused riches
 “ and plenty ; still more early and upon a
 “ scale of greater extent, discovering
 “ itself at Surat, where it is now said to
 “ be on the decline ; but always uni-
 “ formly increasing and extending itself
 “ in the neighbourhood of the European
 “ establishments, because there the de-
 “ mand has been found to be uniform,
 “ the payment is known to be certain,
 “ and because there, the manufacturers
 “ receive a protection which ensures to
 “ them the profits of their labour.

“ It were to be wished, that still
 “ greater encouragement were given to
 “ them, and that possessed as we now
 “ are of the countries where the manu-
 “ factures for the consumption of Europe
 “ are in greatest abundance and perfec-
 “ tion, the policy of our administration
 “ were directed towards improving the

“ condition of the manufacturers, and that
 “ by attaching them to our government,
 “ we might secure to ourselves a prefer-
 “ ence in their labours, until the full ex-
 “ tent of our demands should be com-
 “ pleted, and until our rivals, without
 “ foundation or even pretence for com-
 “ plaint, should be made to yield to us
 “ that superiority in the commerce with
 “ India, which our dominion and the le-
 “ nity of our government entitle us to
 “ look for.

“ Those who have had opportunities
 “ of comparing the texture of the goods
 “ provided for Europe, with those fabri-
 “ cated by the natives for their own con-
 “ sumption, must know, that the qualities
 “ of our calicoes the lengths and breadths
 “ to which they are woven, and the de-
 “ nominations by which they are distin-
 “ guished, differ as much from those ma-
 “ nufactured for the natives, as the uses
 “ do for which they are designed ; and

“ though it would be of little consequence
 “ to inquire at what time this innovation
 “ took place, yet it appears of import-
 “ ance to remark it here ; because, as
 “ means were heretofore found to detach
 “ the weavers from the work to which
 “ they had been accustomed, and to en-
 “ gage them in these new manufactures,
 “ it seems not a forced inference to con-
 “ clude, that the same success might now
 “ be expected to follow every encourage-
 “ ment that should be given them. And
 “ as professions are entailed amongst the
 “ Hindoos, and every male descendant
 “ is born under the obligation of con-
 “ fining himself to the occupation of his
 “ father, and of choosing his wife from a
 “ family of the same profession ; it can-
 “ not be doubted, but that where manu-
 “ facturers are so numerous, our invest-
 “ ments might be completed, even though
 “ the orders should exceed all former ex-
 “ ports from India to Europe ; and that

“ still sufficient encouragement might be
 “ left for other European nations to con-
 “ tinue in this trade.

“ It would be presuming too much
 “ to suppose that it were possible here
 “ to prescribe all the particular modes,
 “ which should be adopted for stimulat-
 “ ing the industry of the manufacturers,
 “ who now work for the Company, or for
 “ encouraging those in the adjoining
 “ countries to transport themselves, their
 “ families, and their looms, to the neigh-
 “ bourhood of our settlements. These
 “ are circumstances which must ever be
 “ regulated, because they will ever be in-
 “ fluenced, by characters and situations ;
 “ and because they must vary with the
 “ views and caprices of men.

“ There are, however, some general
 “ lines of encouragement, which will
 “ hardly admit of exception ; and the
 “ first of these, for a manufacturing peo-
 “ ple, would seem to be the certainty of

“ procuring, at all times, the necessities
 “ of life at moderate prices. To secure
 “ to them this advantage, public grana-
 “ ries might be established, under such
 “ regulations as would necessarily influ-
 “ ence the rates of the market, and in
 “ such abundance, as might enable the
 “ government to open the public stores,
 “ whenever the retail prices should ex-
 “ ceed the easy subsistence of the poorer
 “ working people.

“ It would scarcely be possible to pro-
 “ pose any mode of encouragement,
 “ which would operate, with equal effi-
 “ cacy to this, amongst all ranks of peo-
 “ ple, and particularly with the weaving
 “ manufacturers, for no class in India
 “ more rigidly abstain from the use of
 “ animal food. But as professional im-
 “ munities are ever found to influence
 “ the success of new undertakings, it
 “ might be politic to exempt, for a time,
 “ those weavers who should engage in

“ the manufactures of the Company,
 “ from the rent or assessment with which
 “ they are now every where charged
 “ for the privilege of establishing and
 “ working their looms.

“ Some assistance too might be given
 “ to them in the provision of the cotton
 “ thread, of which their manufactures are
 “ composed; and which they now pur-
 “ chase at a great disadvantage. This
 “ thread is an article of trade, and being
 “ brought from a great distance, its price
 “ must necessarily be enhanced in every
 “ stage of its passage, from the first pur-
 “ chaser, until it at length falls into the
 “ hands of the weavers, at the heavy ad-
 “ vance of a retail sale.

“ It will hardly be credited, that in the
 “ small extent of the Company’s domi-
 “ nion, this thread, like every other ar-
 “ ticle of trade, is subjected to the pay-
 “ ment of a heavy duty, to every Zemin-
 “ dar and renter through whose country

“ it passes ; and that commerce, meeting
 “ with the same demands and discouragement
 “ in every other part of the Peninsula,
 “ is now confined to articles of necessity,
 “ or is carried on in the names,
 “ and under the protection of Soucars,
 “ and of men in office, which exempt it
 “ from the payment of duties.

“ Partial and insufficient as these expedients
 “ must be, it cannot but be
 “ thought fortunate, that any circumstance
 “ should have happened to yield
 “ relief to the merchant under the heavy
 “ pressure of such impositions ; and it is
 “ a satisfaction to know, that as the income
 “ to the Zemindars from these duties
 “ is now rendered inconsiderable, by
 “ the frequent use of the dustucks, through
 “ which this exemption is conveyed, the
 “ resumption of the privilege, under
 “ which the duties are collected, may be
 “ effected without any material diminution
 “ of their revenue.

“ It will, however, be politic to defer
 “ discovering any intention of this kind,
 “ until the established security of their
 “ property shall have removed every ap-
 “ prehension of distrust from the Zemin-
 “ dars, and until the generous policy of
 “ the Company, encouraging them on
 “ every side, shall have brought them to
 “ submit, without reluctance, to a reform
 “ of such importance to the general in-
 “ terest of the state.

“ Whenever this opportunity shall of-
 “ fer, it will be of infinite consequence
 “ to reduce the number of custom-houses
 “ which are now to be met with in al-
 “ most every village of these provinces,
 “ and to free commerce from the com-
 “ plicated detail it is thereby exposed to,
 “ by establishing one general duty, the
 “ payment of which, in any part of the
 “ Company’s dominion, shall serve the
 “ merchant for a passport into every vil-
 “ lage of their country.

“ Having already trespassed so much
“ on your patience, it would be presump-
“ tion to attempt a further intrusion, if
“ it were not justified by the conviction,
“ that all your endeavours to encourage
“ industry and manufactures must prove
“ ineffectual, if measures are not taken
“ to secure the advantages which they
“ may confer : if the husbandmen, at a
“ distance from the seat of government,
“ too remote to be travelled, even for ob-
“ taining justice, should be left to feel
“ the weight of oppression, without the
“ hope of redress ; and if the inhabitants
“ of these countries should still remain
“ without a prospect of being judged,
“ under some regular and authorized
“ mode, by those laws and usages which
“ they are taught from their infancy to
“ regard with peculiar veneration, and

“ which are known to differ in the most
 “ essential points from the laws estab-
 “ lished in this country.

“ The distinction of tribes, which is
 “ the first principle in the constitution of
 “ the Hindoos, necessarily precludes that
 “ indiscriminate justice, which levels all
 “ ranks of people in the eye of our law,
 “ and which places the noble and the me-
 “ chanic upon an equality in all public
 “ offences ; while in India the Bramin,
 “ uniting the dignity of the first order
 “ in the society with the sacred function
 “ of the priesthood, is allowed privileges
 “ and immunities, which no other tribe
 “ can dare to dispute or invade.

“ The descent of property, which with
 “ us is generally entailed to give dignity
 “ and importance to the elder branch of
 “ the family, amongst the Hindoos is di-
 “ rected to go in equal division amongst
 “ the males, where division is insisted on ;

“ but their laws discourage this so much,
 “ and the established usage, with the pub-
 “ lic opinion, so powerfully recommend
 “ the union of family, and the common
 “ enjoyment of all the acquisitions they
 “ may make, that the instances of sepa-
 “ ration are as rare, as they are disre-
 “ putable.

“ Innumerable instances still more
 “ forcible might be stated, to prove the
 “ impossibility of reconciling the spirit
 “ of the laws under which we live, with
 “ the institutes of the Hindoos ; and as
 “ these institutes are blended with their
 “ religion, and have been preserved to
 “ this time under every revolution that
 “ has happened, it cannot be supposed
 “ that any other system would now be
 “ received by them.

“ The question here therefore would
 “ seem to be, not whether their institu-
 “ tions should be innovated, by an at-
 “ tempt to introduce our laws ; but

“ under what form, their own laws may
 “ be administered with most advantage
 “ to the subject, and with most security
 “ to the state? and this it is hoped will be
 “ found a question of less difficulty than
 “ it may at first appear.

“ It has been already seen, that the
 “ lands in these provinces are for the
 “ most part held by Zemindars, and that
 “ Zemindars from their original institu-
 “ tion were vested with judicial powers
 “ in their respective districts. In this
 “ light were they viewed, when the Com-
 “ pany (being itself a Zemindar under
 “ the Saned of Jaffier Ally Cawn) ap-
 “ pointed Mr. Holwell to undertake the
 “ duties of that office; and when that
 “ gentleman, anxious to acquit himself
 “ in a charge which he found complicated
 “ and of extensive jurisdiction, applied
 “ to have associates joined to him in the
 “ judicial part of his trust.

“ In this light too, have the Zemindars

“ been hitherto considered in these pro-
 “ vinces, and though there is too much
 “ reason to apprehend, that judging with-
 “ out associates, and unrestrained by any
 “ superintending authority, their deci-
 “ sions have been more marked by par-
 “ tiality and resentment, than by the
 “ rules of law or the principles of jus-
 “ tice ; it would not seem candid to in-
 “ fer from hence, that because the in-
 “ stitution has been abused, it must
 “ therefore be a bad one. On the con-
 “ trary, referring again to Mr. Holwell,
 “ the institution will appear to have pe-
 “ culiar merit ; for it is said, that in the
 “ course of four years, while he presided
 “ in that office, not a single complaint
 “ was preferred against his judgments in
 “ criminal cases, and but one appeal was
 “ made from his decrees in matters of
 “ property.

“ Seeing, therefore, that justice has
 “ been administered to so much advantage

“ under the authority of a Zemindar,
 “ may it not be hoped, that under pro-
 “ per regulations, the same benefits might,
 “ by the same means, be extended
 “ throughout these provinces, and that
 “ in their zemindary courts, the people
 “ might be gratified, in being judged by
 “ those laws which they so much ve-
 “ nerate, and to which they still ascribe
 “ the riches and population that former-
 “ ly so particularly distinguished their
 “ country from every other part of the
 “ world.

“ It has been an usage amongst the
 “ Hindoos, of as great antiquity as their
 “ laws, for the Rajahs to form a council
 “ from the most learned of the Bramins,
 “ to assist them in the administration of
 “ justice, and to pronounce the decisions
 “ of the law upon all cases of property
 “ or offence. It could not, therefore, be
 “ deemed an innovation, to direct that
 “ in every Zemindary throughout these

“ provinces, a council of this kind should
 “ be formed, to consist of any number
 “ of Bramins from ten to three, who
 “ should constantly assist the Zemindar
 “ in his judicial capacity, and whose opi-
 “ nions should controll him in all mat-
 “ ters of law.

“ A public register of the proceedings
 “ of these courts, which would seem to
 “ be a part of their constitution, from
 “ the report of Mr. Holwell, and which
 “ is so consonant to the practice of the
 “ Hindoos in other cases, would not on-
 “ ly tend to restrain the Zemindars and
 “ their associates from every abuse of
 “ their power, but would enable the go-
 “ vernment, by comparing the proceed-
 “ ings of the several courts, to judge by
 “ what further regulations the course of
 “ justice might be assisted ; where the
 “ rigour of the Hindoo laws might be
 “ tempered, without invading their con-
 “ stitution ; and aboye all, how the use of

“juries might be introduced, and the
 “natives of these countries be made to
 “feel, under the security of that privi-
 “lege, the great advantage of living un-
 “der an English administration.

“It may be objected to this, that the
 “translation of proceedings so volumi-
 “nous and complicated, would require
 “the assistance of a greater number of
 “agents, than might be found qualified
 “for such an undertaking. But may it
 “not be answered, that this objection is
 “in itself a reason, and that in shewing
 “how imperfect and confined the com-
 “munication between the natives and
 “the English now is, it marks strongly
 “the necessity of adopting some mode
 “of encouragement, by which the study
 “of our respective languages might be
 “made more general ; and what mode
 “could be proposed more likely to give
 “this encouragement to the natives, than
 “the certainty of being employed ?

“ If, therefore, no other objection
 “ should be found to oppose this measure,
 “ the one above suggested would not
 “ seem difficult to be obviated ; and as
 “ the establishment of the Zemindars in
 “ their lands, under such security as
 “ might remove apprehension, should
 “ precede the regulations here proposed,
 “ there would be sufficient time, before
 “ that could be effected, to extend the
 “ knowledge of our language, and to
 “ render the study of the Hindoo more
 “ familiar ; and if small premiums of en-
 “ couragement were to be offered to the
 “ natives, and rewards of more conse-
 “ quence were to be held out, to excite
 “ the application of the Europeans, it
 “ cannot be doubted but that, at the ex-
 “ pence of ten or twelve thousand pounds,
 “ you would have, in a short time, a suf-
 “ ficient number of agents, well qualified
 “ to translate these proceedings, and

“ whose studies could not fail to throw
 “ new lights on the history of a country,
 “ and of a people, with which we are yet
 “ but too imperfectly acquainted.”

OBSERVATIONS.

FOURTEEN years have elapsed, since the letter just recited was presented to the Court of Directors. The information that has been collected, within so long a period, upon the subject of the revenue, and upon the detailed arrangement of the Hindoo and Mahomedan systems, under which the revenue was collected, have furnished the best ground upon which a judgment can be formed, of the principles which the preceding letter was intended to explain.

The object which I had principally in view in writing that letter, was to shew the impolicy of adopting, under the English government in India, that construction of the supreme authority over the land revenues of the country, which the

Mahomedan states had asserted, and which was, at times, exercised with great severity and oppression, in the countries now under the dominion of the English.

I had conceived, that a more qualified construction and exercise of sovereign power might be safely introduced, under the active authority of English administration, and I was persuaded, that such a mode of government, steadily pursued, would be found, not only more efficient for all the purposes of the state, than a despotic and arbitrary rule; but that, as it would necessarily tend to bring forth the exertions and talents of the ingenious and industrious natives living under our protection, it would, by those means, enlarge the sphere of public, as well as of private prosperity.

I felt an anxious desire to see extended to the subjects of Great Britain in India, the same securities under which

a British subject in Europe holds his property, and the same freedom with which he can dispose of his person ; but I was equally solicitous, that in extending to them benefits of such inestimable value, no innovation should be attempted in those usages and established privileges, which the Hindoos consider as of equal importance with such rights ; and that it might be effected without unloosing any of those ties, by which the different gradations and relations of men are connected together in that distant part of the British dominion.

I knew that the situation of the Company's affairs required that a progressive increase should, if possible, be established in their territorial revenue, and that the extension and improvement of their commercial interest should be made to keep pace with their resources ; but I was solicitous, that whatever measures were taken for those purposes, they should be

founded upon a basis of such solidity, as might enable the English government to proceed with confidence, and as should at the same time encourage the industry of India to exert itself in proportion.

Under the influence of those opinions, which reflection and experience have strengthened and confirmed, I have derived peculiar satisfaction from learning, that a permanent settlement of the territorial revenue, has been lately perfected in Bengal, upon principles which have been described to me to be in a great measure analogous to those I had the honour of submitting to the Court of Directors in the year 1779, relative to the Northern Circars.

Under the settlement of 1792, as I am informed, the tenure of a Zemindar, and of every other landholder in Bengal, from having been precarious and undefined (as is still the case in the Northern Circars), has been converted into a defi-

nite and independent freehold, by the establishment of a permanent rate or assessment. Internal commerce, from having been fettered by the exacting avarice of every Zemindar, and by the vexatious delays of multiplied custom-houses and collectors (which continue to obstruct its course in the Circars), has, I understand, been opened to the fair trader in Bengal, under easy and stated duties. The administration of justice (which is yet but a name, without form or effect, in the Circars) is said to have obtained an establishment in Bengal, under regulations which promise to the cultivator and to the manufacturer, the most speedy and efficacious redress for any injuries they may sustain ; while it offers to the proprietor of land, and to the merchant, the most certain security in their property, and the greatest encouragement in their speculations.

If such have been the leading features

in the system that was established in Bengal in 1792, under the authority of the dictatorial powers of government, which alone could have enabled the administration of India to have perfected so great a work, I allow myself to hope, that I shall not be thought assuming, when I refer to that arrangement, as a most distinguished elucidation of the ideas which I had the honour to offer for consideration, in my letter to the Court of Directors in 1779.

Local circumstances in Bengal, of which I am not competent to judge, may have rendered it advisable to carry the system at once into effect there, in the greatest extension of which it was susceptible; and by the establishment of one fixed assessment upon all the lands in the hands of each occupant (whether cultivated or waste), to put a standard rate upon the whole.

But, I apprehend, it will be found

that the Northern Circars, have not yet attained that degree of improvement, which would warrant the immediate adoption of the system in so great an extent. I am humbly of opinion, that until the Zemindars and other occupants of the soil shall have been enabled, by the protecting aid of British government, to cultivate their lands to a much greater extent than they now do, it would be more for the common benefit of the subject, and of the state, that the PRINCIPLES of the system should be but GRADUALLY introduced into those provinces ; and that we should begin, by fixing an invariable assessment upon those lands only, which may be considered to be in a course of cultivation ; reserving to government the RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE, upon an ASCERTAINED proportion, in the produce or income from the lands that may hereafter be brought into improvement.

Under this modification, the process

and detail of which I have before endeavoured to explain, in my letter of 1779 to the Court of Directors, I have no doubt but that a progressive increase might be established in the land revenue of those provinces; and that the income of the state might be made to augment with the extended industry and agriculture of the country, without infringing in any respect the great principles of permanency and security, which form the basis of the system.

The natural advantages which the Northern Circars possess, as has been before observed, in having the rivers Kistnah and Guadavery flowing through them (the waters of which for more than a century have been suffered to overflow and inundate the country), MIGHT be employed to facilitate various communications through those provinces, and be made to render productive the rich, but long neglected wastes which are to be

seen in every district. The Colere lake, formed by nature to receive, in an expanse of several miles, the fertilizing element of water, MIGHT be improved by art into a reservoir, capable of preserving and of distributing it, at the proper season for the cultivation of rice ; in every stage of which, from the first flooding of the ground to assist the operation of the plough, until the grain begins to form in the ear of the transplanted blade, water is as essential to the culture of rice, as is the earth in which its fibrous roots are nourished and sustained.

The vast and hitherto unexplored forests of teek, which, from their extent, and the luxurious growth of the trees, have rendered the climate on either side of the river Guadavery above Gootalah, unhealthy to an extreme, and have therefore too generally proved fatal to the agents, whom private speculations have sent to Gootalah for the purpose of pur-

chasing timber, MIGHT become, under the more intelligent and active direction of public encouragement, a source of abundant supply for our Indian navy, without prejudice to the health of those who may be employed in selecting and sending it down the river; and whole districts MIGHT be rendered habitable to man, which for centuries have been visited only by the ferocious tiger, and other animals of prey.

The iron mines of the Rajahmundry Circar, MIGHT be made to furnish an article of infinite importance to the industry and to the commerce of India; and from the vicinity of those mines to the woods, all the operations of the foundry might be performed at a small expence, and might be made to assist, by the consumption of wood, in clearing the country, and in correcting the air.

All the important benefits here alluded to, might be drawn from our valuable

but hitherto neglected possessions in the Northern Circars, if the RIGHT of government to PARTICIPATE in the produce or income from the improvements of the waste lands, and of the forests, and unwrought mines of the country, should be reserved to the state; because, upon that principle, the public treasury might be made to furnish the large advances of money that must be requisite for perfecting reservoirs and canals, and for diverting mountain torrents, and the waste water of rivers into those receptacles; because the influence and authority of government might be employed, and it alone could be adequate, to limit and direct the labour of the people to work in the woods, at that season of the year only, when the exhalations of a confined air are rendered least noxious by the prevalence of the hot land winds, and when, by restricting their work to the district in which it might be thought advisable

to commence, the danger of injury to health, from that employment, would be in a great degree lessened ; and probably the cause would, in a few years, be removed, from the rapidity with which the woods might be thinned, and from the accommodation and medical relief which might be provided and administered in the first stages of disease.

Individual efforts could not, by any exertion that Asiatics are equal to, be made with sufficient force and intelligence, to warrant the expectation that similar advantages could be derived from their separate and limited resources. On the contrary, if a complete and unqualified property should be given to the Zemindars and other landholders, without any reservation, in the waste lands and forests, it is to be apprehended that little or no improvement will be attempted in the Northern Circars.

During a period of twenty years of

uninterrupted peace, and without the intervention of any public calamity whatsoever, neither the industry nor the cultivation of those provinces seem to have received any improvement or extension. In the year 1787, which was the twenty-first year of the British government, an inundation of the sea destroyed a considerable district of the country, and swept away above fifteen thousand of the inhabitants. Those provinces were visited by another calamity of a more extensive and fatal influence in the year 1790, when the failure of the periodical rains occasioned a scarcity, which the continued droughts of 1791 and 1792 increased to such an excess, that it has been computed one half of the inhabitants, or near five hundred thousand people of every description, were carried off.

Under circumstances of such accumulated adversity and distress, the benevo-

lence of government can alone enable the landholders, in those depopulated and impoverished provinces, to derive advantage from the permanency of tenure, which its wisdom and justice may convey to them. And it would therefore seem to be as reasonable, as it would be just and provident, that the state, in furnishing the means for improving the natural advantages which those provinces possess, and in assisting the inhabitants towards their recovery from past calamities, should RESERVE to itself a PARTICIPATION in the income that may be derived from the direction and application of those means.

The reasons which I have assigned in support of the opinion I have just submitted, being derived from circumstances that may seem peculiar to the present state of the Northern Circars, it might

possibly be inferred, that I conceive the southern provinces of the Carnatic do not require the same cautionary progress towards improvement ; and that, therefore, the system established by Lord Cornwallis in Bengal, might safely be introduced into those southern provinces, whenever an amicable arrangement with the Nabob of the Carnatic shall place them under an English administration.

To obviate an inference which, if acted upon, could not fail to produce consequences the very reverse of those it would be intended to bring forth, it is necessary to observe that, as the Polygars in the south of the Carnatic are at this time in possession of that species of force and power, which the Zemindars of the Northern Circars possessed when they first became subject to British rule, it will be expedient to pursue, in the southern provinces, a process similar to that by which the Zemindars in the north were brought

into a state of necessary dependence upon the established government; until this preparatory course shall have removed the great obstacles to order, by turning the active habits of the Polygar people from rapine and turbulence, to arts of industry and agriculture, it will be vain to attempt the introduction of any other mode of government than that of their chiefs, to whom they are attached from interest as well as from habit, and from the connection of cast. In this as well as in most other features of character, the Polygars of the south, at this time, will be found to resemble the description that has been given of the Zemindars of the Northern Circars, while they were under the Mahomedan government. The power which the Polygars have assumed is supported by the number of retainers, whom they have drawn to their standard, by allotments of land upon a tenure of military service. The same mode was

pursued by the Zemindars of the north, while their views were directed to the attainment of independence; and with the one as with the other, their followers have been kept to the exercise of arms, by the restless spirit of the chiefs, and the warfare in which they have been constantly engaged, either by resistance to the superior government, or in quarrels amongst themselves.

This similarity of character between the Polygars of the south, and the Zemindars of the north, inclines me to think, that the measures which were thought advisable for correcting the habituated errors and political vices of the one, might be successfully employed for the same purposes with the other; and in this view I have extracted the following passages from a letter which, in conjunction with the other members of the administration of Mazulipatam, I addressed

to the government of Madras on the 19th November, 1773.*

“ It must be acknowledged that the
 “ spirit of our government, and the high
 “ tribute which has been for some years
 “ collected, has now reduced the Zemin-
 “ dars so low, that no great danger is to
 “ be apprehended from their military
 “ power. But although no real danger
 “ may threaten, we think great inconve-
 “ niences may be expected, while they are
 “ suffered to retain the idea of their hav-
 “ ing a right to assemble their people
 “ on any occasion ; or even while they
 “ are suffered to consider any part of
 “ their people so dependent upon them,
 “ as that they must obey their summons
 “ whenever they shall think proper to

* In that letter will be found the outline of the plan, which, from a conviction of its utility, I was induced to submit to the Court of Directors at more extent, in 1779.

“ call them together. The manner by
 “ which they hold them to this depend-
 “ ence, may be urged as an additional
 “ evil ; for it is customary amongst the
 “ Zemindars, to give small portions of
 “ ground to their followers, at an under
 “ rate, whereby not only they themselves
 “ are deprived of a part of that benefit
 “ which they ought to receive, but go-
 “ vernment likewise is injured, as the
 “ proportion due to it from the income
 “ of the land is by such means lessened,
 “ for that proportion is always regulated
 “ by the nett receipts of the Zemindar.

“ We think, therefore, the interposi-
 “ tion of government will be highly ne-
 “ cessary in this instance, and that the
 “ Zemindars should be restrained from
 “ retaining a greater number of their
 “ people than may be necessary, as at-
 “ tendants upon occasions of public ce-
 “ remony. It is natural to imagine
 “ they will be very averse to a mea-

“ sure of this kind, and even oppose it
 “ by producing the articles of agreement
 “ that were made with them in 1766, by
 “ which they were bound to furnish a
 “ military assistance. Should they urge
 “ this, and it is the only plea of autho-
 “ rity on which they can found a right,
 “ the most favourable opportunity will
 “ thereby be opened for enforcing the re-
 “ striction we have proposed ; for as that
 “ condition must necessarily have been
 “ burdensome, the proposition of releas-
 “ ing them from it, should be represent-
 “ ed as a relief.”

The Polygars of the south, who have
 not been accustomed to respect the au-
 thority of the Nabob's government, and
 who are more formidable than the Ze-
 mindars of the north were in 1773, will
 not, it may be imagined, be less disposed
 than the others were, to resist any pro-
 position that may have a tendency to re-

duce the number of their retainers ; like them, they may refer to a public act in justification of their pretensions ; and it must be confessed, that the treaty of 1792, by asserting the right of the Nabob to their services, has furnished them with an argument that can only be answered by our giving, to that condition of their tenure, the construction of its being a burden upon them, and by making their release from it, appear to proceed from a considerate attention to their relief.

The mode of proceeding which, I conceive, would most favour our views in this instance, would be for government to act upon the letter of the treaty of 1792, which has ascertained the amount at which it has been thought fit to estimate the collections from the Polygars, and to confine our demands upon them to that sum ; but in doing this, I apprehend it would be politic, and certainly it would be just, to make the Polygars understand, by an annual, or triennial renewal

of their cowles, or engagements with government,* that this moderation in its demands proceeded from a principle, which embraced the general interests of the country and of the people, and that the extended improvement of the former, and the increased industry of the latter, were consequences which it was expected, should proceed from it.

With a view of promoting both the one and the other of those important objects, and of making means so beneficial in themselves, the progressive stages towards the introduction of the general system, it would be advisable that the principal agents of government should frequently move from district to district, varying their courses, and always giving previous intimation to the Polygars of their intention, with an express desire that a road might be cleared in the direction they meant to travel. To facili-

* An expedient of necessity arising out of the supposed construction of the treaty.

tate so useful a work, the native troops of the Company might occasionally be employed in it ; but their assistance should always be made to appear as intended to lighten the burden on the Polygars, or to expedite a work which might not otherwise be completed in time.

In the course of a few years, by the observance of this rule, various road communications might be opened through a country, which is now accessible only by circuitous and narrow paths. The Polygars and their people would gradually be drawn from their irregular and disorderly practices ; and the industrious manufacturers, who abound in the southern provinces of the Carnatic, would be enabled to proceed in their occupations without interruption, or the apprehension of danger.

The encouragement and protection which should be given to the manufacturers, by employing them in providing

an investment for the Company (a measure which the persevering industry of Mr. Martin has, this year, induced the government of Madras to accede to) will open, in another direction, a still more intimate intercourse, between the various classes of the natives, and the representatives of the English government; and thus, by an imperceptible but a quick and certain course, the provinces of the south will be prepared for the introduction of Lord Cornwallis's system, under modifications similar to those which have been already explained, as being necessary to be observed in the Northern Circars.

The progress and beneficial operation of those modifications are, at this time, so very particularly exemplified, in another part of the English dominion under the government of Madras; and they are now extending to our new subjects in the ceded districts of the Barra-Maul, such

advantages and so great encouragement, under the intelligent administration of Captain Read, that I cannot, in justice to his merit, and to the mode of proceeding which I have so much endeavoured to recommend, avoid remarking, that in the short space of two years, that gentleman, by having recourse to the village accounts and registers, and by availing himself of the established forms and institutions of the Hindoos, has been enabled to perfect a settlement of the revenue, with the inhabitants of every village, throughout the whole extent of the ceded districts, on the north of the river Cavery; the judicious use he has made of the information with which those valuable materials have furnished him, has not only tended to attach the natives to the English government, by the just and protecting character in which it has appeared to them, under his mild and active administration, but he has availed him-

self of it, to raise the public revenue of those districts, from the sum of 240,000 star pagodas, at which they were estimated by Tippoo Sultaun in the deed of cession, to the nett receipt of 455,581, or near double the amount of the rent-roll upon which they were delivered over to us.

When Captain Read commenced his administration, he found that the coercive power of Tippoo Sultaun had displaced the Zemindars, and that the despotism of his government had deprived them, not only of the general superintendence and controll in the districts which they had respectively managed, and over which, long possession had established their power, and prescription had almost given them a right ; but that it had extended itself, with few exceptions, to the resumption of the lands to which they had an unquestionable right, and to the abolition of those fees of office, which

former governments had assigned, as a recompence for the discharge of prescribed duties.

In this distressed and fallen state, the Zemindars of the ceded countries were found by Captain Read, to whom they preferred petitions for restoration ; that officer, not less awake to the rights of individuals than to those of the state, improved the opportunity which those petitions opened to him, and by the judicious use he made of it, he rendered an act of justice to individuals, the means of producing to the state, the most important and extensive benefits. • The Zemindars were assured by him, that they should be restored to their just rights, and as a necessary preliminary to the performance of that engagement, an inquiry into the nature and extent of those rights was instituted without delay. The immediate result of that inquiry was to separate just and established rights, from pretensions

which had risen out of the abuse of power : and it terminated in procuring to the Zemindars the restitution of those lands and fees of office, to which they could prove a title from any regular act of government, while it re-annexed to the domain of the state, the more extensive tracts which had been improperly severed from it.

By this mode of proceeding, and by a well judged application of the same principle to all similar cases, in which the landed property of the state had been invaded and alienated, without sufficient vouchers to authorize the conveyance, Captain Read has greatly augmented the public revenue ; he has attached the cultivators and inferior inhabitants of our frontier districts to the government of the English, by ascertaining and securing to them their property and the fruits of their industry ; and he has connected the Zemindars to our power by the strong

-tie of interest: for past experience has taught them, that the property to which they have been restored by the lenient justice of the English, can only be preserved to them by the continued exercise of British rule.

How widely different from the description that has been now given of the Zemindars in the ceded districts, WAS the situation of the Zemindars of Bengal, when we first assumed the exercise of power in that kingdom and its dependencies! how different too WAS the situation of the Zemindars in the Northern Circars, when they fell under our dominion? and how different from this reduced and fallen state, is the condition of the Polygars in the south of the Carnatic?

With a contrast of circumstances so marked, it cannot appear extraordinary, that government should regulate its proceedings by a different course, in those

different countries. WE FOUND the Zemindars of Bengal in possession of extensive provinces ; we allowed them to continue in that possession, during a term of years which almost amounted to prescription, under a variable, but always an increasing rent ; and we have confirmed to them, by a formal act in the year 1792 a perpetuity, at an advanced assessment, in those possessions, which in 1763 they held by the right of power.

The Zemindars of the Northern Circars, indeed, submitted to our authority in 1766, upon conditions, which, if policy had not forbid it, would have justified an investigation of their rights, and might have warranted that construction of those rights, which Captain Read has so justly given to the claims of the Zemindars of the ceded provinces. But it must be remembered, that HE FOUND those Zemindars dispossessed of their rights, and of their usurpations. Whereas WE FOUND

the Zemindars of the Northern Circars in the full enjoyment of the one and of the other. We left them in that enjoyment; and we have permitted them to continue in it so long, that justice, as much as policy, now forbids the idea of resumptions, upon the principle which, under very opposite circumstances, Captain Read has acted upon, with so much judgment and success, in the ceded provinces. But though from these considerations, it might be thought improper to attempt resumptions, it would seem too strong an inference to draw from this forbearance, that government should preclude itself from the right to participate in improvements. I must therefore repeat, what I have already more than once adverted to, that in my humble opinion, it will be both just and politic, before we convey to the Zemindars of the Northern Circars, a perpetuity in their tenures, that we should inform ourselves of the true state of the country, and for this

purpose that we should have recourse to the village registers and records, which appear to have been the sources, from whence Captain Read derived such accurate knowledge of the revenues, in his department, and which will be found never to disappoint the patient and discriminating inquirer.

It will not, I apprehend, be found less necessary to proceed by slow and progressive steps, in the JUDICIAL improvements which it may be thought advisable to introduce into the Northern Circars, than it has been represented will be requisite in the department of the revenue. Those provinces, and every other part of our possessions under the government of Madras, may be considered at this day, in respect of police, as new acquisitions; which, however closely united they may be to our dominion by the power that first connected them with

it, have as yet known the English government only by the steady, but not oppressive exercise of that power.

It was from a consideration of this circumstance that I was induced, in 1779, to suggest as a preparatory measure, that the Zemindars, who are all vested by their office with judicial powers in their respective districts, should be enjoined to discharge that duty, by holding regular and open courts of justice, under the denomination of zemindary courts; and it was with a view of drawing the confidence of the people to those courts, as well as of regulating their proceedings, and directing the due administration of justice, that I proposed to associate with the Zemindars, three or more Bramins, as coadjutors in each court, whose opinions should contrall them in all matters of law. I conceived that a vigilant attention to the conduct of those coadjutors, as well as of the Zemindars, would be necessary ;

and I recommended that a public register might be kept of their proceedings and decisions ; not only because the people were accustomed to a similar practice in other departments, but because these registers would furnish government with the best materials for judging, by what further regulations the course of justice might be assisted.

No change having taken place in the polity of those provinces since the year 1779, and no circumstance having occurred to improve the condition of the inhabitants, or to render them more fit for the introduction of a new system, I am led to renew the proposition which I made at that time, from the persuasion I am under, that it will be found to offer, under a sanctioned usage, the most efficacious remedy to the existing evils, and that it will prove the best course for preparing the natives of that portion of our empire, to receive the greater benefits

which it may hereafter be intended to convey to them.

In Bengal, a gradual but marked progress of improvement, during twenty years, had prepared the natives to expect, and to know the value of, the advantages which would necessarily result to them, from a permanent system. Every step that was made in the department of the revenue by that government, had connected with it the correction of the police, and the revival or reform of the judiciary establishment which the Mahomedans had introduced, and which had been upheld under their administration, until the powers of government were assumed by us. Our Hindoo subjects in that state, were early impressed with a confidence in our intentions; and being convinced that their happiness was a primary object of our consideration, they were engaged to meet those beneficent

views, by a communication (which their Mahomedan conquerors had never been able to draw from them) of their ancient institutions, for the declared purpose that they should be translated into English.* The exemplary interposition of public authority in 1779 to guard their national usages and religious preventions; the employment of a military force to resist the invasion of them, which was then attempted by the officers of the high court of English judicature, established at Calcutta; and the subsequent approbation which the British legislature manifested of that conduct, by passing an act to indemnify those who had committed so necessary a violation of our own laws; all these were circumstances, which, while they proved to the Hindoos, that the delegates of government merited the confidence they

* Which was ably executed in Bengal by Mr. Halhed, in 1777.

had placed in them, must have excited in their minds, the most profound veneration for their new sovereign.

Our Mahomedan subjects in Bengal met with similar encouragement; they were led to give us their confidence, by seeing, in the continued jurisdiction of their established courts, and from the attention that was shewn by us to the learned expounders of the Koran, that the English administration was not less favourably disposed towards the followers of Mahomed : the translation of the institutes of Akbar into English,* was equally calculated to inspire both Hindoos and Mahomedans, with sentiments of the best founded attachment towards a government, the discriminating judgment of whose representatives thus kept pace with their zeal, and who had opened to themselves, as guides for their own

* A most valuable work, in three volumes quarto, by Mr. Gladwin, in 1783.

conduct in a foreign rule, the ordinances and regulations of the most tolerant, the most wise, and the most powerful of the Mogul emperors of Hindoostan.

In this manner were the natives of Bengal progressively prepared for a permanent system of revenue, and for an improved administration of justice. In the Northern Circars we have yet to begin with both; and it is doubtful whether even the institutes of Akbar, or the compendium of the Hindoo laws, would materially assist us, in the first stage towards either. It is now near half a century, since the Mahomedan power ceased to be a controlling authority in the Northern Circars, and since the despotism of the Zemindars established itself in their separate districts. Few traces of Mahomedan courts or jurisdiction are now to be met with there; the number of individuals of that persuasion is so small, and they are in so

abject a state of wretchedness, from poverty and indolence, that they can only fall under the consideration of government, as objects of charity and compassion.

The commerce and the manufactures of the country are entirely in the hands of the Hindoos ; and the cultivation of the soil depends solely upon their industry. They form a numerous population, and they are supposed to have preserved, even under the arbitrary rule of the Zemindars, the ancient usages, as well as the language of their nation, in more purity than any other people in India. But with this advantage will be found connected, so rigid an adherence to the forms, as well as to the spirit of their institutions, that it is imagined any attempt to convey even benefits to them, through a channel with which they were not acquainted, would be resisted as an inva-

sion of the usages to which they are so much attached.

To conciliate the Hindoos of the Circars, must therefore be the first object of our attention ; and to effect this, we must accommodate our plans to their prejudices ; we must endeavour to gain their confidence by shewing them, as was done in Bengal, that we mean to proceed on the ancient ordinances and established usages of the country. We should invite the Bramins of the Circars to revise the code which the Pundits of Bengal so ably compiled for our information ; and we should encourage them to suggest any amendments or additions which local circumstances might make them think necessary. By these means the natives of the Northern Circars would be brought to respect our intentions ; and by having evidence before them, of the unexampled communication

which was made to an English government, by the Hindoos of Bengal, they may be led to observe a similar conduct. Perhaps the best course we could pursue, after this, for accomplishing our purpose, would be to apply the regulations of the laws which they so much venerate, to correct the practice of those laws, in the courts in which the people have been accustomed to see them partially, and too often oppressively, administered by the Zemindars. But in this we should proceed cautiously, and we may do so without prejudice to the justice of the country; for it is known that, in all matters of disputed property, the Hindoos resort in the first instance to arbitration; which is a practice of such antiquity, that the arbitrator is mentioned immediately after the magistrate, throughout the whole of the chapter on justice.* A reference of this kind, most commonly in-

* Gentoo Code, chapter 3.

cludes several persons, and by that means publicity is given to a process, which is well calculated to terminate differences, without either the expence or the delay incident to the mode of proceeding in regular courts.

If the decisions which are in this manner obtained were, within a stated time, to be inserted in the register or record of the village, and of the district in which the property in dispute was situated, it would give to them the sanction of authority, and by rendering them binding upon the parties, it would tend to check the spirit of litigation, to which mankind are too much given in every part of the world, but which is no where more prevalent than in the East.

I am not competent to suggest either the regulations under which the zemindary courts should be constituted, nor the limitations which should be given to their jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary

in this place that I should enter upon those topics. The sole object I have had in view, has been to express my sense of the necessity of proceeding, by slow and guarded steps, in the great and arduous work of establishing a system for the administration of justice, in the widely extended dominions which we possess or controll on the Coast of Coromandel.

I presume not to question either the wisdom of the plan that has been established in Bengal, or the prudence of introducing it in all its extent there. But I deprecate the adoption of a similar conduct in the Northern Circars, or in the southern provinces of the Carnatic. I deprecate the application of abstract principles, or even the deductions of our own experience in other parts of India, without a considerate attention to local circumstances, and to the prejudices and habits of the natives, in the different and detached branches of our empire.

We are not yet prepared, by a knowledge and by the practice of the Telinga language, which is the universal medium of communication in the Northern Circars; or by the use of the Malabar, which exclusively prevails in the southern provinces of the Carnatic, to open that freedom of intercourse, which alone can bring us acquainted with the sentiments and opinions of the natives. In Bengal, one common language had spread through the whole extent of that empire; and from circumstances which it is not now necessary to trace, that language became prevalent amongst all the Europeans who were settled there. At Madras, and at all the dependencies of that government on the sea coast, for an extent of nine degrees of latitude, the reverse of this has happened; in negotiations, and in all political concerns, the Persian and the Maharratta languages have been the mediums through which business has been con-

ducted ; while all affairs of commerce and of domestic concern have been transacted either in Telinga or in Malabar. Under these circumstances, the agency of the natives, who, to qualify them as interpreters, had but one foreign language to acquire, became the channel of communication ; and though the enlarged sphere of our dominion, and of our political relation on that side of India, have lately excited an emulous competition amongst the gentlemen employed there, to acquire the Persian, the Mah-ratta, the Malabar, and the Telinga languages, it must require time to render the knowledge and practice of them general and familiar.

While we are employed in the study of those several languages, our native subjects at a distance from the sea coast, who have hitherto generally communicated with us through the agency of interested interpreters, will, it may be hoped, make

some progress on their side, in the study of English. The Company have lately encouraged the establishment of public seminaries for this purpose, by granting, as a foundation for every school that may be opened, an allowance of one hundred pounds a year ; an act of liberality which, under the fostering care of the present Governor, will be improved into a strong cement of union between the native subjects and the British power in that division of our empire. By these and such other means of approximation as may present themselves, the people and the representatives of government will be made mutually to contribute, towards the accomplishment of that system and order of things, which, under the existing circumstances, shall appear to be the best calculated to promote the general good.

In the mean time, no measure could more effectually manifest to the people, the benevolent disposition of the English

government towards them, than the establishment of public granaries. The ravages of famine which have so recently desolated the Northern Circars, and the still more destructive consequences, which attended a similar calamity in Bengal, in the year 1769, call loudly upon us to provide, by timely precaution, in every part of our dominions, against the return of so dreadful a misfortune. All the governments which have preceded us, and those which are our cotemporaries, have in some degree acted upon this principle; but it has been reserved for British humanity and British policy to form establishments of this kind, upon a broad and permanent foundation, calculated to meet the wants, and to supply the demand in every quarter. Great progress has been already made towards this in Bengal; and whenever the measures that were proposed there in 1783,* shall be carried com-

* See Governor General's Minute, 20 November, 1783.

pletely into execution, every province in that extensive region will be effectually secured against the return of famine. It is hoped that similar resources will be provided in every portion of our empire, and particularly that a plan of this kind will soon be introduced into the Northern Circars, where it might be carried into effect without the least hazard of loss, and at a very moderate and but temporary charge to the state ; for instance, if it were made a general order, that magazines of grain should be laid up in different districts, at those periods of the year when purchases might be made to most advantage in the country ; and if it were established as a general regulation, that those public stores, or such portion of them as it might be judged expedient at the time, should be exposed to sale, whenever grain should rise above a certain stated price ; under such regu-

lations, which have nothing either complicated in their construction, nor difficult in the execution, it would seem evident that government might influence the markets, without the interposition of authority or the exercise of any other means to controll them, but such as must every where arise from the power of increasing the quantity of the commodity upon sale. By a judicious application of the resources which those magazines would furnish, the people at large might be secured against distress, either from the scarcity or the price of grain, which constitutes the first necessary of life in India ; while the public, by the very exercise of its benevolence, would find, in the advance which it would be proper and necessary to make, in the rate of sale, above the rate of purchase, that ample means would be thereby provided, for defraying all the charges which

ought to be incident to such an undertaking.

It has been already observed, that this measure would have a powerful operation upon that description of manufacturers, whose industry and labours have so materially contributed to support our commerce with India ; but I think it necessary to repeat the observation here, because the encouragement of the weavers is a leading step, towards the success of the measures, which, in the year 1780, were proposed by me to the Court of Directors. I had not the good fortune at that time to succeed in obtaining from the Company, any relaxation in their monopoly, or in the exercise of the restraining laws, which were enacted for securing to them, the exclusive trade with India : but the legislature has since viewed the subject upon a more enlarged scale, and a great extension has been

given, by the act of 1793, which renewed the charter of the Company, to the principle which in the year 1780 I offered to their consideration in the following letter.

TO THE HONOURABLE THE
COURT OF DIRECTORS
 OF THE
EAST INDIA COMPANY.

Argyle-street, Dec. 14, 1780.

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ **I**N the letter which I had the honour
 “ of addressing to you on the 3d of Fe-
 “ bruary, 1779, I endeavoured to sketch
 “ the outlines of a plan for the improve-
 “ ment of the provinces under the chief-
 “ ship of Mazulipatam, and with that
 “ view I attempted to give some idea of
 “ the relative situations of the Zemin-
 “ dars, the Soucars, and the husbandmen,
 “ and of the manner in which they are
 “ severally connected with the govern-
 “ ment.

“ With a view equally directed to the
 “ interest of the Company, I now beg

“ leave to entreat your attention to the
 “ subject of private remittances from In-
 “ dia to Europe, which having, for some
 “ years, been principally made through
 “ the channel of foreigners, has not only
 “ diverted from this country, a consider-
 “ able part of its natural commerce with
 “ India, but has furnished our rivals with
 “ the means of supporting that trade, un-
 “ der singular advantages.

“ As this is a subject of infinite import-
 “ ance to this country, whether it be
 “ considered with regard to its naviga-
 “ tion, its revenues, or the private advan-
 “ tage of individuals, it will be necessary
 “ to examine it in some detail.

“ Previous to the distresses of the
 “ Company in the year 1766, their trea-
 “ suries in India were always open to
 “ receive the money of individuals, upon
 “ bills of exchange payable in England ;
 “ the terms of this exchange were, in
 “ Bengal, 2s. 3d. the rupee, at Bombay

“ 2s. 6d. and at Madras 8s. the pagoda,
 “ the rate of exchange at which the ac-
 “ counts of the Company were kept in
 “ those different settlements, and which
 “ they observed in payment of salary to
 “ their agents.

“ In the year 1772, a variety of cir-
 “ cumstances having involved the Com-
 “ pany in difficulties, it became necessary
 “ to limit, to a small amount, the remit-
 “ tances which should be made through
 “ their treasury ; and, probably with a
 “ view of discouraging them altogether
 “ for a time, the rate of exchange was
 “ lowered, from Bengal to 2s. 1d. the ru-
 “ pee, from Bombay to 2s. 3d., and from
 “ Madras to 7s. 4d. the pagoda, and the
 “ bills were made payable twelve months
 “ after presentation in London ; whereas,
 “ till that period they had usually been
 “ drawn at three months sight. I say, pro-
 “ bably with a view of discouraging remit-
 “ tances for a time ; for as the Company

“ continued to pay the salaries of their
 “ agents, and to keep their accounts at
 “ the former exchange, it cannot be
 “ doubted, but that they intended, when
 “ their difficulties should cease, to re-
 “ establish it as the general standard.

“ But the necessities of individuals, were
 “ too imperious to admit of delay ; their
 “ families were in Europe, or their money
 “ engagements there held them under
 “ obligations, which nothing could super-
 “ sede ; rather than suffer their near con-
 “ nections to feel distress, or expose their
 “ credit to be called in question, every
 “ expedient was to be attempted. The
 “ specie of the country afforded relief for
 “ a time, but a reduced currency soon
 “ obliged the presidencies in India to im-
 “ pose such a duty upon its exportation,
 “ as amounted to a prohibition. The
 “ price of diamonds had fallen so low in
 “ Europe, and was raised so high in India,
 “ that few could support the loss of a re-

“mittance through that medium; and the
 “other less regular channels were be-
 “come uncertain and insecure.

“The French, who at Pondicherry
 “and Chandernagore, were well inform-
 “ed of these circumstances, and who, till
 “this time, had with difficulty supported
 “a very languishing commerce, now saw
 “in our distress, a fund of credit open-
 “ing to them under uncommon advan-
 “tages, and they did not fail to improve
 “an opportunity so favourable to their
 “interest.

“The exclusive privilege of their Com-
 “pany, which ceased with the suppres-
 “sion of their charter, had, some time
 “before this, thrown open the trade with
 “India to private adventurers; but the
 “difficulty of procuring funds to sup-
 “port a commerce at such a distance,
 “had hitherto proved an insuperable
 “obstacle to the enterprize of indivi-
 “duals.

“ The resources which our necessities
 “ now compelled us to hold out to them,
 “ removed at once all the embarrassments
 “ of their situation, and enabled them
 “ not only to revive their commerce, but
 “ to carry it to an extent that it had ne-
 “ ver attained to, even in the prosperity
 “ of their Company ; for upon the very
 “ moderate terms of our own original ex-
 “ change, they were furnished with money
 “ in India, in time to pay for their cargoes ;
 “ while the bills they gave in return, were
 “ generally made payable upon the sale
 “ of those same cargoes in France ; so that
 “ in fact, the French merchant traded to
 “ a great amount, in the most profitable
 “ of all branches of commerce, upon the
 “ funds of the English, and without pay-
 “ ing them any interest.

“ The intercourse of exchange, which
 “ had in this manner taken place between
 “ the French and the agents of the Com-
 “ pany, has been but transferred, by the

“ war, to the other European nations who
 “ trade to India, and it is now giving to
 “ the Dutch, the Danes, and the Portu-
 “ guese, a greater share in the commerce
 “ with that country, than their own re-
 “ sources could ever encourage them to
 “ hope for.

“ No one who is acquainted with the
 “ true principles of commerce can think
 “ it necessary, and no liberal mind can
 “ desire, that we should avail ourselves of
 “ the extended authority we have in
 “ India, to dispossess our rivals of any
 “ general advantages in the trade with
 “ that country, which in its greatest la-
 “ titude, should be left as open to them, as
 “ it is to us.

“ Were we to adopt a different line of
 “ proceeding, and to attempt the direct
 “ interposition of power ; a conduct of
 “ that kind could not fail to defeat its
 “ own purposes, by exciting prohibi-
 “ tions against the importation of In-

“ dian manufactures, in the other ma-
 “ ritime states of Europe; so that, without
 “ deriving any national advantage from
 “ the endeavour to restrain, we should
 “ but expose ourselves, in consequence of
 “ it, to the resentment of our neighbours,
 “ who would seize with avidity such an
 “ opportunity for exclaiming against the
 “ monopolizing spirit of our commerce.

“ Upon the narrow scale, therefore, of
 “ immediate interest, as well as upon the
 “ broader grounds of public justice and of
 “ good policy, we should leave the trade
 “ with India perfectly open to our rivals;
 “ but this admitted, they could not rea-
 “ sonably complain, however they might
 “ suffer by the event, of our endeavours
 “ to draw back, into our own channel,
 “ the remittance of English money, and
 “ if leaving them in all the freedom of
 “ commerce, we should, by industry and
 “ good regulations, find the means of in-

“ creasing our own importation to Great
“ Britain.

“ If this could be effected by any or-
“ ders which you, Gentlemen, could send
“ abroad, or by any plan that could be sug-
“ gested for the extension of the Compa-
“ ny’s trade, I would not presume to in-
“ trude this address upon you; but it is too
“ well known, that every argument and
“ endeavour have been already employed,
“ without effect, for these purposes; and
“ permit me to add, it is but too certain,
“ that no relief can be expected from the
“ Company’s treasury, their commerce
“ being inadequate to the remittance of
“ their own revenue.

“ Under these circumstances, I am en-
“ couraged to submit to your better judg-
“ ments, whether effectual relief might
“ not be obtained, and every difficulty
“ be obviated, by the establishment of
“ some regulation, which should con-

“ vey to the agents of the Company, in-
 “ cluding the commanders and officers of
 “ the ships employed in their service, the
 “ advantages of a separate trade with
 “ India, under certain restrictions, and
 “ which should authorize them to make
 “ consignments of such trade to the Court
 “ of Directors. That is to say, that the
 “ advantages of this separate trade, as it
 “ has been already explained, should be
 “ withdrawn from the foreigners, who
 “ have too long engrossed it, to the great
 “ detriment of this nation, and be now
 “ conveyed to the agents of the Com-
 “ pany ; and that the Court of Directors
 “ should assume the place, lately held by
 “ the principal merchants of France,
 “ and now enjoyed by the Dutch and
 “ Danish East India Companies.

“ I would be understood to mean, that
 “ the Company, taking the imports of
 “ any one year from India, as a stand-
 “ ard for their future public importa-

“ tion, should permit their agents, that
 “ amount being completed, to make con-
 “ signments to them, upon their own se-
 “ parate account ; such separate trade to
 “ pay a freight of ten per cent. upon the
 “ sales, to the Company, and such com-
 “ mission, as the Court of Directors
 “ (with whom the general agency should
 “ remain) might think adequate to the
 “ charge and trouble of such consign-
 “ ments.

“ It has been shewn in the preceding
 “ part of this letter, that the necessity
 “ of limiting remittances through the
 “ treasury of the Company, first created
 “ the necessity, equally powerful on their
 “ agents abroad, to open some other
 “ channel, and that from hence has pro-
 “ ceeded the great increase of the foreign
 “ trade to India ; it must be repeated
 “ here, that the situation of the Com-
 “ pany's affairs, will not permit them to
 “ withdraw this restriction, and to open

“ their treasury for remittances ; so that
 “ the original cause subsisting, the evil
 “ which had resulted from it must also
 “ subsist, and probably will extend itself,
 “ unless a remedy be applied to check
 “ its progress. It is with this object in
 “ view, that I have been induced to of-
 “ fer the foregoing proposition to your
 “ consideration, and that I will now, with
 “ your leave, go into some explanation
 “ of it.

“ The advantages which, it appears to
 “ me, might be expected from an ar-
 “ rangement of this kind, are first, that
 “ the money now given to foreigners,
 “ and with which their trade with Ben-
 “ gal and the Coast of Coromandel is
 “ principally supported, would be em-
 “ ployed in providing goods for the
 “ Company’s freight ; and that, in con-
 “ sequence, the trade of our rivals, being
 “ deprived of this great resource, would
 “ necessarily decline. Secondly, that

“ every attention would be given to im-
 “ prove the manufactures of India, of late
 “ greatly debased; for as the private in-
 “ terest of the agents abroad would be
 “ particularly concerned in the quality of
 “ the goods they might send to England,
 “ it is to be presumed that no pains would
 “ be spared to procure the best. Thirdly,
 “ that the public revenues of this coun-
 “ try would be greatly augmented, by an
 “ increased importation, while the nation
 “ would benefit by the receipt of that
 “ freight, which is now paid to our ri-
 “ vals. And lastly, that the declension
 “ of foreign importation from India,
 “ would operate effectually to raise the
 “ price of the English market, which
 “ must ever be influenced by those of
 “ the Continent.

“ If the idea here suggested should be
 “ adopted, the Dutch, Danes, &c. instead
 “ of receiving money in India at a low
 “ exchange, and without interest, as they

“ now do, will be obliged to send bullion
 “ thither upon their ships, which by in-
 “ creasing the charges of their trade,
 “ will necessarily oblige them to raise
 “ the prices of their sales. I must add,
 “ that the increase to the circulating spe-
 “ cie of India, which this would occa-
 “ sion, offers in itself an argument of
 “ the first importance; the drains that
 “ have been made from that country of
 “ late years, have been very great; and
 “ it is well known that the importation of
 “ bullion from Europe, which formerly
 “ yielded it an annual and large supply,
 “ has decreased in proportion.

“ The principal objections that occur
 “ against this plan, seem to be; that the
 “ Company’s affairs require an extension
 “ of their own trade; that it may be ap-
 “ prehended the agents abroad would too
 “ often appropriate to themselves, the
 “ best manufactured articles in every
 “ assortment of merchandize; and that

“ the increased importation might affect
 “ the sales of the Company.

“ In answer to these objections, which
 “ certainly are of great weight, it may
 “ be observed, that the orders of the
 “ Company for many years, have been
 “ given for the increase of their invest-
 “ ments, with but little effect ; and that,
 “ for the reason already assigned, they
 “ must remain ineffectual ; because their
 “ agents abroad have, from necessity, dis-
 “ regarded these orders ; and because,
 “ from necessity, they must continue to
 “ disregard them.

“ To the second objection it may be
 “ replied, that a condition should be es-
 “ tablished, and held as a general rule,
 “ between the Company and their agents,
 “ that whenever the freight goods should
 “ sell at a higher price than the goods, of
 “ the same assortments, provided for the
 “ Company, in all such cases, the differ-
 “ ence should be carried to the credit of

“ the Company. And to the last it may
 “ be said, that as the increase of our im-
 “ portation would at first be little more
 “ than in proportion to the decrease in
 “ that of our neighbours, the difference
 “ at the foreign market would be per-
 “ ceived but in the carriers ; a difference
 “ of little consequence to the German,
 “ the Swiss, the African, or the Ameri-
 “ can, who may purchase ; but of the
 “ utmost importance to a maritime na-
 “ tion like this, whose strength as well
 “ as riches, depends upon an extended
 “ foreign commerce.

“ The course of trade, diverted from
 “ our rivals by these means, would soon
 “ return into its proper channel, and the
 “ Company would then be enabled to
 “ participate in its advantages ; for they
 “ might gradually reduce the sum which
 “ they now allow to be drawn every year
 “ upon their treasury, until the whole
 “ amount of the £ 350,000. at which it

“ is limited, should become a clear re-
 “ mittance of their own revenue. That
 “ effected, they might, if it should be
 “ found necessary, increase their public
 “ importation, as their agents could never
 “ complain against an extension of the
 “ public commerce, while they were per-
 “ mitted to continue their separate con-
 “ signments; and when experience should
 “ have proved to them, that the manu-
 “ factures of India, properly encouraged,
 “ could never be exhausted. I will add,
 “ when the manufactures might be as
 “ much diversified as extended; and
 “ when we might be enabled to make
 “ the largest importation in the articles
 “ which now yield the largest profits.

“ I allude here particularly to the ma-
 “ nufactures of the Coast of Coromandel,
 “ where your investments have never yet
 “ been carried to any great amount, from
 “ the want of sufficient funds for that
 “ purpose, and from the little encourage-

“ment your agents have hitherto had,
 “to direct their attention upon that sub-
 “ject, beyond the sources from whence
 “supplies were drawn, upon the first es-
 “tablishment of your factories.

“That a much wider field now lies open
 “to them, and that the manufactures
 “upon that side of India are in sufficient
 “abundance to supply every possible de-
 “mand, are facts too well established to
 “be here enlarged upon; for it is known
 “that the weavers throughout Hindoostan
 “are the most numerous of the manufac-
 “turing casts, and the very extended
 “commerce which the French carried
 “on from Pondicherry and Yanam, be-
 “fore the war, is an evidence every way
 “unquestionable, that the industry of
 “the weavers needs but encouragement
 “to call it forth.

“A new and a rich source of trade is
 “now offered to us in the Circar of
 “Guntoor, where the stained calicoes,

“ and printed handkerchiefs are manu-
 “ factured in the greatest perfection and
 “ abundance ; nor are we less favoured
 “ on the other side of India, where we
 “ seem to have established an influence,
 “ which promises to give a great increase
 “ to our investment from Bombay ; for
 “ the country of Guzerat has ever been
 “ celebrated for the quality of its chintz,
 “ and other manufactures of that kind ;
 “ insomuch that the term chintz, or chitz,
 “ is said to have been derived from the
 “ name of a town, which lies in the
 “ neighbourhood of that province.

“ In suggesting these new sources, as
 “ well as the improvement of our pre-
 “ sent commerce, I can safely say, that
 “ I confine myself much within the line
 “ of probable advantage : there are others
 “ which a very little reflection will ap-
 “ ply, equally, perhaps still more, con-
 “ sequential ; but I flatter myself, that
 “ those already stated, may deservedly

“ claim the consideration of the Com-
“ pany.

“ In aid of the reasons already adduced
“ to engage your attention to the subject
“ of this letter, I must add one, which I
“ am persuaded will always have weight
“ with you, when it can be made subser-
“ vient to the public interest: I mean
“ the private emolument of the gentle-
“ men employed abroad in the service of
“ the Company.

“ The liberal appointments with which
“ you have already distinguished some of
“ the first offices in India, leave no room
“ to doubt, but that your indulgence has
“ been restrained from extending itself
“ to the whole body of your agents, by
“ the impossibility of affording propor-
“ tionate salaries to such a number. Un-
“ der this persuasion, I am encouraged
“ to hope, that the prospect of opening a
“ channel, through which honourable and
“ fair profits may be derived, by those

“ amongst them, whose situations may
 “ exclude them from the advantages of
 “ large salaries, will be a recommenda-
 “ tion of the plan, which I have now the
 “ honour to submit to you. I am satisfi-
 “ ed it will receive additional force, when
 “ it is considered, how much it is cal-
 “ culated to remove the cause from which
 “ has proceeded the heavy losses to which
 “ every description of your agents have
 “ been subject in the remittance of their
 “ property to Europe: losses not of imagi-
 “ nation, or of inconsiderable import, but
 “ of a magnitude sufficient to awaken the
 “ most serious attention of the Company,
 “ and of the public ; for if they are mea-
 “ sured only by the debt now due, and per-
 “ haps never to be recovered from Messrs.
 “ Law and Chevalier (heretofore go-
 “ vernors of the French settlements of
 “ Pondicherry and Chandernagore),
 “ their amount, even upon this calcula-
 “ tion, would arise to a national object ;

“ and if we add to it the immense proper-
 “ ty said to be sunk, for ever in China,
 “ and which, in the first instance, must
 “ have been sent thither for the purpose
 “ of remittance, the whole sum may
 “ be estimated at near two million ster-
 “ ling.

“ Such, Gentlemen, are the ideas which
 “ have occurred to me upon the present
 “ subject, and which I trust will meet
 “ with your candid reception. The ob-
 “ ject applies to almost every individual
 “ who has made India the scene of his
 “ labours and public services; and in-
 “ volves the means of facilitating his fu-
 “ ture repose, as well as of advancing
 “ the general interests of the Company,
 “ and of the nation. I will only add, that
 “ as I feel my mind invariably disposed
 “ to exert itself in the service of the
 “ Company, I shall have infinite grati-
 “ fication if any ideas which I now sub-

“ mit to you, or which at any period I
 “ may have the honour to communicate,
 “ should have the good fortune to meet
 “ your approbation.”

OBSERVATIONS.

THE great embarrassments of the Company's affairs upon the conclusion of the second Mysore war, in March 1784, induced me to resume the consideration of this subject, and led me to revert to the idea of a regulated commercial intercourse between India and England, as the most probable means by which employment could be given to the necessitous manufacturers of India. It was evident that neither the income nor the resources of the Company could, for some years, be rendered adequate to the provision of a large investment, without injury to the just and pressing demands of the equally necessitous soldier. As the delegate of the government of Madras in the provinces south of the Coleroon, the

sufferings and the merits of the large army that was collected in that quarter, had fallen particularly within my notice: for several months they had been subsisted in the country of Tippoo Sultaun; but deprived of that resource by the termination of the war, they returned to the impoverished provinces under the dependence of the Company, with claims for an arrear of pay, which, under any other circumstances, it would not have been possible for them to have endured: with some of our native troops it extended to the term of seven months, while many of the European officers had demands of a much longer date. Under the pressure of a distress, the effects of which I had daily opportunities of seeing, and to which I could not administer any adequate relief, either from the ordinary resources of the Company, or through the credit of their bonds, which were then at a great discount; I was led to think that a satisfac-

tory expedient might be found in a transfer of part of the debt to England. Colonel Fullarton, and all the field-officers of his army, to whose consideration I referred this suggestion, were of opinion that it would be acceptable to the army in general. The gentlemen who were employed in the civil departments of the service, expressed their acquiescence in the terms, and all agreed that the utmost extent of their credit should be exerted to prevent any depreciation of the bills of exchange that might be issued. Supported by this unanimous concurrence, and the public spirited zeal which accompanied it, I represented to Lord Macartney, that the arrears due to every description of persons, the native troops excepted, might be discharged by bills of exchange upon England at four, five, and six years sight; and I proposed, that to provide a fund for the payment of those bills, all British subjects without

exception, should be permitted to send goods upon the Company's ships, such goods to be consigned to the Court of Directors, and to be made subject to a charge of 20 per cent. for freight, commission, and warehouse room. Unfortunately, the acts of Parliament relative to the trade of the Company were at that time supposed to militate against the adoption of such a measure. Two years afterwards it was undertaken, but in that interval, the arrears due to the native troops had been discharged by a paper currency, which, their necessities compelling them to convert into ready money, they exchanged at a loss of more than one half of the amount, for which they had received it.

The extended possessions and the increased revenues of the Company, forbid the apprehension that we can again be exposed to such distress, or be obliged to resort to such an expedient. An enlarged

sphere of commerce now invites the speculation of the British merchant, and the internal resources of India, will be found to expand with the demand. Under the skilful direction of gentlemen, whose zeal and public spirit deserve the thanks of their country, the productions and the manufactures of India are rapidly improving in quality, and varying in kind. The intelligent philanthropy of Dr. Anderson has, in the course of a few years, introduced the culture of silk into all our dependencies on the Coast of Coromandel, and has, by that means, furnished the poor with employment, while it has provided a new source of wealth to the public. The persevering industry and the skill of Dr. Roxburgh have been equally successful in the Northern Circars, where the pepper vine is now cultivating, under his direction, to a considerable extent. Mr. Martin, in the southern extremity of the Peninsula, has not only established a new investment upon a large scale for the Com-

pany, but he has naturalized the cinnamon tree, in the province of Tinnevely, and his plantations are in so promising a state, that we may soon hope to have our cargoes from Madras enriched by the addition of that valuable spice, which has hitherto been an article of monopoly to the Dutch.

In Bengal, the spirit of improvement has been still more active, and, from the extended range in which it has had to operate, its effects have been more conspicuous.* A large importation of sugar and of indigo, have been already thrown into the English market from thence, and this experiment has furnished proof, that however well the sugarcane and the plant from which the indigo is expressed, may have succeeded in the western hemisphere, into which they

* I lament that, from the want of correct information, I cannot pay my tribute of acknowledgment to those who have most contributed to this.

were introduced by European industry, they still preserve, in their original soil, superior advantages. Tobacco is an indigenous plant in all our Asiatic possessions, where it attains so high a degree of spirit and strength, under the influence of an eastern sun, that it cannot fail to meet a preference on comparison with the produce of America, whenever it shall be thought proper to encourage the competition. The chay plant, which may be called the madder of India, does not less invite the attention of the intelligent speculator; its properties are various; but it is peculiarly distinguished by the brightness and durability of the red colour which it produces. This plant is cultivated with most success in the districts near Mazulipatam, the investment from whence is denominated, from the circumstance just alluded to, the investment of red or chay goods. These, and a vast variety of other articles, will, no doubt by degrees, be brought into the

course of trade by the active enterprise of individual speculation, encouraged and supported by the protecting wisdom of government. In the eastern hemisphere, channels of navigation and commerce which have never yet been explored, will be opened : many of the sources from whence India formerly drew supplies of specie, in exchange for its manufactures, will be recovered and improved ; and every step we advance in those directions, must tend to produce new incitements to industry in Great Britain and Ireland, and to enlarge the demand for our woollen and other staple commodities.

FINIS.

25 OC 59

ERRATA.

- Page 16 line 5 after the word " power" *insert* :
- 17 — 1 after " occupancy" *dele* " for."
- 90 — 22 for " diverted" *read* drawn.
- 121 — 12 & 14 for " Kishua" *read* Kishna.
- 134 — 16 after " their" *dele* " own."
- 162 — 8 for " to a fine" *read* to pay a fine.
- 170 — 12 for " established" *read* obtained.
- 181 — 12 after " provinces" *dele* " and."
- 184 — 20 for " Soucadar" *read* Soubadar.
- 224 — 14 for " rofit" *read* profit.
- 238 — 18 after " calicoes" *insert* ,
- 280 — 3 for " est mated" *read* estimated.

25 OC 59

SUPPLEMENT.

SOME time after the *Tracts*, which are collected together in the present work, were returned from the press, a pamphlet appeared, containing a series of questions, that are stated in it to have proceeded from Marquis Cornwallis, and which are supposed to form the basis, or at least to point to the principle of his Lordship's system for new modelling the Indian army.

In that pamphlet, which was printed at Calcutta, each query and suggestion, in the order they are supposed to have proceeded from Lord Cornwallis, is answered by an animadversion, expressed in the warmth of strong feelings, and evidently intended to announce, in direct terms, the dissatisfaction of the officers in the service of the Company, to the plan suggested by his Lordship.

From this document, which has not the less force, because it has not been published in England, it appears evident, that the mode by which Lord Cornwallis proposed to relieve the officers of the Company from the grievances under which they have so long laboured, has not been considered by them as calculated either to remove the original and chief cause of their complaint, or to satisfy the expectations which they have encouraged themselves to entertain of future preferment.

If any circumstance could have added to the conviction which I have already expressed,* that no partial remedy could correct the radical defect of a divided establishment in India, it would be that Lord Cornwallis should have failed of success in such an undertaking. His high character gave every support to the attempt, while his experience, with his

* Vide Tracts, p. 64 to 69.

local and his professional knowledge, must have furnished every suggestion that could have been urged upon such a subject. That under these advantages the undertaking should not have succeeded, is perhaps the strongest evidence that could have occurred of the impracticability of such a measure.

This evidence will be found to derive additional force from a work that has lately been published, in which the measure and extent of the expectations entertained by the officers of the Company's army are given to the public, in the form of a petition from those officers to the Crown, and of an address from them to the Court of Directors, to which are added observations, detailing the peculiar nature of their case, and explaining the political as well as the professional grounds of the alteration they solicit in the military establishment of the Company's army.

Every proposition in those papers,

considered abstractedly, is so just in itself, is so well argued, and so ably enforced by the peculiar circumstances of the case, that I apprehend there are but few points respecting which any difference of opinion will be found to prevail. But however just these propositions may be in the abstract, it will appear that in the most essential point they would, on application, lead to consequences the very reverse of those which it must be the object of Government to produce; and that instead of removing the cause of the jealousy which, it is now admitted, does prevail between the officers of the Crown serving in India, and those of the Company, they would but transfer the grievance that is so justly complained of, from the latter, to throw it upon the officers of his Majesty, who have equal claim to the protection and to the justice of the state.

I am perfectly satisfied that it was not

the intention of the officers of the Company, and that it cannot be their wish, to solicit any partial distribution of favour or preferment, to the prejudice of the officers of his Majesty who have served with them in India. The observations which illustrate and explain their petitions, were evidently drawn up under an impression that a systematic distinction was about to be established in the army in India. That all the Europeans in the service of the Company were to be transferred from that line of service, and to be formed into regiments in the service of the Crown: that the native corps, to which the mass of the Company's officers were to be confined, were to be formed into regiments, consisting of three or four battalions each, and commanded by a colonel; to whom alone, of the whole corps, the line of promotion in his Majesty's army at large was to be opened.

The supposition of such a change in the

state of the military establishment in India, could not fail to excite an apprehension in the minds of the Company's officers, that instead of finding from it any improvement in their situation, comparatively with that of the officers of the King's regiments now in India, they would more probably experience an aggravation of the grievances they now labour under, by the operation of an arrangement, which while it diminished their corps, and narrowed their line of promotion, would add numbers and extend preferment to another corps of the army, who already possessed superior advantages, and who with this augmentation were to become their established rivals.

Under this impression, the officers of the Company's army were naturally led to think, that unless a new organization of the native troops, to which corps they were chiefly to be confined, were to take place, previous to the separation of the

Europeans from it ; and unless a promotion of general officers were, at the same time, to be made from their establishment ; they might probably lose the benefit of preferment by seniority, which has hitherto been the rule of promotion and of preferment in the army of the Company ; and that the command of the principal military stations might be claimed, and would probably be given to officers in the immediate service of the Crown, who, though of an army-rank superior to them, might be much their juniors in point of service.

Compelled by the hard necessity of their situation to petition their Sovereign, as well as the Company, for relief ; and taught by circumstances to believe, that they must not look for it in the re-establishment of the old system of one united army, commissioned by the Company ; nor expect to receive it in the form of a complete and equal incorporation of their

establishment with the army of his Majesty, the officers of the Company were led to solicit, that the native part of the Indian army, in its separated state, might have the benefit of being organized upon the same principles with those which had brought the army of the Crown to its present state of perfection, and that the same gradations of rank which prevailed in the one, might be introduced into the other.

It was not within the province to which those officers must have conceived themselves confined; neither could they suppose it necessary, that the suggestions which they offered upon their own separate case, should be accompanied by any explanation, beyond what immediately arose out of the general principle upon which those suggestions were founded. The various modifications under which it might be judged expedient to apply that principle (if it were to be

adopted), they left to the consideration of those, who having the general control, and being equally the guardians of the state, and of all its servants in India, could best regulate and apply them.

The plan which the officers of the Company's army thought it necessary under these circumstances to suggest, is now before the Board of Control. The justice and discernment of that superintending authority will examine it in all its parts, and in the various relations which it must have with his Majesty's army at large, as well as with that particular part of it which now is employed in India. They will consider, whether under any modifications, two distinct military establishments, officered by the subjects of Great Britain and Ireland, and therefore each composed of men, equal in every civil and social right, can be continued in India, without danger to the interests of the British empire there. They will

consider, whether establishments so formed, have not inherent in them the seeds of discord; and whether jealousies, though hitherto kept down by the zeal of individuals for the public service, may not, from the public discussion of separate pretensions, take the shape of principle, and lead to the claim of right. And above all, they will consider (if the distinction of service must at every hazard be continued), whether it may not be absolutely necessary to soften and correct it, by introducing a regular and equal rule of promotion between the two establishments, instead of the unequal and constantly varying course of preferment that now prevails, and which in its consequences cannot fail to produce frequent returns of irritation, and to interrupt that harmony, which alone can give to an army the full advantage of its discipline and numbers.

It has been already observed, that the mode which was suggested by Lord Corn-

wallis, for new modelling the Indian army, could not even under the authority of his Lordship's high character and professional distinction, obtain the suffrage of the Company's officers. A short statement of the effect which would be produced by the plan since suggested by those officers will show, that the arrangement which the peculiarity of their situation has led them to propose, would prove as little calculated to reconcile the officers of his Majesty to the service in India, as the plan ascribed to Lord Cornwallis appears to have been calculated to reconcile the officers of the Company to the alteration it proposed to make in their establishment.

The officers of the Company have proposed that all the colonels of European infantry, and the commandants of artillery (those being the officers of highest rank in the service of the Company), should be promoted to the rank of general officers. That the native infantry

should be formed into brigades, each to consist of three regiments, and to be commanded by a brigadier, with the rank of major-general; and that the native regiments, which are now commanded by a captain, and which have but one subaltern officer attached to each company, should be constituted, officered and appointed like the European regiments now in the service of the Crown.

The explanatory observations of the officers in the service of the Company, which are intended to show the operation of this plan upon the army in Bengal,* suppose that it would occasion the following promotion on that establishment. Six colonels of infantry, and the commandant of artillery, to the rank of general officers. The ten officers next in succession to them to the rank of major-general. The fifteen officers next

• The Company's army in Bengal is supposed to consist of 4 regiments of Europeans, 27 regiments of Sepoys, and 1 regiment of native cavalry; in all 32 regiments. Two regiments of the King's infantry is stationed in Bengal,

after them, to the rank of colonel, with all the increased gradations of rank to which the new organization of the native establishment may give rise.

At Madras, where the army have equal claims, as well from service as from the strength of the establishment,* a similar promotion must be supposed to take place.

It is known that the King's regiments are for the most part stationed in that quarter ; it will therefore be proper to trace more distinctly the course of the promotion which, upon this plan, would take place in the army of the Company under the Presidency of Madras ; and to show the effect which it would produce in the relative situations of the officers in the King's regiments there.

The promotion of the six senior officers

• The Company's army at Madras is supposed to consist of 3 regiments of Europeans, 24 regiments of Sepoys, and 5 regiments of native cavalry ; in all 32 regiments. Five regiments of the King's infantry and one regiment of cavalry are stationed at Madras.

upon the Madras establishment to the rank of general, would bring that promotion down to lieutenant-colonel Bilcliffe, who was advanced to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1786; and the promotion of the ten officers next in succession after lieutenant-colonel Bilcliffe to the rank of major-general, would include in that rank ten lieutenant-colonels.

The immediate effect of this promotion of the officers of the Company on the Madras establishment upon the officers of the King's regiments now serving there would be, that Colonel Stuart, who in 1782 went to India with his regiment as lieutenant-colonel, who has served there during twelve years, and who was promoted to the rank of colonel in his Majesty's army in 1792, would fall under the command of officers, the senior of whom was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1786, four years after Colonel Stuart had attained the same rank; that is to say, the officer who took

place in the line, during the last Mysore war, immediately after General Medows, would, under the proposed arrangement, be commanded by officers, who, during that war and to this time, have no higher rank than that of lieutenant-colonel in the service of the Company. All the lieutenant-colonels in his Majesty's regiments now in India, would be passed over, in consequence of this promotion, not only by all the majors in the service of the Company, but by four of the captains on their establishment, to complete the number of colonels required upon this plan. The majors in the King's regiments would be passed over by twenty-nine captains in the service of the Company, who would be promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and many of the captains in those regiments would be passed over by younger captains from the army of the Company, who to complete the establishment, must be promoted to the rank of major.

Whatever may be the merit of the offi-

cers in the service of the Company, however strong may be their claims from length of service and long endured hardships (and no one can rate the one higher, or more deprecate the continuance of the other, than I do), it must be evident that a mode of administering relief to them, and of rewarding their services, which should subject to such a general and unqualified supersession the officers of his Majesty's regiments in India, could not fail to produce, with circumstances of peculiar aggravation, that feeling of jealousy and dissatisfaction from the latter, which it is the interest, and must be the wish of Government, to remove from the officers of the Company.

From this view of the subject, which is drawn from an attentive consideration of the explanatory observations made by the officers in the service of the Company, as well as of the plan ascribed to Lord Cornwallis, I cannot hesitate to say that, in my humble opinion, neither the one nor the

other of those proposed arrangements offers any thing like a remedy for the evil which, all agree, it is necessary should be corrected ;—an evil which having originated in the distinction of service, has been rendered more inveterate by every palliative that has been applied ; or rather, by every experiment that has been tried, in the various changes which have taken place since the year 1783.

Until that year, the pre-eminence of his Majesty's commission was the only distinction on service between the officers of the Crown and the officers of the Company ; and though that pre-eminence conveyed to the former a right of command over all officers of the Company of the same rank, without regard to the date of commission, this had been of such long establishment, that neither the augmentation of the Company's army, nor the acknowledged merits of their officers, had given rise to any complaint against it.

In the year 1783, several regiments of his Majesty having been sent to India, to reinforce the army of the Company, the submission of their officers was put to the most severe trial, by the local rank that was then given to all the field officers of the King's regiments employed in India. A lieutenant-colonel, though he had but just been promoted to that rank in the line of his Majesty's army, was by this local rank, placed above all the colonels in the service of the Company, without regard to their professional merits and local experience. In like manner, all the majors of those regiments, having received the local rank of lieutenant-colonel, took precedence of all the lieutenant-colonels of the Company. In 1788, a new regulation took place, by which the local rank of 1783 was done away; and those officers who had acted as colonels during the second Mysore war, and who had commanded all the colonels of the Company,

in consequence of the arrangement of 1783, were now made to give place to *all* the colonels of the Company, whom they ought never to have been put over, but whom, having commanded during five years, it seemed a hardship to fall under. By another regulation of the same year, the long established pre-eminence of his Majesty's commission was taken away; by which means, those reduced colonels of the King's fell under the command of such lieutenant-colonels in the service of the Company as held commissions of an older date.

In 1793, the officers of the Company perceiving that the equality which the preceding regulation professed to establish between them and the officers of his Majesty, would be "illusive and nugatory, " unless a rank adequate to the situation " and responsibility of the Company's officers were to be conferred on them, " they addressed the Court of Directors,

“soliciting that the regulation which for-
 “bids the advancement of any officer in
 “the Company’s service above the rank
 “of colonel might be done away, and
 “that a reasonable proportion of general
 “and field officers may be allowed on
 “their establishment.”*

Those propositions appear to have been
 succeeded in the progression of plans by
 the suggestions of Lord Cornwallis for
 new modelling the army, which have
 been already alluded to, but which it is
 proper should be stated here more dis-
 tinctly. They are professed to be formed
 “on a supposition, that all the Com-
 “pany’s troops, European and native,
 “are to be taken into the service of the
 “Crown. That the Europeans are to
 “be formed into regiments, to be num-
 “bered from the youngest of the King’s
 “present establishment. That the na-
 “tive troops are to be formed into regi-

* Address to the Court of Directors from the Bengal army.

“ ments of two, three, or four battalions,
 “ with colonels to command them; and
 “ that those colonels, and the colonels of
 “ European infantry, are to be promoted
 “ in their turn to the rank of general of-
 “ ficers.”*

The officers of the Company, dissatis-
 fied with the principle, as well as with
 the modifications implied in this arrange-
 ment, have thought it necessary to renew
 their propositions, and to enlarge them
 with explanatory observations, the gene-
 ral purport of which will be found in the
 following extract.

† “ Consonant therefore to the prin-
 “ ciples of justice, and to considerations
 “ of prudential policy, no transfer of
 “ the whole, or any part of the East
 “ India Company’s forces to his Majes-
 “ ty’s service, can be effected previous
 “ to an equalization of the two corps,
 “ in regard to the numbers and rank of
 “ their officers. The officers of his Ma-

* Queries, 1, 2, and 16. † Observations, p. 53.

“ jesty’s army, after the equalization, to
 “ have a fair proportion of all promotions
 “ resulting from the union, on the ground
 “ of the relative number of the King’s of-
 “ ficers to be permanently stationed in
 “ India, to all the officers of the Com-
 “ pany’s three Presidencies who shall be
 “ transferred.”

Again, same page. “ On the solid
 “ principles of fair and equal justice, he
 (the officer in the service of the Compa-
 ny) “ claims, on being transferred to the
 “ King’s service, that gradation of rank
 “ to which he finds himself entitled on
 “ modelling the East India Company’s
 “ army, by the same scale which regu-
 “ lates the King’s, viz. colonels com-
 “ manding stations that of general officer,
 “ lieutenant-colonels commanding bri-
 “ gades that of major-general, captains
 “ commanding regiments that of colonel,
 “ and lieutenants commanding companies
 “ that of captain. The officers who shall
 “ be transferred to have the same privileges

“ and immunities as are enjoyed by officers originally in his Majesty’s army, and to enjoy these, as well in Europe as in Asia.”

Having now traced the various changes that have taken place within twelve years, in the relative rank and precedence of his Majesty’s officers, with those of the Company. Having shewn that the plan ascribed to Lord Cornwallis for new modelling the army in India, as well as the propositions that have been suggested by the officers of the Company, as an amendment of that plan, however ably they may have been digested and arranged, are each of them open to the objection, of rather tending to increase the existing evil, than proposing a remedy adequate to the correction of it: and being convinced from what has passed, and from a deliberate consideration of the subject, that the professional jealousies,

which, until lately, have been rather felt than expressed by the officers of the Company, can now only be removed by an impartial incorporation of the two establishments; I will proceed to state the mode by which, I conceive, that incorporation might be effected, without giving any reasonable cause of umbrage or dissatisfaction to either service.

I am the more encouraged to enter upon this task, from a belief, that the only true principle upon which a fair equalization of rank can be established, will be found in a liberal construction of the ordinance which his Majesty was pleased to make in the year 1788, for the adjustment of rank between his officers and those of the East India Company: by that ordinance it was directed, that the officers of the Company should take rank in his Majesty's army, from the 15th of June, 1783; and in consequence of the regulation which was thereby established, the date of commission became the rule of precedence; and

the distinction between the officers of the Crown serving in India, and those of the Company, was rendered merely nominal, as it respected the established ranks in each. If that gracious act of the Sovereign had been followed by a resolution on the part of the Company, which should have secured to their officers all the benefit the act was intended to convey to them. If brevet promotions had been made by the Company, at such times as his Majesty has since thought proper, by that course of general promotion, to encourage and reward his officers, it must be apparent, that the principle of equality, which his Majesty had thus condescended to establish, would have been preserved; and, it may be presumed, that the organization of the native establishment (about which there is now so much question), would have resulted from it, as a necessary consequence; because that organization would have offered the best

sion became the rule of precedence; and

mode of employing, to advantage, the number of field officers who would have been included in such a promotion.

To show the extent to which this one measure would have operated, in producing those effects; it will be proper to state the rule of the general promotions, which have taken place in his Majesty's army, since 1788, and then to apply that rule to the army of the Company.

In the year 1790.

The lieut. colonels of 1781, were promoted to the rank of colonels.

The majors of 1781, to the rank of lieut. colonels.

The captains of 1776, to the rank of majors.

In the year 1794.

The colonels of 1790, were promoted to the rank of major-generals.

The lieut. colonels of 1787, to the rank of colonels.

The majors of 1790, to the rank of
lieut. colonels.

The captains of 1786, to the rank of
majors.

The operation of a similar act of li-
beral justice on the part of the Company
towards their army; including all the
different corps of which it is composed,
would be as follows:

AT BENGAL.

The colonels of 1790, viz.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{r} 8 \text{ of the line} \\ 2 \text{ of artillery} \\ \hline 10 \text{ colonels} \end{array} \right\}$	would be promoted to the rank of major-generals.
The lieut. colonels of 1787, viz.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{r} 12 \text{ of the line} \end{array} \right\}$	would be promoted to the rank of colonels.
The majors of 1790, viz.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{r} 29 \text{ of the line} \\ 3 \text{ of artillery} \\ \hline 32 \text{ majors} \end{array} \right\}$	would be promoted to the rank of lieut. colonels.
Captains of 1786, viz.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{r} 106 \text{ of the line} \\ 13 \text{ of artillery} \\ 4 \text{ of engineers} \\ \hline 123 \text{ captains} \end{array} \right\}$	would be promoted to the rank of majors.

AT MADRAS.

The colonels of 1799, viz.	2 of the line	would be promoted to the rank of major-generals.
The lieut. colonels of 1787, viz.	3 of the line 2 of artillery 5 lt. colonels	would be promoted to the rank of colonels.
The majors of 1790, viz.	7 of the line 3 of cavalry 10 majors	would be promoted to the rank of lieut. colonels.
The captains of 1786, viz.	51 of the line 2 of artillery 1 of cavalry 1 of engineers 55 captains	would be promoted to the rank of majors.

The effect which this measure would produce upon the establishment of the Company's army, will be seen by the following view of the number and rank of the field officers, who stood upon the list of the Company's army, in 1794, compared with the number and rank of those who would be placed upon that list, if the proposed promotion were to take place in 1795.

AT MADRAS

1794.

The field officers in the service of the East India Company, in 1794, at their different settlements, were in number as follows:

AT BENGAL.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Total.
Infantry	10	16	29	12 Colonels.
Artillery	2	2	4	20 Lieut. Colonels.
Engineers	—	2	—	33 Majors.
	12	20	33	65

AT MADRAS.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Total.
Infantry	6	11	9	6 Colonels.
Artillery	—	3	2	15 Lieut. Colonels.
Engineers	—	1	1	17 Majors.
Cavalry	—	—	5	
	6	15	17	38

AT BOMBAY.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Total.
	2	7	8	17

1795.

The proposed general promotion would make the number of field officers in the service of the Company as follows:

AT BENGAL.	Major Generals.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Total.
Infantry -	8	14	33	106	10 Major-Generals. 16 Colonels.
Artillery -	2	1	4	14	38 Lieut. Colonels.
Engineers -	—	1	1	4	124 Majors.
	10	16	38	124	188

AT MADRAS.	Major Generals.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Total.
Infantry -	2	6	15	53	2 Major-Generals.
Artillery -	—	2	1	7	8 Colonels.
Cavalry -	—	—	3	3	20 Lieut. Colonels.
Engineers -	—	—	1	1	64 Majors.
	2	8	20	64	94

AT BOMBAY.	Major General.	Colonel.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Total.
	1	1	11	5	1 Major-General. 1 Colonel. 11 Lieut. Colonels. 5 Majors.
					18

From the preceding statement it appears, that if the principle of equality which his Majesty was pleased to establish between his officers and those of the Company, were now to be acted upon, there would be an augmentation of four colonels, of eighteen lieutenant-colonels, and of ninety-one majors, upon the establishment of Bengal, besides the promotion of ten officers to the rank of major-general: and that at Madras, there would be an augmentation of two colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, and forty-seven majors to that establishment, exclusive of two officers who would be preferred to the rank of major-general. The operation of this principle would also be found to extend itself to the subaltern officers of the Company's army, who, though not included in the general promotion, would necessarily derive preferment from it. The established gradations of rank would require this in the first

instance, but it would receive a still more considerable extension, from the alteration, which so great an addition to the number of the field officers, would necessarily give rise to in the constitution of the army. The officer who now commands a battalion of Sepoys with the rank of captain, would probably be continued in the same command, but he would hold it with the advanced rank of lieutenant-colonel or major; the companies of a battalion so commanded, would be given to captains; and the number of subalterns attached to the native corps, would of course be regulated by this change in the establishment. So that by a simple and regular process, the promotion would be made to act generally upon all ranks in the army of the Company. The measure from which this important benefit would be conveyed to the officers in the service of the Company, would not occasion any increase of

numbers or addition of expence to their establishment, beyond what would necessarily proceed from whatever alteration it may be thought proper to make in the formation of the native corps. It being a fixed rule, in the service of the Crown, from which this mode of promotion would be taken, that the pay of the regimental rank only, and not the pay of the brevet rank, should be drawn by officers. In the adoption of this rule, and in the application of it to the service of India, it should be made to extend to field allowances, as well as to pay ; it not being reasonable that the Company should be burdened with any increased charge, in consequence of the brevet promotions that may now, or at any future time, take place, for the purpose of preserving to their officers an equal advancement in rank with the officers of the British army.

The principle upon which a new organization of the native corps might be

formed, being established upon the ground suggested by the officers of the Company; and the equalization of rank, between them and the officers of his Majesty, being provided for, upon the letter as well as the spirit of the regulation of 1788, it will be proper to inquire in what way the operation of those measures might affect the field officers of his Majesty, and in what manner they might be enabled to derive their fair proportion of advantage resulting from the equalization.

The regiments of the Crown now in India, are serving there under their lieutenant colonels, or other officers of inferior regimental rank. Those officers have no participation in the established emoluments of the regiments; the whole being received by the general officers, on whom it has pleased his Majesty to confer the command of them. It has been at all times the usage of his Majesty's service to give the command of established regiments to

officers, who, having attained the rank of general, are presumed, from length of service, to have the best recommendation to royal favour. It is not probable that this rule would be deviated from, by an immediate exception in favour of the officers serving in India, and that the command of the regiments now there, would be taken from general officers, and be conferred upon the colonels acting with them in the regimental rank of lieutenant-colonel. The gracious disposition which his Majesty has already manifested towards the officers of the Company, does indeed inspire a confident hope, that his royal favour will be extended to his own more immediate officers employed on that distant service; and that as vacancies shall happen in the command of those regiments, a preference will be shewn in the disposal of them to the officers now serving with them in India. But even this well founded hope would leave the pro-

spect which the field officers of those regiments would have before them, very inferior to the situations of advantage which would be immediately opened to the field officers of the Company's army ; and it is conceived, that they could be relieved from that disadvantage, and be placed in a situation where they might have the benefit of equal justice, in no other way, than that of being declared eligible in their turn, and conformably to the dates of their commissions, to the command of the European regiments in the service of the Company, when the new organization of their army shall take place.

This seems to be the only mode by which an equal proportion of the promotion that might result from the equalization, could be conveyed to those officers of his Majesty. This would render the equalization of rank between the two services, an union of the establish-

ments in fact, because it would necessarily lead to every subordinate arrangement which might be wanting to perfect and complete the incorporation of them. It would occasion a regimental promotion in the regiments of his Majesty now in India, and thereby extend the benefit of the new system to all the officers of the Crown serving there. It would lead to the abolition of the practice of selling commissions, because it would secure to the officers of his Majesty's regiments, a course of preferment without purchase; and would at the same time open to them a prospect of high professional situation dependent only upon their own good conduct; it would lead to the adoption of the practice that has long obtained in the army of the Company, of making the admission to the military service originate in the appointment of cadet, and thereby preserve to the Indian army the essential

advantage of having all its officers early
 trained to the habits and usages of the na-
 tives with whom they are to act, and in
 whom, submission to authority will ever
 best be secured by opinion. In addition to
 all these advantages, as well to the public
 service, as to the officers of his Majesty's
 regiments now in India, there would re-
 sult from the arrangement proposed this
 further important consequence, that it
 would forcibly evince the necessity, as
 well as the justice, of admitting the field of-
 ficers of the Company to take their place
 on the army list of the Crown: because,
 without such admission, one of two new
 sources of jealousy and complaint would
 ensue, either those field officers of the
 Crown, whom it has just been proposed
 to declare eligible, upon a principle of
 equal justice, to the command of European
 regiments in the service of the Company,
 would, in accepting such command, be

deprived of their present established right to preferment and honours in the army of his Majesty—or, if this right should be reserved to them, together with a participation in the advantages of the Company's service; and preferment in the King's army should be denied to the field officers of the Company, the latter would have just cause to complain of a partial distinction, and to remonstrate against an arrangement, in which all the advantages would be on the side of the officers of the Crown.

It has been with a view to obviate this, and in the hope not only of removing every existing grievance, but to provide against every possible cause of returning jealousy, that the measures herein proposed have been offered to consideration: they are reduceable to the following heads. A *general promotion* of the officers in the army of the Company, upon the same rule that has

governed the general promotions in his Majesty's army, since the 15th June, 1783, that being the period at which his Majesty's regulation of 1788 fixed the equalization to commence. The *admission* of the field officers of his Majesty's regiments, now serving in India, to participate with officers of equal rank in the service of the Company, in the command of the European regiments, which may be formed upon a new organization of the Company's army. The *arrangement* of that organization upon the same scale and principle that now obtains in the army of his Majesty ; by which regiments are commanded by field officers, and companies by captains, with a stated proportion of subaltern officers under them. The *admission* of the officers of the Company to army-rank upon the establishment of Great Britain, so that a field officer in the service of the Company may be assured of rising, in his turn, to all the ho-

nours of the profession, upon equal terms with the officer who shall have attained the same rank in the service of the Crown. The *abolition* of the right to dispose of commissions by sale. The *adoption* of the rule which shall restrict admission into the King's regiments serving in India, above the rank of cadet. And lastly, the *establishment* of a staff of general officers for the service of India.

I will now proceed to submit what I have to offer upon this last branch of the subject, as well as upon the mode of providing an adequate retreat for those officers of the Company, who having attained the rank of general officer, may not be included on the staff of India.

The political, as well as the professional, reasons for forming a staff of general officers for the army establishment of India, have been ably detailed in the Observations already referred to.* I will not swell this

* Sect. 1, 4, and 8.

sketch by adding any arguments to those which have been advanced in that work, to support a measure that is recommended by the practice of every well constituted government ; and against which no solid objection can be urged. When the Indian army shall be composed of regiments officered and appointed, as the regiments in the service of the Crown now are, it would seem an absurdity not to provide for the due government of such a body, by the appointment of general officers, who, in time of peace, should keep all the parts in unison, by a systematic plan of discipline ; and who, in time of war, should regulate and direct its operations.

In the selection of officers for that important charge, great attention will no doubt be paid to the advantages of local knowledge :—to the experience which may have been derived from having acted with an army, composed, as our armies in India ever must be, chiefly of native

troops; and from having conducted such an army against enemies, whose mode of warfare is known to differ so materially from that upon which European tactics are formed. The importance of those considerations is so evident, and the danger of disregarding them might be so serious in its consequences, that it cannot be necessary to dwell upon them. Whenever they are deviated from, the measure can only find its justification in the merits of the individual character so distinguished; and particularly, in the union of professional talents, with a disposition that can accommodate and apply them, to a scene so different from that to which he may have *been accustomed in Europe*, or in the western hemisphere.

It is therefore to be hoped, that when the staff establishment for India shall be formed, it will be composed of those only, whose qualifications and talents shall peculiarly recommend them for that impor-

tant charge; and that the Company, with whom the nomination may be supposed to originate, and his Majesty's ministers in deciding upon their nomination, will equally shew, that the selection has been governed by a regard to the public service, and not by favour, or an attention to patronage.

It may not be improper to observe in this place, that three of the King's officers now in India, Colonels Balfour, Harris, and Floyd, who have served for several years in that country, as lieutenant-colonels to different regiments, have lately been included in a promotion of major-generals; and that agreeably to the usage of the King's service, they are, in consequence of that promotion, expected to withdraw themselves from their regiments, and to return to England. It has already been shewn, that ten of the Company's colonels at Bengal, and two at Madras, would be preferred to the rank

of major-general, whenever a promotion on the principle of equalizing the two services shall be made. If, when that promotion shall take place, it should at the same time be declared, that the usage of the King's service just referred to, shall become the rule of service in India, and that no general officers but such as belong to the staff in India should, in consequence, be employed there; and, if it should happen that any of those twelve officers of the Company should not be appointed to that staff, there would, on such an event, occur that new case to which I have alluded, and for which it cannot be improper to suggest a provision.

It would be an inversion of every rule by which we are accustomed to measure the progress of fortune, if officers, who from length of service, shall have attained the rank of general, were, upon that preferment, to lose every other advantage arising from their profession, and

be left, without pay or appointments of any kind, to the precarious chance of finding a place, at some future time, upon the staff of India. On the other hand, it might be thought a partial distribution of favour, if those officers, who had been in the receipt of all the advantages accruing from the command of a regiment, during the time they were colonels, were, upon their promotion, still to be continued in the receipt of those advantages; and that those who should succeed them in the rank of colonel, and in the exercise of all the duties attached to it, should be confined to the mere appointments annexed to the commission of colonel.

It is conceived, that either of these extremes would inevitably lead to a new subject of grievance and dissatisfaction; and therefore it is extremely to be wished that a middle way may be found, free from such objections. It is thought that

this may be done, and that a further important benefit, which shall hereafter be noticed, might be obtained, if officers, either in the service of the Crown or of the Company, who should obtain the rank of general in India, and not be employed on the staff there, were to be allowed the full appointments of colonel, with permission to return to Europe, or to remain in India, and to draw them without deduction in either country. Those appointments being understood to include a colonel's proportion in the allowance paid by the Company under the denomination of gratuity in addition to the pay of colonel, as it is rated in the King's service at £1. 4s. a day, or £438. a year; which would form a provision for those officers, nearly equivalent to the emoluments of a regiment in England, and should be continued to them, until his Majesty should think proper to bestow upon them the command of regiments in his service.

A provision of this kind secured to the old officers of the Indian army, whose merits and services give them a just claim to the protecting care of the Company and of the state, would in its operation extend far beyond the comforts of their retreat. It would open a prospect of such encouragement to all ranks of the army employed there, that no officer would incline to exchange from a service, in which preferment was secured to him in his turn, without the aid of money, or the intervention of interest, to enter into one, in which, both money and friends are often found necessary to procure a very moderate advancement. This check, which interest could not fail to impose upon exchanges between officers on the British and officers on the Indian establishments, is the important benefit to which I have alluded ; and I am persuaded it would be found to operate in that respect as effectually, as

a prohibition could do, if it were assisted by the grant of that reasonable indulgence of furlough which the officers of the Company have solicited, and which is recommended by the uniform practice of the British establishment, in whatever quarter of the world our armies may be employed.

The cause which has hitherto deprived the officers of the Company of this indulgence, will, like every other defect in the old system of the Indian establishment, be removed under the new organization. While the number and the rank of officers attached to the native corps was limited and inadequate to their general strength, the public service might have suffered, by the smallest reduction in the number of those, on whom the energy as well as the discipline of a Sepoy battalion is known to depend. This will no longer be the case, when every company in a battalion shall have an officer

at its head of rank equal to the captain, in whom the chief command only is now vested; when the number of subaltern officers shall be increased, in a proportion that shall preserve the necessary gradation of rank and service, between them and the captains of companies, and between those and the field officers in the command of the battalion. It is therefore most earnestly to be wished that the privilege of furlough, as it is enjoyed by the officers of his Majesty's regiments, may be extended to the officers in the service of the Company; and it is conceived, that in possession of this, they will have attained that fair and impartial equalization with the establishment of the Crown, which it has been the object of the preceding pages to lead to, and which alone can effectually remove every cause of jealousy, and every reasonable ground of complaint. In arranging the system which shall thus relieve the officers who now are in

the service of the Company, from a state of "comfortless exile and dreary despair," and which shall open to them what they have emphatically denominated, "the essence of their profession, its hope, its pride, and its honours." * It may be thought but a just retribution to the few survivors of those, whose talents and services first contributed to establish the foundation of the Company's empire, if their retreat were to be dignified by a gracious extension of the royal favour; and if by making the principle of equalization to act retrospectively, all those who had served in India with the rank of field officer, were now to be placed on his Majesty's army list, in the rank which from the dates of their commissions they might be entitled to hold, under such an act of the Sovereign's gracious condescension. This would add but few names to the number of general officers now on the

* Memorial from Madras.

army list ; it could not occasion any expence to the Company or to the state ; neither could it give rise to any new pretensions. The officer who from seniority would be the first to receive the benefit of such an act, Brigadier General Caillaud, has lived to see his fame recorded in the elegant pages of Orme's continued History of the Military Transactions in India ; and, at an advanced age, he is now in the enjoyment of that, which constitutes the best proof of personal worth, the regard and esteem of a numerous and most respectable acquaintance. The advancement of an officer of this description, from the local rank of brigadier-general, which was conferred upon him by his Majesty, in 1764, to the place which as a lieutenant-colonel of 1758 he might hold on the army list, could not be thought an objectionable extension of the royal favour. The other officers who stand in the same pre-

dicament with General Caillaud are very few in number. Their merits have been amply acknowledged by the governments under which they have served, and their pretensions will be found fully to justify his Majesty's Ministers in recommending them for this honorary mark of their Sovereign's approbation.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Page 15, line 17.—“The *Soubadar* of the
“*Deccan* continues to solicit the aid of our
“*friendship*.”

Extract of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the
Soubadar of the *Deccan*, dated 7 July, 1789.

Your Highness's letter, containing proposals
provisions of friendship was presented to me by
Messrs. *Abul Cassim* and *Abul Fatah* and has been
immediately forwarded to the Secretary of State
under whose sanction the answer returned to the
Soubadar of the *Deccan* is now in the hands of the
Secretary of State.



verbal communication of Mr. John Cosm...

APPENDIX.

THE following documents have been referred to in the preceding Tracts. They are for the most part drawn from official records, which not being open to the public, it has been thought the more necessary to insert extracts from in this place. The object of introducing them is principally to enable the reader to judge, from such authentic materials, how far the opinions and suggestions that were submitted to consideration in the Tracts of 1779, 1780, and 1788, have been enforced and confirmed by subsequent experience.

Page 15, line 17.—“*The Soubadar of the Deccan continues to solicit the aid of our friendship.*”

Extract of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Soubadar of the Deccan, dated 7 July, 1789.

Your Highness's letter, containing strong expressions of friendship, was presented to me by Meer Abul Cossim, and has afforded me the most inexpressible satisfaction. I have perfectly understood all the matters intrusted to the verbal communication of Meer Abul Cossim.

The sincere and friendly sentiments which I have discovered your Highness to be impressed with towards me, have induced me to show the confidence I place in your Highness's declaration, by candid and explicit conversations with Meer Abul Cossim on subjects of the highest importance; and as they all of them have tendency to strengthen and increase our friendship, I shall communicate, without reserve, to your Highness, what has occurred to me relative to them.

In proof of the sincerity of my intentions that the treaty* should be carried into full effect, I agree that in the 6th article of the treaty the words " whenever the situation of affairs will allow of such a body of troops to march into the Deccan," shall be understood to mean, that the force engaged for by this article, *viz.* two battalions of Sepoys, and six pieces of cannon manned by Europeans, shall be granted whenever your Highness shall apply for it; making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any power in alliance with the Company, *viz.* Pundit Purdhaun, Madajee Scindia, and other Mahratta chiefs; Peishwa, Ragajee Bhoolasla, the Nawab of Arcot, and Nawab Vizier, Rajah of Tanjore and Travancore; that the battalions, at present not defined in number,

* The treaty of Hydrabad made in 1766, and renewed at Madras in 1768.

shall not consist of less than 800 men each; that the six field pieces shall be manned with the number of Europeans which is usual in time of war; that the expence to be charged to your Highness shall be no more than the exact sum which it costs the Company to maintain a body of that force; when employed on service in the field; and that this expence be as per separate account: that this detachment shall march within two months, or sooner if possible, after it is demanded; and your Highness shall be charged with the expence of it from the day it enters your Highness's territories, until it quits them on its return to the Company's, with the addition of one month, at the average calculation of the whole amount, in order to defray the charges the Company must necessarily incur to put such a force in a state fit for service.

Extract of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Secret Committee, dated Fort William, the 1st August, 1789.

I think it my duty, in addition to the communications that you will receive in the dispatches from the Board, and in my letter to the Court of Directors, of the nature of my different conferences with the Nizam's vakeel, Meer Abul Cossim, to inform you that the vakeel, on all occasions, expressed a strong desire, on the

part of his master, to enter into new engagements with this government, and was, in particular, extremely solicitous that the Company should agree, on conditions to be discussed, to furnish a much larger body of troops for the Nizam's assistance, than that which was stipulated by the treaty of 1768.

After having been repeatedly urgent on this head, he asked me, on the day on which he took his leave, whether a proposal to form a connection between his Highness and the Company, similar to that which actually subsists between this government and the Vizier, would be listened to: but upon my informing him, with every expression of my own personal good will to his master, and with the strongest assurances of the friendly disposition towards him on the part of the Company, that I was not authorized, during the present general tranquillity in India, to form new treaties with any native power whatever, he requested that what he had said should only be considered as a private suggestion of his own wishes, and not as an official proposition. It may, however, be almost needless to remark, that he was probably possessed of sufficient powers to negotiate, if his advances had met with any encouragement.

Extract of letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Secret Committee, dated Fort William, 1st November, 1789.

You have been already acquainted, that the public accounts were finally adjusted with Meer Abul Cossim, his Highness's vakeel, in the most amicable manner; and that the vakeel had made several propositions and advances to me, which would have furnished a sufficient opening to commence a negotiation for contracting engagements of a much more extensive nature than those which at present subsist between his master and the Company, if I had then been at liberty to listen to them, and could have brought myself to think that any material alteration in our present system of political connection with that prince, would be consistent with a due consideration of our general interests.

His Highness and his minister have uniformly manifested to Captain Kennaway the same inclination to enter into new engagements with the Company.

But, after the most mature reflection on the subject, I am of opinion, that in the present political state of India, our interest and reputation will be most secure by declining new engagements, and confining ourself to an honourable execution of our part of the treaty with his Highness, which is already known to all the powers in this country. Whilst Tippoo's

animosity to the Company continues to be undisguised and inveterate, the Mahrattas are the people whose friendship is by far of the greatest value to us; and as, in answer to all their advances, I have uniformly declared to them, that neither our instructions, nor the laws of our country, admitted of our forming new treaties in time of peace, I could not negotiate any new agreement with the Nizam, without exposing us to the imputation of want of sincerity from the Mahrattas; and as his Highness's political situation with the Mahrattas has long approached almost to a state of dependance upon the Poona government, we could make no material alteration in the terms of our connection with the Nizam, without its being construed by the Peshwa's ministers as an attempt to detach him from them, and the natural consequence would be to create an incurable jealousy in them, of our ambitious designs, which might possibly prepare their minds for attending to propositions from Tippoo, that might prove embarrassing and dangerous to us.

Extract of letter from the Governor General and Council to the Secret Committee, dated Fort William the 5th November, 1789.

That you may be enabled to judge of the propriety of a closer alliance between his Highness and the Company, and of the extent to

which it should be formed, we submit to you the following reflections.

The territories of the Nizam are situated between two states, far superior to him in power and dominions, both of which he fears and conciliates; but his apprehensions are more immediately excited by the force and ambition of Tippoo Sultaun. It is possible, that if he were attacked by either, the jealousy of the other might be roused, and that power prevailed upon to unite with him. Indeed his policy seems to be directed by this reflection. He negotiates equally with Tippoo and the Mahrattas, and appears to look forward to the probability of having an enemy in one or the other. His connection is apparently strongest with the latter, to whom the strength and ambition of Tippoo are an object of jealousy, and some apprehension; the Mahrattas have the most influence with the Nizam, and an interference in his dominions, from which we understand that they derive some revenue. We have reason to conclude that the mutual deputation of agents, and the intercourse which has taken place between this government and Nizam-Ally, has been viewed with suspicion by the Mahrattas. We have little doubt that his Highness would give occasion for it, by magnifying the importance of his connection with the Company.

Page 60, line 10. "Nicobars"—

Note présentée à Vienne par le Ministre de
Dannemarc.

Il se repandit depuis quelque tems le bruit
qu'un vaisseau parti de Livourne sous pavillon
Imperial Royal pour commercer aux Indes
Orientales, s'étoit emparé des Isles de Frederic,
autrefois nommées Nicobar et Sombreira,
situées vers le Golfe de Bengale, à l'entrée du
Détroit de Malacca, pour y fonder d'établisse-
ment, et construire un fort à sa défense.

Ce bruit n'eut pas d'abord de quoi inquieter
la cour de Copenhague, qui dût estimer peu
vraisemblable, qu'on ait voulu troubler une
possession universellement reconnue Danoise.
Mais après que des nouvelles publiques et non
contredites, persistent d'assurer ce fait, dont le
retard d'arrivée des vaisseaux Danois des In-
des empeche d'en avoir connoissance précise, le
Soussigné a eu ordre de s'en éclaircir amicale-
ment avec le Ministère Imperial Royal.

Comme les Isles sus mentionnées appartiennent
notoirement au Dannemarc, qui de l'aveu
des habitants en prit possession en 1756, et
fournit leur regie au gouvernement de Tran-
quebar, le Roi ne sauroit se persuader, qu'une
demarche aussi incompatible avec ses droits évi-
dents, qu'avec les sentiments d'équité et de jus-

tice, qui caracterisent le glorieux règne de sa Majesté l'Imperatrice, ait pû s'exécuter par ses ordres, à moins qu'ils ne fussent obtenûs sur des faux exposés de la part des auteurs du projet.

C'est donc en consequence, que le Roi s'attend avec une confiance pleniére dans l'amitié de l'Imperatrice Reine, que sa Majesté desavouant l'enterprise, voudra bien en accorder la juste satisfaction, punir ceux, qui ont insulté le pavillon Danois, et donner ses ordres, pour remettre toutes choses dans l'état où elles furent avant la dite tentative, ainsi que procurer un juste dedommagement des fraix et pertes, que les sujéts du Roi ont pû essayer à cette occasion.

Le Soussigné, s'acquittant en espoir d'un prompt et favorable succès de sa commission près du haut Ministère d'état Imperial Royal, a l'honneur d'y joindre les assurances de son très humble devoûement inalterable.

Fait à Vienne, le 6 Decembre, 1779.

Page 119, line 18. "*The original policy of his father.*"

Extract of a letter from Hyder Ally Cawn to Governor Dupré, dated 31 Dec. 1771. Inserted in Appendix, No. 14, to Tanjore Papers.

I informed you that the Mahrattas were all deceit, watching this opportunity of taking ad-

vantage of others. That their aim was to spread their ravages as far as possible: that their coming into this country was attended with various bad consequences, and therefore that the Company's and my troops ought to be joined in the punishing and expelling them therefrom.

I now also, conformably to the sincerity of friendship subsisting between us, and with a view to our mutual good in future, beg leave to mention, that by our junction and union, the enemy, impressed with the utmost awe and dread, will desist from their troubles, and requisitions, and demands, and with shame be expelled from these parts, without the attainment of their object.

But should it so happen that the Mahrattas, this time, acquire even the smallest thing from the Company's territories, it will be a bad precedent; for in that case, having once got a taste of the sweets, they will every year, prompted by their insatiableness, invade the country, requiring impossibilities; whereas, should their hopes of this nature be now entirely cut off, they will never dare to cast so much as a look towards the Company's possessions, and both our countries will ever remain in tranquillity and security. The consideration of which (agreeably to the friendship and union between us) induces me to mention that if, consulting your name and reputation, and the good of affairs in future, you shall

positively determine on the junction of our forces to expel the Mahrattas, and will advise me thereof. I will come myself with my troops and a considerable artillery into the Barramohaul country, when the junction of our forces being effected, by God's blessing, the expulsion of the Mahrattas, will with the greatest ease be accomplished.

From Governor Dupré to Hyder Ally Cawn.

I have had the pleasure within these few days to receive your letter of the 31st Dec. and observe the contents, which I must acknowledge are very just. You will clearly understand, from my letter of the 11th of Dec. what my friendship and regard to the interest of both Carnatics led me to wish. The accomplishment of that wish however depended, as I then informed you, upon the orders I was expecting to receive from Europe. I received them accordingly about three weeks since. It is the part of a sincere friend, when it is not in his power to do that which he is desired, at least to remove fruitless expectation, and not mislead his friend. Upon the receipt therefore of the said letters from Europe, I sent for your vakeels and told them the purport of those letters, desiring that they would inform you of the same, that you might take such measures as you should think best for your affairs. Had these letters

been favourable to your desires, I should not have delayed one moment to write to you myself on the subject. The truth of the matter is this. The Company are desirous of carrying on their trade in these parts, without giving offence to any one; they do not desire to acquire one fort or country more than they possess already. This being the case, they cannot assist any one beyond the Arcot Payen Ghaut with their forces. Since therefore it is not in my power to give you any assistance of troops, in consequence of the orders I have received, you may be assured, at the same time, that out of the Arcot Soubahdarry I will not assist any one else.

Page 134, line 7. "*Some amicable arrangement*"—

Extract of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, dated 10 August, 1790.

Paragraph 16.—I shall refer you to the correspondence, that will be transmitted by the Board, for the discussions that have passed between the government of Fort St. George and the Nabob of Arcot, on the subject of the enormous arrears into which his Highness's stipulated payments to the Company's treasury have progressively fallen, in the course of the last twelve or fourteen months; and for the particulars of the grounds on which, I considered it to be my indispensable duty to acquiesce in

the proposition of the Madras government, that the possessions and revenues of the Nabob of Arcot should, for a certain time, be taken into the immediate management of the servants of the Company.

Par. 17.—It was, I must acknowledge, with great concern that I gave my sanction to a measure, which I knew would occasion pain and mortification to a Prince so far advanced in years, and whose interests have long been so closely connected with those of the British nation; but I was impelled to the determination by the strongest considerations of humanity, justice, and public necessity.

Par. 19.—By executing this resolution, I have every reason to believe, that while we provide for the general safety, we at the same time greatly promote the interests of humanity; for by the concurrent accounts that I have received from many quarters, I am perfectly convinced, that from the Nabob's being unacquainted with the details of business, and either from an indifference to the distresses of his subjects, or from a total incapacity to superintend and control the conduct of his renters and managers, the most insatiable extortions and cruel oppressions are no where in India more openly and generally committed with impunity upon the mass of the miserable inhabitants, than by his Highness's officers in the internal manage-

ment of his country ; and it will therefore not only be felt as a relief by the body of the people, to be put under the authority of the Company's servants, but we shall probably be able, by mild and just treatment, to conciliate the attachment of the southern Polygars, who from being harassed by the unreasonable exactions of the Nabob's renters, have almost always been ripe for disturbance and revolt.

Par. 22.—I must freely own that I could not venture to propose any plan, on the success of which I could have a firm reliance, unless the Nabob could be induced by a large annual revenue, regularly paid and properly secured to him, to surrender the management of his country for a long term of years to the Company.

Par. 24.—The Nabob's age, his long connection with us, his rights to the possession of the country, which, however, without our assistance, would have been but of little value to him, and exaggerated accounts of his former services, may furnish topics for popular declamation, and may possibly engage the nation, upon mistaken ideas of humanity, to support a system of cruelty and oppression ; but whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations, and should conceive that I had not performed the duty of the high and

responsible office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare that the present mixed government cannot prosper, even in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed; and that unless some such plan as that which I have proposed, should be adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic must continue to be wretched, the Nabob must remain an indigent bankrupt, and his country an useless and expensive burden to the Company and to the nation.

Extract of a letter from Mr. John Sullivan to Lord Macartney. 16 Dec. 1781. From Palamcotah near Tinnevelly.

Since my arrival here I have endeavoured to inform myself of the state of this country (Tinnevelly) and of its resources; and I have the satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that it may be considered as the most productive province of the Carnatic, capable of further and great improvements, under a well regulated administration; and even of an immediate increase of revenue, if the force now coming to the southward, should be employed to establish the authority of Government under the guarantee of the Company.

Under the separate management of the Nabob, those advantages cannot be hoped for, neither can I encourage your Lordship to ex-

pect them from the agency of native collectors, who, at the distance of 500 miles from Madras, and in a country where more dignified representatives have been little respected, will have both opportunities and pretexts for misconduct.

This consideration would in itself induce me to submit to your Lordship, whether it would not be adviseable to except this province from the general regulation, which you have established for the collection of assigned revenue.

But I am influenced by a stronger motive, in the belief that your Lordship will improve the great work you have begun, and that you will obtain from the Nabob, a permanent assignment of country, not only equal to his proportion of the military expences of the Carnatic, but to the quota which he should furnish towards a military fund.

There is no part of his dominions, from which so much revenue can be drawn, and where so many political and commercial advantages will be found to unite, as in the province of Tinnevelly, the income from which may now be estimated at a clear receipt of three lacks of pagodas, and might be increased in a few years of peace and good order to five lacks.*

* A revenue to the full extent here estimated was afterwards collected by Mr. Irwin, during the years 1783, 1784, and 1785, and during the last war by Mr. Torin.

Since I have had any knowledge of India, the Nabob has made Tinnevelly the nursery of his own separate army. The number and power of the Polygars furnished him with the excuse, while the distance from Madras made it difficult to ascertain the strength or the expence of the troops he maintained.

The consequences of his having such an establishment were early foreseen; but it was reserved for your Lordship to know the extent of the evil, and to apply the only radical remedy, namely, that of taking his troops into the service of the Company.

But even this would fail of its effect, if this country were again to fall under the immediate government of the Nabob; and I fear that all the influence of your Lordship would not prove sufficient to avert such an evil, if the mode now pursued, of employing the servants of the Company in the collection and general superintendence, were to be discontinued.

On the other hand, I will venture to say, that the great difficulty being now removed by the Nabob's acquiescence in the general assignment of his revenues, he would soon be reconciled to the measure I have here suggested; and that an increased revenue, with a new and an extensive commerce would be the reward of your Lordship's labour.

I may add, that the vicinity of Tinnevelly to Travancore, a country dependant upon an ally so attached as the Rajah of Travancore is known to be to the English interest; and the certain aid that may be drawn from his troops, who are clothed and armed like our own, would render the revenue of Tinnevelly perfectly secure to us; whereas there is a possibility that differences may be revived between the Rajah and the Nabob.

To prevent this, and to guard against similar intestine feuds as much as possible, and at the same time to provide the means of completing the Nabob's subsidy, I would submit for your Lordship's consideration, whether it would not be adviseable to obtain from the Nabob an assignment of the Peishcush from the southern Polygars, together with an assignment of the districts of Palnaud and Ongole in the north, in like manner as that which has already been proposed with respect to Tinnevelly.

I am much mistaken if those funds, under your Lordship's management, would not fully acquit the Nabob to the Company; and in that event, I am convinced your Lordship would wish to leave the remainder of the Carnatic to the Nabob, the income from which, unless the revenue were to be grossly mismanaged, would in a few years liquidate his debts, and leave a rich succession to his family.

The date of the preceding letter will shew that it was written, three years antecedent to the order passed by Parliament, whereby the Company were directed to receive annually from the Nabob, a specific sum to be applied towards the discharge of his public debts and of his private debts to British subjects.

It became necessary, therefore, to extend the proposition for an assignment, and the following suggestion was accordingly submitted by me, to Mr. Dundas in the summer of 1790, at which time I had the honour of sending to him a copy of the preceding letter.

Extent of the assignment which it would now be proper to obtain from the Nabob.

Denominations.

	Value,
Tinnevelly country and the	pagodas.
Peishcush from the Polygars -	500,000
Madura - - -	100,000
Nattam and the two Marawars	250,000
Tritchynopoly and Tondeman	300,000
Tanjore Peishcush -	200,000
Terriore, Arialore, and Warriar-	
pollam Peishcush -	120,000
Ongole and Palnaud -	130,000
pagodas	1,600,000

Page 135, line 10. "*The Polygars.*"

Extract of a letter from Colonel William Fullarton, commanding to the southward of the Coleroon, to Lord Macartney and the Select Committee of Madras, dated camp, 26th April, 1784.

The countries of Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinnevely, and Marawar, contain above one hundred thousand Collieries and Polygars in arms, naturally brave, and habitually impatient of all regular government.

The English possessions and resources to the southward have been so recently endangered and impaired by the rebellious spirit of these savages, that I shall never presume to be responsible for the efficacy of any arrangement of defence, until the most refractory of them are disarmed, their woods and strong holds laid open, and their forts occupied on the very first appearance of disobedience to the circar.

I send this letter to Mr. Sullivan, that he may forward it, with his remarks and emendations.

Extract of a letter from Mr. John Sullivan, to
 Lord Macartney, dated Karical, 2d May,
 1784.

Your Lordship will find by the inclosed copy
 of what I wrote to Colonel Fullarton on the
 29th ult., that our opinions coincide on the
 subjects of general arrangement, and the distri-
 bution of the troops, as they have done on every
 other essential point of service.

If we differ as to the mode of establishing
 order amongst the Polygars, we see alike the
 necessity that some effectual measures should
 be taken and pursued for that purpose, and I
 am persuaded no man will be more disposed
 than Colonel Fullarton, to recommend mea-
 sures of lenity and encouragement, when he
 shall know that the disturbances and disorders
 amongst the Polygars, and their frequent dis-
 obedience to Government, have proceeded as
 much from the oppressions and exactions they
 have suffered, as from the radical vices of their
 dependent state.

The mode of administration that has been
 pursued with our northern Zemindars, and
 which is now introducing amongst the Polygars
 of the south, promises to remove the one and
 correct the other. The example of good faith
 on the part of Government towards them, is
 alone wanting, to render them, not only the

best subjects, but a real aid to Government; instead of being, what they have hitherto proved to be, a burden in time of peace, and a dangerous enemy in the event of war.

Extract of a letter from John Sullivan to Lord Macartney and the Select Committee of Madras, dated Tanjore, 29th June, 1783.

I have now the honour to transmit a general account of the revenue collected in the districts of Warriarpollam and Terriore, during the five years which preceded the present war.

Your Lordship, &c. will perceive that the medium of the receipts in Warriarpollam, after deducting the charges of collection, amounts to 70666 Porto Novo pagodas. From this sum it is proposed, that one-third part, or 23555, should be reserved for the Polygar, who is to protect the country. The remainder, or 47111, will be the nett annual receipt to Government, to be augmented at every subsequent settlement, in the proportion of one-quarter part and no more, of the increased collection in the country.

To ascertain the amount of such collection, the accounts of the district are to be at all times open to the inspection of Government, and a general statement is to be delivered, at the close of every year, by the head accountant of the district.

The Reddy of Terriore, whose country adjoins to Arialore, as the latter does to Warriarpollam, is the principal landholder, as well as the Polygar of the district, and in those different characters, he has different and distinct interests.

As landholder and cultivator of his own lands, he claims an unparticipated right to the income arising from them. It does not appear that they have ever been subject to any established tax or deduction, but he has often experienced demands from Government, under the name of Nazur, or free gift.

As Polygar, his rated revenue is considerable, as your Lordship, &c. will perceive by the account of the collections that were made, during the five years which preceded the war. The medium of that account gives an annual receipt of rupees 277,000, from which if one-third or 92,333 be deducted for the proportion of the Polygar, there will remain a revenue to Government of 184667 rupees.

If the Committee will be pleased to cause the accounts of Warriarpollam and of Terriore, to be examined during any part, or during the whole period of the Nabob's administration, I have reason to believe it will be found, that whatever may have been the nominal revenue, the expences of collection and of troops to pre-

serve order in the country, absorbed so much, that the nett receipt to Government, fell considerably short of the sum which it is now proposed to draw from those districts.

This, though an argument of some weight in favour of the present arrangement, will appear but a secondary consideration, when it is recollected, how much our interests suffered, when the Polygars found themselves compelled, by the oppressive exactions of the Nabob (supported by a British force) to attach themselves to the enemy; how much their defection from Hyder Ally, at this critical period, has embarrassed him, while it has facilitated our operations; and how much the local situation of those countries must enable the Polygars, in all times of war, to become useful friends, or very dangerous enemies.

With such motives of policy, and of immediate interest to support the proposed arrangement, I need not appeal to the justice or to the humanity of the Committee, though both humanity and justice plead for the re-establishment of the ancient family of Warriarpollam.

I may venture to say, that if a similar mode of settlement were to be extended to all the Polygars of the Carnatic, they would, in a short time, be converted into faithful subjects, instead of being the disturbers of the country, and that

they might be made the most secure barrier against the inroads of an enemy.

Page 160, line 23. "For by an express law of the Hindoos."

Gentoo Code. Chap. 13, page 190. Of shares, in the cultivation of land.

If a person makes over to another, for the purpose of cultivation, land, that has been waste for one or two years, and that person having by careful management, improved the ground, should raise a crop from thence, in that case, of the whole crop so raised, one-sixth shall go to the owner of the ground, and the remaining five-sixths shall belong to the cultivator; if this person abovementioned, having agreed to take land of the other, for the purpose of cultivation, should afterwards neglect either to cultivate it himself, or to cause it to be cultivated by others, in that case, whatever crops other lands in the same place, similar to the lands specified, shall produce upon a medium, the cultivator shall give to the owner of the ground, the proportion of one-sixth of such medium crop, and the magistrate also shall take from the cultivator, a fine of the same value.

If a man makes over to another, for the purpose of cultivation, land that has been waste for

three or for four years, and that person by improvement of the soil, raises a crop there, in that case, of the whole crop so raised, one-eighth shall go to the owner of the ground, and the remaining seven-eighths shall belong to the cultivator; if this person above mentioned, having agreed to take land of the other, for the purpose of cultivation, should afterwards neglect either to cultivate it himself, or to cause it to be cultivated by others, in that case, whatever crops other lands, in the same place, similar to the lands specified, shall produce upon a medium, the cultivator shall give to the owner of the ground, the proportion of one-eighth of such medium crop, and the magistrate also shall take from the cultivator, a fine of the same value.

If a man makes over to another, for the purpose of cultivation, land that has been waste for five years, or for any longer period whatever, and that person, by cultivation, raises a crop there, in that case, of the whole of the crop so raised, one-tenth shall go to the owner of the ground, and the remaining nine-tenths shall belong to the cultivator; if this person above mentioned, having agreed to take land of the other, for the purpose of cultivation, should afterwards neglect either to cultivate it himself, or to cause it to be cultivated by others, in that

case, he shall pay the proportionate value and fine, in the manner above specified.

Gentoo Code, chapter 13, page 193. If a man gives to any person, for cultivating, land waste or not waste, he may not take it back from that person, without some fault found (that is proved) against him.

Page 162, line 14. "*A public officer was established in every village.*"—Page 163, line 5, "*Other officers charged with similar duties in the subdivisions of the provinces.*"

British India Analyzed, vol. I. Mohammedan Provincial Establishment in the Northern Circars.

Vol. I. page 148. The Desmook, Zemindar, Chowdry, or chief of a district containing one or more Pergunnahs by Sunnud, held the first rank. He was the intermediate agent of government, to superintend a portion of the country, to redress petty grievances, furnish the husbandman with necessary advances, and to collect, or become responsible for the rent to the state.

Vol. I. page 149, 150, 151. The Despandeah (in the Deccan) in Bengal, the Canongoe, or provincial register, for the most part exercised by Brahmins: the Canongoe registered grants of every kind. This register contained the original rent-roll of the lands in detail, serving as

a standard, or gross valuation, in political calculations, of the revenue; the actual sources of the collections made from the Reyuts; the annual account of the assessments, receipts, and balances of the country, as settled with its intermediate agents; the divisions, measurement, quality and produce of the lands, enumeration of the villages, farms, husbandmen, manufacturers or artificers liable to taxation, and in general all donations, arrangements, and circumstances affecting real or personal property, and particularly defining the proprietary interest of the state, were naturally made matters of record in the office of Despandeah or Canongoe, as they could only be properly authenticated and acquire validity after passing through such form of registration. To render this intended check more efficacious, not only on the Zemindars and lesser native superintendants, but also on the Amuldar himself, and all his immediate agents in affairs of civil administration or finance; private interest and hereditary independence were the powerful incentives, added to personal honours, consideration, and influence, to insure the honest full discharge of this important trust; two and a half per cent. on the revenue, ascertained by his own vouchers to have been collected throughout the country was assigned to the public register, his heirs and deputies in perpetuity.

Vol. I. page 152. The Puteel, Maccundum, or chief Reyut of a Deh Gam or village, was precisely, within his narrow precinct, what the Desmook was in the Pergunnah or Zemindarry.

The Koolcurny, Carnum, Putwarry or accomptant, held the next inferior gradation to the Despandeah.

These were the principal and more permanent officers for the revenue, in a regular chain of subordination to each other, when acting under their native head.

Extract from Sir John Shore's Minute. June 1789.

Paragraph 248. It appears to have been an established measure in this country, that the accounts of the rents of every portion of land and other sources of revenue should be open to the inspection of the officers of Government. It was chiefly by the intimate knowledge and the summary means of information, which the Government thereby possessed, that the revenue was collected, and the Zemindars were restrained from oppression and exaction. To the neglect of these ancient institutions, to the want of information in the Government of the state and resources of the country, may perhaps be justly ascribed much of the evils and abuses which have crept into the revenue.

249. In order to preserve the valuation and

register of Toorilmul, the office of Canongoe was appointed, and in this office all the records of public accounts were kept. Naibs, or deputies were stationed in different parts of the country, to mark the establishment of new villages, transfers of land, and other circumstances, which occasioned a change in the state of the country: and every sale or deed of transfer, the measurement, the boundaries and divisions of land, were registered by them with a minute exactness.

These records were referred to on every point that respected the finances or civil government, and in all disputes concerning lands. They contained an account of all customs and variations in them, and served frequently as a guide in imposing or collecting the revenue, and as a check on the embezzlements and exactions of the Zemindars and public officers.

250. In the villages there were also officers for keeping the accounts of them, properly known by the name of Putwarries, who were generally considered as hereditary. Their accounts formed the basis of the Canongoe's records, and in some places, they are said to have been appointed by the Canongoes. At all events, whether they received their nomination from them or from the Zemindars, or from any public officer, I conceive them to be servants of the state, and responsible to it for their trusts.

251. In the institutes of Akbar, the several inferior officers for registering the accounts of the land and rents, are recited under various denominations, some of which are no longer preserved. But the principle is there clearly established, and the correspondence of terms is immaterial.

Of late years, and more particularly since the establishment of the English authority, the names and functions of the inferior officers have been confounded, and the whole system has fallen into insignificance or abuse. The Canongoes have been as ready to take advantage of this as others, and hence the office has been by some condemned as of no use, because little was derived from it. The conclusion is not warranted by the laws of reasoning.

252. The apparent necessity of the revisal of these institutions, and an observation on the abuses which have crept into them, seem to have suggested to some of the collectors, the idea of their abolition, and the substitution of other officers in their stead.

259, 260, 261. Measures in the detail must always be subject to variation from local circumstances and contingencies, which no foresight can provide against. But principles should be fixed, if possible. The fluctuation in the members of Government, as well as in the officers employed in the subordinate departments, renders the

establishment of principles indispensably necessary. In the stability of system alone, we must look for a remedy against evils, which can never be thoroughly eradicated or corrected.

262. We are not, however, to expect that our subjects will at once give us credit for this principle : time will be required for imprinting it solidly in their minds, and to eradicate the habits acquired under a despotic government, and strengthened by the fluctuating measures of our administration. But the advantages which they will derive from it, will by degrees force conviction upon them, and stimulate them to exertions, which they never could be expected to make, when the benefits of them were rendered precarious by the frequency of alteration.

Page 164, line 21. "*Headmen of the village.*"
Extract from Sir J. Shore's minute, June, 1789.

Paragraph 242. In almost every village, according to its extent, there is one or more head Ryott, known by a variety of names in different parts of the country, who has in some measure the direction and superintendence of the rest. He assists in fixing the rents, in directing the cultivation, and in making the collections.

The following Extract from Mr. Barnard's Report of the Company's Jaghire, in the vicinity of Madras, will shew the nature and extent of the information contained in the village registers referred to in the preceding pages.

An Account of the Village of Ahtoor, and the Hamlet depending upon it. Quantity of Ground in this Village, and the manner in which it is appropriated.

Twenty-four Malabar feet square make one coory; one hundred coorys one cawny. N. B. A Malabar foot answers to $\frac{1}{3}$ of one foot English.

Cawn ^s	Coor ^s	
182		In pagodas, in choultrys, in tanks, topes, flower gardens, wells, highway, cow-place, burying-ground.
200		One hill, bad ground, bushes, ground kept to tread and measure the paddy on.
63		Two yaries, or large tanks.
35		Two tongels, or small yaries.
1280		A large water course, which rising near Tineary, empties itself into the river at this place.
60		Sautanonjerry channel, to water the paddy grounds.
40		Mailacherry channel, ditto.
1		A spring proposed to be enlarged, and to have a channel conducted from it to the paddy grounds.
1672		Ground lying in the river.
76		Town and Hamlets.
9		Parcherys.
102	75	Paddy, } old
14		Combo, or dry grain, } free gifts
6		Paddy, } new
2		Combo, } free gifts
52	50	Paddy, } old
62	75	Combo, } free gifts
59	50	Paddy, } new free gift
640		Paddy, }
304	50	Combo, or dry grain, }
210	25	Paddy, }
440	25	Combo, }

Belonging to the landholders and their servants.

Belonging to strangers and others, who, without any property in the soil, cultivate grounds in the village.

Cultivated circar ground. From this article the land revenue entirely rises.

Uncultivated circar ground: By the repairs proposed in a future article, this ground will be in a condition to be cultivated.

5514 50 Total ground in the village.

Amount of the Revenue both in Grain and Money. 1762.

	Cullum	Mo.	Na.		Pag.	Fan.	Ca.		Pag.	Fan.	Ca.
Paddy	-	-	5929	11 1	sold for	1715	22 20	Paid by the weavers	-	-	1 4 40
Verago	-	-	499	6 2	do.	137	10 75	Ditto by the Bazar men	-	-	1 0 0
Natchany	-	-	336	4 4	do.	155	8 20	Refiner of cotton	-	-	18 0
Combo	-	-	162	5 0	do.	68	28 10	Oil-man for his house 9 fan.; for his trade	-	-	28 40
Tenay	-	-		1 6	do.	2	0 0	19 f. 10 c.	-	-	2 13 40
Saamy	-	-		6 6	do.	6	60	Beetle gardeners	-	-	13 40
Cholum	-	-		1 6	do.	2	40	Compositions for damages by stray cattle	-	-	110 0 0
Horse gram	-	-	22	4 4	do.	11	11 20	Inhabitants for their houses and gardens assessed at so much per cent. of the rent of the village per annum	-	-	22 2 20
Red gram	-	-	96	11 5	do.	48	17 35	Conecoplies and shroffs of the village	-	-	136 8 20
Black gram	-	-	1	7 0	do.	1	21 30				
Sweet gram	-	-	40	1 5	do.	16	10 55				
Cauramany	-	-	18	6 5	do.	7	21 75				
Sweet oil seed	-	-	34	0 7	do.	44	25 25				
			7143	4 3		2207	8 65				
Amount of what the produce sold for	-	-			-	2207	5 65	Amount of rent at which the inhabitants farmed the village and its dependencies this year,			
Amount of quit-rent and compositions	-	-			-	136	8 20	pagodas	3500		
					Current pagodas	2343	17 5				
Amount of loss sustained by the inhabitants in their farm this year	-	-			-	1156	18 75				
					Pagodas	3500					

N. B. One pagoda of the currency of Madras, is 36 fanams, or 8 shillings; one fanam ditto is 80 cash. One cullum contains 12 mercalls; one mercall 8 naulies.

It is remarkable of the landholders, that those amongst them whose title to their lands is supposed to be best established, and the property esteemed so secure as to be frequently sold for its full value, calculating by the produce; that even these people have nothing but prescription and possession to plead for the support of their rights; and no written titles, but deeds of conveyance, where the grounds have passed from the original owner, are to be found amongst them.

Page 193, line 11. "A Zemindar besides
"the superintendence of the revenue."

Sir John Shore's Minute. June, 1789.

Paragraph 166. The situation of a Zemindar combines two relations; one, which originates in the property of the land a portion of the terms of which he pays to the state; and the other, in the capacity of an officer of government for protecting the peace of the country, and for securing the subjects of the state from

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Page 193, line 11. "*A Zemindar besides the superintendence of the revenue.*"

Sir John Shore's Minute. June, 1789.

Paragraph 166. The situation of a Zemindar combines two relations; one, which originates in the property of the land, a portion of the rents of which he pays to the state; and the other, in the capacity of an officer of government, for protecting the peace of the country, and for securing the subjects of the state from oppression.

Page 200, line 12. "*The greatest care will be requisite.*"

Sir John Shore's Minute of June, 1789.

Paragraph 193. It is of the last importance, if possible, to distinguish between the imperfections that are natural to the Zemindars, and others which the practice of their rulers have given rise to, in order to discover the principle of future regulation.

Page 207, line 13. "*An arbitrary increase.*"

Sir John Shore's Minute. June, 1789.

Paragraph 193. Neither an arbitrary nor a variable system of government is calculated to inspire its subjects with confidence. If exposed to fluctuating demands, they will give

little attention to make improvements; or if they should attempt them, they will be equally careful to conceal them. If liable to be dispossessed of the management of their estates, they will have no anxiety to acquire the habits of superintending them, and will look to present advantages, unconcerned at future consequences.

Paragraph 194. I by no means attribute the habits and situations of the Zemindars to our administration. The evil had long before taken root. The universal dispossession of the Zemindars by Jeffier Khan, the impositions upon them by his successors, and the notorious corruption of the native government, existing, I believe, wherever Mahomedan despotism prevails, are causes sufficient to account for the consequences.

Page 208, line 7. "*But it is not the right, it is the policy of the measure.*"

Sir John Shore's Minute of June, 1789.

Paragraph 383. A property in the soil must not be understood to convey the same rights in India, as in England. The difference is as great as between a free constitution and an arbitrary power. Nor can we expect, under a despotic government, fixed principles or clear

definitions of the rights of the subject. But the general practice of such a government, when in favour of its subjects, should be admitted as an acknowledgment of their rights.

Paragraph 384. I have endeavoured to point out, what it actually left to its subjects, under the assertion of claims apparently calculated to leave them nothing. This part of the precedent is not worthy our imitation.

Page 211, line 8. "*The Zemindars no longer dependant.*"

Sir John Shore's Minute of June, 1789.

Paragraph 197. In making a settlement for a term of years with the Zemindars, we rely upon the strongest of all principles, by uniting the interest of the subject with that of the government. Although this principle has been checked by fluctuating measures, there is no reason to suppose, it will not gradually operate under another system, when it is allowed scope, and particularly if regulations are adopted to strengthen it. This mode affords Government the only substantial security for the revenues, by making the property of the lands responsible for it. To permit the Zemindars to retain their property, without allowing them to exercise

the functions annexed to their denomination,* seems absurd and impolitic; since nothing but an absolute exclusion of them, and a declared annihilation of their rights, can destroy their influence.† This system has the simplicity derived from the employment of farmers, with a security which every other plan wants; and finally, it is the only plan which can be adopted without some degree of injustice to the acknowledged rights of the Zemindars.

Page 220, line 3. "*A variety of regulations.*"

Sir John Shore's Minute, June 1789.

Paragraph 195. The habits of the people, formed by despotism, and exhibiting a mixture of simplicity, fraud, servility, and tyranny, seem too inveterate to be corrected by another set of rules.

* Vide paragraph 166 of the Minute already inserted.

† By the settlement of 1792, the Zemindars were deprived of the authority under which they exercised the police; and police officers were appointed by Government.

Page 241, line 3. "*Public Granaries.*"

Extract of Bengal Public Consultations.

20th November, 1783.

Governor-General.*

The Governor-General avails himself of the occasion of the present apprehensions of a public scarcity, arising from the deficiencies of the late harvest, and the appearances of a similar failure in the present crops, to recommend to the Board a plan, which he has more than once suggested, both on the records of the present and former system of administration.

Expedients precipitately formed on the pressure of sudden calamity, will generally meet with popular applause, if they have for their object either the immediate removal or future prevention of it; but are yet liable to the effects attendant on all measures, which the passions have a share in dictating. That which is herein proposed will have the united support of pressing exigency and long deliberation.

In the year 1773, a similar appearance threatened these provinces, but in a less degree, with an approaching scarcity. Vigorous and early measures were taken for its removal, and succeeded. It appeared from the inquiries

• Mr. Hastings.

then made, and from others, which were connected with the famine of 1769, that the first want was invariably artificial, proceeding from the expectation of a real want, and from the natural inducement which it afforded to the dealers in grain, to withhold it from the market, in the hopes of deriving a larger profit from a more distant sale; and this with the compulsive means, which were used to force the grain into consumption, and which drove the proprietors into destructive expedients for hoarding and secreting it, appeared to prevail as the principal cause of the famine which ensued, even to the final close of it.

To prevent a future return of the same dreadful evil, no precaution seems so obvious as that of erecting public granaries, which should contain a sufficiency of grain to be thrown into the markets on any occasion really demanding it, and operate as a perpetual check on the providers of grain, to prevent their either raising the price beyond the abilities of the poor to purchase it, or withholding it entirely from general consumption. But to the common structure of these repositories, there are many objections; and these extend to any plan, which depends on the use of them, such as their daily expence, wastage, decay, the accidents to which they are liable from thieves, vermin, and

fire, and the augmented losses of annual sales and renewed purchases.

These consequences might be all removed by the use of edifices constructed of strong and entire masonry, provided it could be well ascertained, that the grain deposited in them would endure for a length of time without perishing.

The Governor-General made the trial in a very small piece of brick-work, which the members of the Board may yet view from the windows of the general council-house. On the 22d April, 1773, he deposited therein about nineteen maunds* of paddy, the building being then new, and not sufficiently dry. On the 7th Sept. 1775, after a period of almost two years and a half, he caused the grain to be taken out, and found it perfectly good, except about twenty seer, which lay at the bottom, and appeared to have drawn and imbibed the moisture of the brick-work.

Not satisfied with this experiment, he again filled the cavity with the like quantity of grain, &c. the 17th April, 1777; and suffered it to remain till the 18th June, 1782—a term of five years and two months. He recollects it to have been all in good condition; he caused it to be beat into rice, and produced at his own

* One Bazar maund is equal to 82 lb. 2½ oz. avoirdupois.

table, where it was judged by many gentlemen, who were his guests, to be equal to the best table rice in taste; but a little, and very little discoloured.

On the success of these united trials, the Governor-General proposed, that large granaries, built upon the same principle, should be erected in the new fort, of dimensions equal to the garrison store, to be filled with grain, after having stood a sufficient time for the moisture of the walls to evaporate, and to be closed with masonry, so that no air could penetrate it.

They were finished in September, 1780, and filled with grain in the months of March, April, and May, 1782; that is to say, with 20,023 mds. 20 seers of paddy, and 51,258 mds. of rice.*

It is to be remarked, that the first trials were made under many disadvantages, the walls being but a foot in thickness, of coarse and loose construction, and the cavity so small, that the grain contained in it may be said to have almost touched the surface, where of course it would be most exposed to decay in every part of it. The spacious dimensions of the buildings, which were constructed for the application of these trials,

* One of those magazines was opened in 1785, during the administration of Sir John Macpherson; and the grain which had been deposited in it there, was sold for more than it had originally cost.

kept the whole mass in equal preservation, and the thickness and solidity of the walls excluded all possible entrance of the external air, and guarded their contents from the variations of heat, cold, and moisture, which might penetrate a coat of thinner or looser texture, and accelerate their decay.

The Governor-General wished to have referred to the consultations, in which he has before recorded his sentiments on this subject, but has not been able to trace their places in the numerous volumes in which they are hidden. He can only say, that he believes the first intimation of it to have been made either in 1773, or 1774.

The plan which he would now recommend, and which is the same which he has always had in contemplation, is as follows.

1st. That buildings of solid masonry, to serve the purposes of perpetual granaries to the two provinces, according to the construction of the plan accompanying this Minute, be erected at or near the following stations, and made of sufficient capacity to contain the quantities of rice which stand opposite to the respective names, viz.

Patna	for maunds	300,000
Baugulpoor		100,000
Baugwangola		200,000
Calcutta		200,000
Dinagepoor		100,000
Dacca		100,000

In all 1,000,000

2d. That these buildings be constructed at different times, as it will take a length of years to fill them, and as the expence, so divided, will be less burthensome to the government.

3d. That those of Patna be immediately ordered, and the others as the Board shall hereafter, with the aid of more complete and recent materials of knowledge, determine.

4th. That whenever the price of rice shall fall to eight annas sicca for such as is brought for common sale into the markets of Patna, or can be transported at a rate, not exceeding the above, from other places, where it may be produced of a better quality for preservation; the granaries be filled and closed, with due attention to the following article.

5th. That the granaries be allowed to stand at least one complete year, to dry; that they be accurately examined at the time when it is proposed to fill them, and if they are not

found sufficiently dry, that they do continue open another season; that the grain also be ascertained to be perfectly dry, sound, free from vermin, and of the last Khereef, or November harvest; and deposited within the months of February and May, but not before or after that period.

6th. That a stone be affixed to each granary, on which shall be inscribed the quantity of rice inclosed, the date on which it was deposited, and the name of the person by whom it was provided and deposited;—and that it shall not be opened without the special order of the Governor-General and Council.

These are the material parts of the plan, which the Governor-General now recommends; others of minuter detail he purposely omits, as they will better become the consideration of the Board, when they occur in the final execution of it.

The chief engineer has furnished him with the plan of a granary, calculated for the quantity of one lack of maunds, and estimates of the expence which it will require to build one for one lack;* and one for two lacks of maunds;† which he thinks may with frugality be reduced to a much lower amount.

The Governor-General begs leave to add the

* Rupees 57,823 13 5.

† Rupees 104,495 6 4.

following brief, but necessary observations, and will trouble the Board no longer on the subject.

The first cost of the proposed granaries ought to constitute the whole of their expence, since that of the grain will be repaid by the collections of the public revenue, which invariably suffer from plentiful harvests; because the husbandmen, in such an event, want purchasers for their grain; and of course the excess taken by Government will keep up the price of the remainder, and enable them to realize the same proportion of their rents.

One lack of maunds may be estimated to be equal to the consumption of 26,000 men for one month, and ten lacks to that of more than two millions and a half for the same time. These numbers will appear to bear but a small proportion to the number of inhabitants of the two provinces, especially if this be taken according to the exaggerated rate at which they are generally computed, and to the probable duration of any eventual scarcity. But it has been premised that the plan is not grounded on the idea of a necessity likely, at any time, to arise from real want, but designed to counteract the artifices which may be used to create an artificial one. It is not probable that any man will run the hazard of the confiscation of his property,

which ought in such cases to be made the penalty, by attempts to secrete it, when he sees a store ready to be thrown on the market, and to reduce the price. In effect, this is a point which may be considered as wholly influenced and regulated by public opinion, which would equally produce the same salutary purpose, even with magazines of sand instead of grain, if it were possible to maintain the deception: for it is not to be credited, that the harvest of one season shall universally and wholly fail, in both provinces, nor that the store furnished by the preceding harvests shall have been exhausted at the same point of time.

It is proposed to lay in a larger store at Patna than at the other stations. It may probably be judged adviseable to augment it, and for a more substantial use than any to which the others are likely to be applied; for, whenever there shall be a prospect of a scarcity in Bengal or Bahar, the same symptoms will be more alarming in the western parts of Hindostan; and multitudes will flock to these provinces, if they have hopes of relief from their knowledge of such a provision. Possibly the same inducements may operate, even in anticipation of actual distress; but there is no doubt that such will be the effect, whenever the neighbouring or remoter lands are under the pressure of pre-

sent want; and in such an event, by a useful establishment of little cost, and the improvement which may be made upon it, the population of our own provinces may be increased, the waste lands brought into cultivation, and the revenue, by obvious consequence, improved.

For this reason Patna is proposed for the commencement of the design, and it is recommended for immediate execution there; because a measure which promises so much utility, which is intended to guard the lives of millions from a sudden but unforeseen calamity, and which will require a length of time to accomplish it, ought not to be delayed; and because it will afford subsistence to the poor at a time in which they may stand in the greatest need of it; and for that reason alone ought to be done now, if it is to be done at all.

Page 252, line 19. "*The study of our respective languages.*"

Extract of the Company's public letter to Fort Saint George, dated 16th February, 1787.

Paragraph 13. The utility and importance of establishing a free and direct communication with the natives, having been sensibly experienced during the late war in India, and their acquiring a knowledge of the English language

being the most effectual means of accomplishing this desirable object, it is with great pleasure we learn from Mr. John Sullivan, our late resident at Tanjore, that he had, seconded in his laudable undertaking by the zealous exertions of the Rev. Mr. Swartz, prevailed on the Rajah of Tanjore and the Rajahs of the great and little Marawar, to establish schools for teaching English at Tanjore, Ramanadaporam and Shevavunga, the capitals of their respective countries; the two latter assigning pagodas three hundred each, for the support of their two seminaries. These works of peace, Mr. Sullivan informs us, have been interrupted by the calamities of war, and the funds assigned for their support necessarily diverted to other purposes; but we hope they will revive with the restoration of tranquillity.

14. Highly approving of institutions calculated to establish mutual good faith, to enlighten the minds of the natives and to impress them with sentiments of esteem and respect for the British nation, by making them acquainted with the leading features of our Government, so favourable to the rights and happiness of mankind: we have determined to evince our desire of promoting their success by contributing 250 pagodas per annum towards the support of each of the schools abovementioned, and of any

other school which may be opened for the same purpose, and we accordingly direct you to pay such schools respectively, the annual stipend of 250 pagodas, flattering ourselves that our example will excite the native princes in alliance with us to similar and more extensive benefactions.

Extract of a letter from the Rev. Mr. Swartz to John Sullivan, dated Tanjore, September 13th, 1787.

You have taken great and successful pains to get the provincial schools established. Government has sent me the extracts of the general letter.

Your caution not to take into the English provincial schools, children of a low cast, shall be observed:—nay, one could not venture it, as the prejudices are so strong; but the lower sort of people will not so much as wish to learn the English language. Moreover you may be sure, that though our intention is to lessen their prejudices, and so to prepare them for the reception of the truth, nevertheless, in those schools, the English language is taught, and not the Christian doctrine. Every thing in its proper time and place.

From the same to the same.

Concerning the provincial English schools, we have one at Ramanadaporam, and one at Tanjore. The last we have re-established two months ago. You would absolutely think it impossible, that the scholars should have made so great a proficiency as they have done, in so short a time. At present all the scholars are Brahmins, but others desire to come. None but the higher casts are received into this school. As to force them into the acknowledgment of the Christian doctrines, that will, I hope, never enter a missionary's mind. If, hereafter, they should read English books of various kinds, they may perhaps quit some of their prejudices. Truth shall work its own way.—

1845

From the same to the same.
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